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1.1 Problem Statement 
In post-and-rail guardrail systems, rail height played a crucial role in the way an errant 
vehicle interacts with the barrier. Low rail heights increased the propensity for vehicle rollover 
or override, while an excessively tall rail promoted vehicle snagging and underride in small cars. 
The rail mounting height and the post embedment depth may be altered by various installation or 
environmental deviations, such as soil erosion, frost heave, human error, and future roadway 
overlays. Therefore, the range of rail mounting heights that facilitated safe vehicular redirection 
needs to be known to mitigate the concerns of mounting height variability.  
The Midwest Guardrail System (MGS) was originally developed according to the 
standards set forth by the National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP) Report 
No. 350 [1]. As a W-beam post-and-rail guardrail system, it was designed to capture and redirect 
larger vehicles, specifically the ¾-ton pickup truck, while minimizing the potential for barrier 
underride by the small car [2].  
Then, crash testing standards were updated in the Manual for Assessing Safety Hardware 
(MASH) [3]. The MGS was successfully tested according to the Test Level 3 (TL-3) crash 
testing procedures provided in MASH for both the 1100C passenger car and the 2270P pickup 
truck [4,5]. During both NCHRP Report No. 350 and MASH testing, the W-beam’s top rail 
mounting height was 32 in. (813 mm) for the passenger car tests and 31 in. (787 mm) for the 
pickup truck tests. Prior research using a 2270P pickup truck has determined the minimum 
recommended top rail mounting height to be 27¾ in. (706 mm) [6]. 
In 2005, the Midwest Roadside Safety Facility (MwRSF) completed a flare-rate study for 
the MGS. During that project, the MGS was successfully simulated and crash tested with the 
820C small car and flare rates as high as 5:1 [7,8]. The increased impact severity of this 
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particular configuration did not result in barrier underride and indicated that the upper-height 
tolerance for the MGS may be significantly higher than 32 in. (813 mm). 
Raising the height of the rail led to the following four issues regarding system 
performance of the MGS: (1) vehicle underride for small cars; (2) post snagging for small cars; 
(3) excessive deflection due to reduced lateral resistance for pickup trucks; and (4) overloaded 
anchors that were designed with shorter rail heights for pickup trucks. Before the larger 
deflections were quantified or the anchorages were evaluated with new rail heights, the rail-
height limit for acceptable small car interaction was defined. Although many full-scale crash 
tests have utilized a small car impacting the MGS guardrail system, there have been no recent 
underride issues and, therefore, no useful insights into the upper rail-height limits for the MGS. 
1.2 Objectives 
The objective of this research project was to evaluate the safety performance of an 
increased-height MGS with respect to underride and post snagging for small cars and to evaluate 
anchorage loading and deflection, lateral barrier resistance, and rail deflection using a pickup 
truck. The guardrail systems were to be evaluated according to MASH TL-3 safety performance 
criteria [3]. The objective was accomplished using a combination of full-scale crash testing and 
computer simulation. 
1.3 Scope 
The research objective was achieved in two phases. Phase I concentrated on crash testing; 
two full-scale crash tests were performed on the MGS with a top rail mounting height of 34 in. 
(864 mm) and 36 in. (914 mm), respectively, using 1100C vehicles. Both system heights 
satisfied MASH TL-3 evaluation criteria for test no. 3-10.  Phase I was documented in 
Determination of Maximum MGS Mounting Height - Phase I Crash Testing [9]. 
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This report, phase II, contains a detailed analysis of the increased-height MGS, which 
required several tasks. First, researchers performed a literature review of recent W-beam tests to 
examine the interaction between small cars and varying height guardrails. Then, a computer 
simulation effort was used to predict a maximum acceptable rail height using a 3-D nonlinear 
finite element program, LS-DYNA [10], and a 2-D finite element program, BARRIER VII, by 
incrementally raising the rail height in the MGS model until a performance limit was reached. 
Additionally, LS-DYNA simulations were used to determine a critical rail height on various 
approach slopes. Finally, conclusions and recommendations were made pertaining to the safety 
performance of the maximum-height MGS. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Overview of Increased Top-Rail Mounting Heights 
The majority of current W-Beam guardrail systems have been modified by raising rail 
mounting heights to improve system performance with high center-of-gravity (CG) vehicles. The 
previous standard mounting heights were 27 or 27 ¾ in. (686 or 706 mm), and current standards 
have increases this to a 31-in. (787-mm) nominal top rail mounting height. Several systems have 
been tested and validated at 31 in. (787 mm) [2,4,11]. In limited cases, systems have been tested 
at 32 in. (813 mm) or higher [5,9]. Raising the rail height can lead to four potential performance 
issues including: (1) vehicle underride for small cars; (2) post snagging for small cars; (3) 
excessive deflection due to reduced lateral resistance for trucks; and (4) overloaded anchors 
which were designed for shorter rail heights. There have been many full-scale guardrail crash 
tests utilizing small cars. However, there have been no underride issues that could provide 
knowledge of the upper rail mounting height limit for the MGS. Additionally, wheel snag on 
posts has not caused reduced rail performance in redirecting small cars. There are two prevailing 
theories in regard to wheel snag on posts: (1) it can increase occupant risk and cause vehicular 
instabilities in small cars, and (2) it is negligible as the vehicle impacts the weak axis of the post, 
causing the post to bend to the ground. Additionally, post snagging may increase vehicle stability 
by tearing the impacting wheel assembly from the vehicle. This action may cause significant yaw 
towards the barrier or be redirected close to the barrier. However, this behavior did not prevent 
the barrier from meeting crash test standards. 
There are no data or sources for tests performed outside of MwRSF for systems with top 
rail mounting heights above 32 in. (813 mm). A small number of tests have been performed at 32 
in. (813 mm) at the MwRSF, and one test has been performed at both 34 in. (864 mm) and 36 in. 
(914 mm). The 32-in. (813 mm) rail height modified systems have been tested to NCHRP Report 
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No. 350 standards and MASH standards [1]. The 34- and 36-in. (864- and 914-mm) systems 
have been tested in accordance with MASH standards, having been tested with the 2,245-lb 
(1,100-kg) 1100C small car [9]. Systems that have been validated by these standards, with the 
820C or 1100C small car, at or above standard top rail mounting heights will be discussed in 
detail. 
2.2 Midwest Roadside Safety Facility Research 
Researchers at MwRSF have developed a revised guardrail system called the Midwest 
Guardrail System, or MGS. This system was developed in order to improve performance for high 
CG light trucks. The new guardrail design incorporated a 31-in. (787-mm) nominal top rail 
height, splices located between posts, and an increased blockout depth of 12 in. (305 mm).  
The MwRSF performed test no. 3-10 with an 820C vehicle on the MGS while in 
development and called the test NPG-1. For this test, the top of the rail was placed at 32 in. (813 
mm) above the ground to demonstrate the barrier’s performance at the maximum allowable rail 
height. In crash test film analysis, minor vehicle underride occurred when the left-front corner of 
the vehicle slightly penetrated below the rail element. This penetration caused the left-front tire 
to slightly snag on post no. 15 and partially disconnect from the vehicle, as shown in Figure 1. 
This snagging caused the vehicle to yaw towards the barrier after leaving the exit box. This 
behavior did not cause any additional occupant risk or vehicle instability, and the barrier passed 
in accordance with NCHRP Report No. 350 standards [12]. 
The MwRSF published a report in 2004 that provided test results for the MGS in standard 
and special applications, including reduced post spacing and in combination with curbs [2]. 
FHWA acceptance for the MGS was received in 2005 [13]. 
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Figure 1. 820C Impact with MGS, test no. NPG-1 
 Project NCHRP 22-14(2) was undertaken by MwRSF to evaluate current roadside safety 
devices. One of the selected barriers was the strong-post W-beam guardrail system. Test no. 
2214MG-3 evaluated the MGS barrier mounted at the top rail height of 32 in. (813 mm), and 
utilized a 2,245-lb (1,100-kg) small car, an impact angle of 25 degrees, and an impact velocity of 
62.1 mph (100 km/h). No significant vehicle underride was observed, as shown in Figure 2. 
However, post nos. 15 through 17 slightly deflected the right-front wheel of the vehicle. The 
passenger side frame, which was connected to the wheel, was bent back, and the right-front 
wheel assembly was pushed up and back into the wheel well, crushing the quarter panel on the 
right-front side; this was deemed insignificant.  
Wheel snag caused the vehicle to yaw towards the barrier, as shown in Figure 3, but it did 
not abruptly stop the vehicle. The barrier passed the test successfully, meeting the proposed TL-3 
requirements presented in MASH [5]. 
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Figure 2. Underride in 1100C Impact of MGS, test no. 2214MG-3 
 
Figure 3. Vehicle Yaw Towards Barrier, test no. 2214MG-3 
In 2008, MwRSF published a report that examined critical flare rates for the MGS. Two 
tests were performed with an 820C small car and a 31-in. (787-mm) nominal rail mounting 
height. The first of the two tests, test no. FR-3, was performed on the MGS with a flare rate of 
7:1. The second, test no. FR-5, had a flare rate of 5:1. Both tests were successful, indicating that 
the critical flare rate for the MGS was 5:1 or steeper. Tests with vehicles in the light truck 
category were also performed and reported [14]. Barrier underride was not prevalent despite the 
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increased impact severity of the higher-flare-rate configuration, indicating that the upper-height 
tolerance for the MGS may be increased from the current maximum height.  
Earlier in 2012, MwRSF published a report that examined maximum height parameters 
for the MGS [9]. Two tests were performed on 175-ft (53.3-m) systems with an 1100C small car 
and rail mounting heights above the 32-in. (813-mm) nominal mounting height. Test no. 
MGSMRH-1 was performed on the MGS with a 34-in. (864-mm) nominal rail mounting height, 
and test no. MGSMRH-2 had a 36-in. (914-mm) nominal rail mounting height. 
Barrier damage in test no. MGSMRH-1 was moderate. The bottom corrugation was 
flattened through the impact zone, and the bottom edge of the rail was folded upward at post no. 
14. The vehicle did not penetrate or underride the barrier and remained upright throughout and 
after the impact event, as shown in Figure 4. The vehicle’s right A-pillar was crushed at its base, 
the right-front corner of the hood was crushed inward, the side panels were scraped from front to 
back, and the windshield was cracked in a spider-web pattern. 
Test no. MGSMRH-2 also exhibited moderate barrier damage with similar bottom 
corrugation flattening as the previous test. Vehicle damage was similar as well. However, the 
vehicle did not suffer damage exceeding that of MASH established deformation limits. Again, 
the vehicle did not penetrate or underride the system and remained upright throughout the test, as 
shown in Figure 5 [9]. 
Both tests were determined to be successful according to MASH safety performance 
criteria, indicating that the MGS can successfully be raised above the standard rail mounting 
height with respect to the small car performance [9].  
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Figure 4. Test No. MGSMRH-1 Penetration 
 
Figure 5. Test No. MGSMRH-2 Penetration  
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Terminals are also affected by the increased rail mounting heights applied to the standard 
barriers. The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) has approved several terminals for use 
with strong-post, W-beam systems. SKT and FLEAT terminals were approved for use with the 
GMS-WB31 system through similarities to the MGS system [15]. The SRT-31 terminal was 
approved for use with the MGS, T-31, and GMS-WB31 systems through test no. 220541-2 [16]. 
Other terminals that were approved for the MGS system are the SKT (test no. SMG-1), the SKT-
LITE, the FLEAT (test nos. FLEAT-5,-6,-8), and the ET-Plus 31 (test no. 220601-2) [16-20]. 
Also, researchers at MwRSF tested a SKT-MGS Tangent End Terminal while working on 
NCHRP Project 22-14(2) (test no. 2214TT-1). The top of the rail was mounted at 32 in. (813 
mm) and met the proposed standards of MASH [21]. 
2.4 Discussion of Full-Scale Tests 
Wheel snag can push the wheel rearward against the wheel well, potentially deforming 
the floorpan. Additionally, wheel snag may increase the longitudinal force on the wheel and slow 
the vehicle too quickly, increasing occupant risk. In the case of test no. 2214MG-3, the wheel 
was pushed into the wheel well, but floorpan deformation was not significant. In this case, wheel 
snag did not stop the vehicle, but it did cause the vehicle to yaw into the barrier. In some cases, 
wheel snag stabilized the vehicle by disconnecting the wheel from the vehicle. In the reviewed 
tests, wheel snag was not a significant concern. 
Barrier underride posed two primary risks to the vehicle and occupants: (1) rail contact 
with the windshield could cause occupant compartment intrusion, and (2) vehicle penetration 
through the barrier may result in secondary impacts with hazards behind the barrier. None of 
these tests, including the 34-in. (864-mm) and 36-in. (914-mm) tests, displayed significant 
barrier underride. 
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However, the potential for underride was apparent as the rail was raised. In test no. 
2214MG-3, the rail contacted the right-front corner of the vehicle and began to slide up the 
vehicle frame. The rail pushed the hood upward, causing the rail to become trapped between the 
hood and right-front bumper section of the vehicle, shown in Figure 6. This caused the vehicle to 
roll away from the barrier, limited vehicle penetration, and prevented vehicle underride of the 
guardrail. 
 
Figure 6. Rail Snag Under Hood of Test No. 2214MG-3 
In test nos. MGSMRH-1 and MGSMRH-2, the right front corners of the vehicles’ hoods 
apparently slid into the valley of the W-beam guardrail, which trapped the hood corners and 
caused significant deformation in that region of the vehicles. The rail did not slide up the A-pillar 
or cause significant occupant compartment deformation, as shown in Figures 7 and 8. A 
summary of relevant full-scale vehicle crash tests and parameters is given in Table 1.
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Figure 7. Test No. MGSMRH-1 Vehicle Damage 
















Table 1. Small Car Testing Performed on W-Beam Guardrail ≥ 32 in. (813 mm) 
Test 
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(102.9) 20 18.74 
NCHRP 
350 Pass 2,12  
3-10 
2214 














































(102.2) 28.13 28.7 
NCHRP 
350 Pass 14 
3-10 








(95.5) 31.3 31.8 
NCHRP 















(103.6) 15 14.49 
NCHRP 
350 Pass 21 
3-10 
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2.5 Simulation Studies 
The Texas Transportation Institute (TTI) analyzed the performance limit for common 
roadside and median barriers using LS-DYNA, including the MGS [22]. In this study, 
simulations were used to determine acceptable vehicle impact heights by incrementally varying 
them. Underride was examined using an 820C Geo small car model, and the initiation of 
override and rollover was examined using a 2000P C2500 pickup truck model. 
The study examined the effects of suspension compression on system redirection by 
lowering the 820C vehicle model with respect to the standard position of the guardrail. This task 
was completed by lowering the ground level for the vehicle. In this research, the increased 
vehicle impact heights were obtained by lowering the vehicle below the defined guardrail soil 
level and removing contacts between the vehicle and the soil. Additionally, contacts between the 
vehicle and the below-ground portions of the posts were removed. This gave a similar effect to 
raising the rail height without actually re-modeling the system or re-meshing any parts. 
However, there was no effective change in the post-in-soil embedment depth or any difference in 
the rotation point of the post in the soil. 
In the underride limit analysis, the vehicle impacted the barrier at reduced bumper 
heights, or effectively at increased rail heights. In the override analysis, the vehicle impacted the 
barrier at increased bumper heights. The limits found by these methods for the MGS, a Modified 
G4(1S) W-beam, and a modified weak post W-beam guardrail system are shown in Table 2 [22]. 
This research shows the underride and override at varying vehicle impact heights which 
is analogous to varying guardrail mounting heights. The analogous effective top rail mounting 
height calculated from the center of the corrugated guardrail is shown in Table 3. 
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Table 2. Performance Limits Found by Texas Transportation Institute Research [22] 
Guardrail Type 
Rail Center Height 
Bumper Top Height  
above Ground Level 
Override Limit Underride Limit 
Upper Lower Ferdous et al. [22] 






































Table 3. Effective Top Rail Height Using Texas Transportation Institute Research  
Guardrail Type 
Effective Top Rail Height   





Midwest Guardrail System 34.7  (881) 
27.1  
(688) 
Modified G4(1S) W-beam 31.7  (805) 
24.0  
(610) 




The results in Table 3 suggested that the maximum top rail mounting height for the MGS 
with respect to the 820C small car should be 34.7 in. (881 mm). However, this research, as 
mentioned previously, did not take into account the reduced soil stiffness from decreasing the 
post embedment depth. In fact, the weak-post guardrail system was shown to have an effective 
maximum height closer to 36 in. (914 mm). This suggested that the post reaction, rotation, and 
reduced soil embedment played a significant role in determining the maximum guardrail height. 
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3 BARRIER VII ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON 
3.1 Brief Background and Application 
BARRIER VII is a computer program used extensively to model and analyze vehicle 
crashes into guardrail systems. In this program, the barrier was idealized as a two-dimensional 
structural framework of arbitrary shape. The analysis was done in the horizontal plane, meaning 
that vertical displacements of the barrier or the vehicle were not considered. In these simulations, 
the vehicle was idealized as a rigid body of prescribed shape surrounded by a cushion of discrete 
springs. 
A baseline BARRIER VII model was developed to study the performance of the MGS 
guardrail, and specifically the anchorages, at a 175-ft (53.3-m) system length and validated with 
corresponding full-scale crash tests. This model was used for parametric studies to determine the 
effect that height had on guardrail post capacity and safety performance, provide a basis of 
comparison with LS-DYNA results, and determine the effectiveness of LS-DYNA models in 
simulating guardrail behavior at raised rail heights. 
3.2 MGS Standard Height, 175-ft (53.3-m) Long System  
Two full-scale crash tests were performed on 175-ft (53.3-m) long standard-height 
systems. Test no. 2214MG-2 involved a 2270P pickup truck impacting a system with a 31-in. 
(787-mm) top rail mounting height at an angle of 25.5 degrees and a speed of 62.9 mph (101.2 
km/h) [4]. The second test, test no. 2214MG-3, involved an 1100C small car impacting a system 
with a 32-in. (813-mm) top rail mounting height at an angle of 25.4 degrees and a speed of 60.8 
mph (97.8 km/h) [5]. These impact conditions fell within the allowable range for the successful 
evaluation of the barrier’s performance.  
The data acquired during test no. 2214MG-2 and test no. 2214MG-3 from the overhead 
high-speed film, onboard vehicle accelerometers, and speed traps were used to calibrate the 
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models to the physical tests [24]. Furthermore, a previously developed LS-DYNA model with 
the same test conditions was analyzed to validate its use and to determine if updating the MGS 
barrier model was justified. The BARRIER VII model, first-generation LS-DYNA model, and 
full-scale tests were analyzed and compared, the results of which are outlined hereafter. 
3.3 Baseline BARRIER VII 2270P Model 
3.3.1  Development and Validation of the 2214MG-2 Model 
The BARRIER VII model had a single beam and three different posts. The model had a 
total length of 175 ft (53.3 m). Two of the posts represented the two breakaway cable terminal 
(BCT) anchor posts on both the upstream and downstream ends for test nos. 2214MG-2 and 
2214MG-3 [4,5]. The post parameters for the W6x9 (W152x13.4) post used in the BARRIER 
VII simulation are shown in Table 4 [23, 24]. The ground-line strut and cable are not modeled in 
BARRIER-VII. Thus, the anchor post strength was given particular attention. The kinetic friction 
value was calibrated according to the physical test exit times and length of contact in order to 
provide the best results.  
Table 4. BARRIER VII Simulation Parameters [23, 24] 
 BARRIER VII Parameters Units Input Values 




















F - Failure Displacement Along B in. (mm) 
15 
(381) 
k - Kinetic Friction Coefficient Vehicle to Barrier 0.40 
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One important validation method was the graphical comparison of the two simulations 
and physical crash test barrier profiles. The input parameters were calibrated if BARRIER VII 
was able to accurately predict the barrier profile. The LS-DYNA profile was obtained by 
tracking the x-y location of various nodes along the barrier model. The barrier profile during the 
physical crash test was obtained from the overhead film analysis. In the actual full-scale crash 
test, the right-front corner of the vehicle impacted the barrier. However, to generate a visual 
comparison with the models, sequential photos of the full-scale test were mirrored about the 
vertical axis, giving the indication of a left-front impact. It was assumed that an actual right-front 
wheel separation was identical to a virtual left-front wheel separation. 
BARRIER VII had some difficulty fully reproducing the guardrail shape between 250 ms 
and 350 ms. However, it should be noted that during the BARRIER VII run, the path followed a 
similar trajectory but was slightly offset during this time period. In the actual full-scale crash 
test, the right-front wheel snagged on post nos. 12 and 13, pulling the wheel away from the hub 
of the truck. From 250 to 350 ms, the front wheel snagged on post no. 14 and was pulled from 
the vehicle. This behavior deflected the vehicle in a slightly different path, leading to the 
difference noted in the BARRIER VII simulation results. Since BARRIER VII was limited to 
planar motion and because tire separation could not be modeled, the deflection could not be 
precisely reproduced. Without snagging, it calculated a smoother deflection of the rail in this 
area. By 350 ms, the tire was torn away, and the rail deflection evened out as the vehicle moved 
along the rest of the rail. 
LS-DYNA replicated the full-scale crash test barrier deflection profile reasonably well. 
The 3-D non-linear finite element program was capable of modeling tail slap, similar to the full-
scale test, and it was also capable of modeling the separation of the left-front wheel, similar to 
the right-front wheel separation of the full-scale test. A graphical comparison of the simulated 
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BARRIER VII results, discretized barrier shape data from the LS-DYNA results, and full-scale 
testing for test no. 2214MG-2 is shown in Figure 9. 
 
t = 0 ms 
 
t = 100 ms 
 
t = 200 ms 
 
Figure 9. Sequential Figures from Simulations and Test No. 2214MG-2 
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t = 300 ms 
 
t = 400 ms 
 
t = 500 ms 
 
Figure 9. Sequential Figures from Simulations and Test No. 2214MG-2 (continued) 
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t = 600 ms 
 
t = 700 ms 
 
Figure 9. Sequential Figures from Simulations and Test No. 2214MG-2 (continued) 
The LS-DYNA modeled an impact at post no. 12, whereas the BARRIER VII model and 
full-scale tests used an impact at post no. 13, which can explain some of the differences outlined 
in this report. For comparison in this report, all LS-DYNA simulation results were assumed to be 
the same as those of the corresponding BARRIER VII simulation and full-scale vehicle crash test 
results had they impacted at the same point. Therefore, post no. 12 of the LS-DYNA model was 
assumed to be post no. 13 of the full-scale vehicle crash test so comparisons could be made 
between the two.  
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3.3.2 Comparison of Test Conditions and Simulation Results 
A second validation method incorporated different evaluation parameters which were 
measured in the full-scale test and calculated using BARRIER VII and LS-DYNA. Tabulated 
validation results for vehicle behavior, barrier displacements, and working width for the 
calibration are listed in Table 5. Both LS-DYNA and BARRIER VII modeled the full-scale 
vehicle crash test fairly well. 
Table 5. Test and Simulation Results for 2270P Vehicle on Level Terrain 






Parallel Time ms 282 324 260 





















Working Width Indicator - Hood Corner Post* 
Hood 
Corner 
Exit Time ms 718 535 580 
Exit Angle deg -13.47 -8.1 -14.08 







*Although the post was the working width indicator, it was unlikely that the post would remain attached to the rail 
for that displacement. 
The largest differences between the full-scale test, BARRIER VII model, and LS-DYNA 
model were the parallel times (282 ms, 324 ms, 260 ms) and exit times (718 ms, 535 ms, 580 
ms). This 183-ms difference in exit time between BARRIER VII and the full-scale test was 
attributed to differences in film analysis and computer simulation. BARRIER VII was able to 
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exactly detect any loss of contact from the barrier, while this may not be observable during film 
analysis. In addition, the right-front tire was detached from the vehicle in the actual crash test, 
causing the vehicle to penetrate farther into the rail, increasing contact time. BARRIER VII was 
unable to model the detachment of the tire and, thus, predicted vehicle redirection sooner. A 13 
percent difference was observed in the parallel times between the full-scale vehicle crash test and 
the BARRIER VII simulation. This difference was attributed to the inability of BARRIER VII to 
accurately model the roll of the vehicle and the detachment of the tire, which caused a slightly 
different redirection angle between 250 ms and 350 ms. LS-DYNA did model these events, and 
had a 7.8 percent difference in parallel time relative to the full-scale test.  
The other observable difference was in the exit angle of the center of gravity of the 
vehicle (13.47 degrees for the physical test [4] versus 8.1 degrees for the BARRIER VII 
simulation). This 39 percent difference was attributed to the 2-D limitation that under estimated 
the exit vector. However, the exit angle simulated by LS-DYNA was only 4.3 percent different 
than the full-scale crash test exit angle. 
3.3.3 Anchor Analysis 
Particular attention was paid in this analysis to the deflection and forces imparted to the 
anchor posts in the system. As the barrier height increased, the post embedment decreased, 
causing the anchors to absorb more of the force imparted on the barrier by the vehicle. Values for 
the maximum deflection and force through the anchors for the simulations are shown in Table 6. 
As previously noted, the LS-DYNA simulation modeled an impact at post no. 12, whereas 
BARRIER VII modeled an impact at post no. 13. This explained some of the slight differences in 
the maximum forces and displacements between the two simulation methods. Despite this 
discrepancy, the anchor forces and displacements of BARRIER VII and LS-DYNA models were 
very similar. 
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Table 6. Simulation Anchorage Calculations with 2270P 
 
The upstream anchor was calibrated by using two measurements: (1) post-test field book 
measurements versus the simulation displacements and (2) the farthest visible upstream target in 
the overhead film. Since there was no high-speed camera above the upstream or downstream 
anchor post, some extrapolation was needed to find the maximum rail displacement at the 
anchors for the full-scale test.  
From field observations for test no. 2214MG-2, the maximum soil displacement was 
approximately 1 in. (25 mm) on the upstream side of post no. 1. Extrapolating this 1-in. (25-mm) 
displacement to the top rail height of 31 in. (787 mm), the maximum upstream anchor 
displacement was 2.134 in. (54 mm) during test no. 2214MG-2. The estimation for the anchor 
post displacement was done assuming a 2/3 embedment depth rotation point and was based on 
estimated measurements from post-test documentation. The post rotation point assumption may 
explain the discrepancy between the full-scale test and the simulation results. BARRIER VII 
predicted a maximum displacement of 2.91 in. (74 mm), resulting in a 27 percent difference. LS-
DYNA predicted a maximum displacement of 3.11-in. (79 mm), resulting in a 31 percent 
difference. Overall, both models predicted very similar anchor displacements. 
BARRIER VII and LS-DYNA estimated maximum displacements of -1.11 and -0.91 in. 
(-28 and -23 mm) for the downstream anchor. Simulation results are shown in Figure 10 for 
anchor displacements on both the upstream and downstream ends.  
Measurement Units 












Time of Maximum Deflection ms 184 140 203 179 
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Figure 10. Anchor Displacement Results from Simulation 
The upstream anchor displacements were measured at node no. 1, and the downstream 
anchor displacements were measured at node no. 225 in BARRIER VII. These nodes correspond 
to the extreme ends of the 31-in. (787-mm) tall system at an impact height of 24.875 in. (632 
mm). A central node was tracked in LS-DYNA on the top of both the upstream and downstream 
anchorages for comparison. BARRIER VII and LS-DYNA predicted very similar displacement 
curves for both anchorages. 
The difference in distance between simulations and film analysis for the farthest visible 
upstream target, post no. 11, is shown in Figure 11. This calibration effort, therefore, shows the 
calibration of the displacement of post no. 11. This post was tracked in both BARRIER VII and 
LS-DYNA. 
Some similarities were observed in the plots of the differences in the x- and y-directions. 
However, for this calibration BARRIER VII was better calibrated than LS-DYNA at post no. 11 
for displacement in the x- and y-directions. A greater discrepancy in the x-direction between the 
full-scale data and the LS-DYNA results for this post displacement was shown.  
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Figure 11. Differences in X and Y Coordinates at Post No. 11 
BARRIER VII had minor difficulty replicating the displacements of the farthest visible 
upstream target, post no. 11. Initially, BARRIER VII under-predicted the x-displacement of the 
target, but this quickly switched to an over-prediction. The initial under-prediction of the target 
by the simulation was attributed to the simulation being able to calculate exactly when the 
vehicle deflects this post at this time. The over-prediction was attributed to how BARRIER VII 
observed post failure. In full-scale tests, the post provided slight resistance which was not 
modeled in BARRIER VII. Also, in the full-scale test, the wheel became detached from the 
vehicle, potentially causing a difference in the deflection of the vehicle and creating slight 
differences in the deflection of the target. This calibration verified that BARRIER VII can 
calculate displacements of posts and can validate results from the anchor post displacements.  
Because LS-DYNA is a 3-dimensional modeling tool, it was expected to be more 
accurate than BARRIRER VII. However, this was not the case. In the LS-DYNA simulation, the 
vehicle pulled the post and rail more than in the full-scale tests, and the posts bent downstream to 
a greater extent. In the model, it appears as though the blockout and post connection was more 
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rigid than in reality, causing the blockout and post to twist together rather than allowing the 
blockout to be pulled away from the post or rail. 
Further analysis was performed to determine the upstream and downstream anchor 
forces. A plot of the anchor force in the upstream and downstream anchors during the impact 
event is shown in Figure 12. The upstream anchor forces were measured in BARRIER VII at 
member no. 1, and the downstream anchor forces were measured at member no. 224. In LS-
DYNA, a plane section was created through the anchor posts at the lowest measurable level 
(immediately above the ground-line hole in the BCT post), and the normal force was plotted 
through the center of the post. These locations corresponded to the furthest upstream and 
downstream ends of the system at an impact height of 24.875 in. (632 mm). The members were 
measured at 0 and 24.875 in. (0 and 632 mm) for the ground level and impact height. In 
BARRIER VII and LS-DYNA, the peak forces through the upstream anchor post were 27.32 
kips (121.5 kN) and 31.47 kips (139.9 kN), respectively. The peak forces through the 
downstream anchor post were 13.37 kips (59.5 kN) and 10.49 kips (46.7 kN), respectively. 
 
Figure 12. Simulated Forces in Anchors 
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These force plots provided similar results. There was a force plateau between 200 and 
400 ms on both plots for the upstream and downstream anchors. In LS-DYNA, the anchor forces 
returned to approximately zero after impact, while in BARRIER VII, residual forces were left in 
the posts due to the displacements. Overall, the similarity of the two plots provide good 
agreement between the two models and results, however, anchor force data for the full-scale test 
were not available for comparison. 
3.4 Baseline BARRIER VII 1100C Model 
3.4.1 Development and Validation of the 2214MG-3 Model 
Similar to the 2214MG-2 test, a finite element model of the 2214MG-3 test was 
developed for use in BARRIER VII and LS-DYNA. The BARRIER VII model had a single 
beam type, and 3 different post types and a total length of 175 ft (53.3 m). The difference 
between the two BARRER VII simulations and LS-DYNA simulations, aside from the 
utilization of an 1100C model for the 2214MG-3 versus the 2270P model for the 2214MG-2, 
was the impact height of the barrier. The impact height was increased by 1 in. to 25.875 in. (657 
mm) to correlate with the top rail mounting height of 32 in. (813 mm) for this system [5]. 
As before, two of the post types represented the two BCT anchor posts on both the 
upstream and downstream ends. The ground-line strut and cable were not modeled for simplicity. 
Thus, the anchor post strength was given particular attention and is discussed further in Section 
3.4.3. The other post type represented the W6x9 (W152x13.4) system posts for the MGS.  
Similar to the validation of the 2214MG-2 model, the validation method for the 2214MG-
3 model involved a graphical comparison of the simulations, using discretized LS-DYNA rail 
displacement data, BARRIER VII data, and the physical crash test barrier profile. The barrier 
profile during the physical crash test was obtained from the overhead film analysis, the LS-
DYNA profile came from node tracking of the barrier throughout the simulation, and BARRIER 
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VII results were from the rail deflection calculation. The validated BARRIER VII input 
parameters are provided in Table 7 [23,24]. The kinetic friction coefficient was calibrated using 
the full-scale crash test results. 
Table 7. BARRIER VII Simulation Parameters 
 BARRIER VII Parameters [23, 24] Units Input Values 




















 F - Failure Displacement Along B in. (mm) 
15 
(381) 
 k - Kinetic Friction Coefficient Vehicle to Barrier 0.30 
 
 LS-DYNA and BARRIER VII simulations were compared directly with full-scale crash 
test data to examine the effectiveness of the programs in simulating the crashes. A graphical 
comparison of the simulations and test no. 2214MG-3 is shown in Figure 13. In the actual full-
scale crash test, the right-front corner of the vehicle impacted the barrier. However, to generate a 
visual comparison with the models, sequential photos of the full-scale test were mirrored about 
the vertical axis, giving the indication of a left-front impact. It was assumed that an actual right-
front wheel separation was identical to a virtual left-front wheel separation. 
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t = 0 ms 
 
t = 100 ms 
 
t = 200 ms 
 
Figure 13. Sequential Figures from BARRIER VII and Test No. 2214MG-3 
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t = 300 ms 
 
t = 400 ms 
 
t = 500 ms 
 
Figure 13. Sequential Figures from BARRIER VII and Test No. 2214MG-3 (continued) 
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BARRIER VII had some difficulty fully reproducing the guardrail shape after 200 ms. 
An “overly stiff” condition appeared to occur in the system as BARRIER VII under-predicted 
the path of the vehicle relative to the full-scale test. When the full-scale test video footage was 
evaluated, it was apparent that some slight underride of the vehicle into the barrier occurred. The 
lowest portion of the rail deflected laterally farther than the top portion. The targets were located 
on the top of the rail for the film analysis, so it was expected that BARRIER VII would under-
predict the deflection from the point where the vehicle began to underride the barrier – 
approximately 200 ms. 
LS-DYNA outperformed BARRIER VII in predicting guardrail behavior. LS-DYNA had 
the advantage of being able to simulate, and closely predict, vehicle behavior at exit. The full-
scale crash test resulted in wheel snag near the vehicle’s exit from the system, causing the 
vehicle to yaw towards the barrier rather than being redirected away from it. LS-DYNA 
simulated this snag and yaw, whereas BARRIER VII predicted a smooth redirection away from 
the system at exit. 
3.4.2 Comparison of Test Conditions and Simulation Results 
The second comparison method incorporated different evaluation parameters which were 
measured in the full-scale test and calculated using both BARRIER VII and LS-DYNA. 
Tabulated validation results for vehicle behavior, barrier displacements, and working width for 
the comparison are listed in Table 8. 
A relatively small difference occurred in the parallel times for the full-scale vehicle crash 
test, the BARRIER VII model, and the LS-DYNA model (216 ms, 230 ms, and 222 ms). A 
larger discrepancy occurred in the exit times (530 ms 381 ms, and 540 ms). The 28-percent 
difference in exit time between BARRIER VII and the full-scale test was attributed to wheel 
snag. In the full-scale vehicle test, the right-front corner of the vehicle slightly underrode the 
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system. This caused snagging which slowed the vehicle and created a longer vehicle-to-barrier 
contact time. The tire deflated, the right-front corner of the vehicle dropped, and the vehicle 
yawed into the barrier. BARRIER VII was unable to model the tire deflation and therefore 
allowed the vehicle to redirect more quickly. LS-DYNA did simulate the underride, and, 
subsequently, the simulation results were very close to the full-scale crash results.  
Table 8. Test and Simulation Results for 1100C Vehicle on Level Terrain 






Parallel Time ms 216 230 222 














Working Width Indicator - Hood  Corner Post* 
Hood  
Corner 
Exit Time ms 530 381 540 
Exit Angle deg -14.1 -9.7 -15.78 
Exit Velocity Vector deg - -15.7 - 





*Although the post was the working width indicator, it was unlikely that the post would remain attached to the rail 
for that displacement. 
Another significant difference between BARRIER VII and the full-scale test results was 
the exit angle of the vehicle (14.1 degrees for the physical test versus 9.7 degrees for the 
BARRIER VII simulation). The 31-percent difference was attributed to the inability of the 
program to correctly simulate wheel snag calculated by BARRIER VII which was previously 
discussed, leading to the under-prediction of the exit vector as the vehicle maintained a longer 
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contact time. The difference in exit velocity was attributed to the differences between the 2-D 
BARRIER VII simulation and the full-scale vehicle test. As the vehicle maintained longer 
contact time with the barriers, the vehicle slowed more drastically, causing the difference. The 
consistent parallel times and similar graphical sequential figures from 0 ms to 200 ms for 
BARRIER VII validates that the longer contact time was the cause of the differences. Post snag 
increased the exit time and decreased the exit velocity. LS-DYNA simulated these results more 
closely and, thus, was more capable of modeling wheel snag and the yaw of the vehicle into the 
barrier. 
3.4.3 Anchor Analysis 
Particular attention was given to the deflection and forces imparted to the anchor posts in 
the system. It was important to calibrate anchor system behavior with existing tests before the 
model could be confidently used to investigate increased rail heights of the MGS. As with test 
no. 2241MG-2, there was no high-speed camera above the upstream or downstream anchor 
posts. Therefore, extrapolation was needed to find the maximum rail displacement for the full-
scale test. From the fieldbook for test no. 2214MG-3, a maximum soil displacement of 
approximately 9/16 in. (14 mm) was measured on the upstream side of post no. 1. By 
extrapolating this displacement to the top rail height of 32 in. (813 mm), the estimated maximum 
upstream anchor displacement was 1.323 in. (34 mm). The estimation for the anchor post 
displacement was done using a 2/3 embedment depth rotation point and was based on 
measurements from post-test documentation, where the precision of the documentation may 
explain the discrepancy between the full-scale test and the simulation results. 
Calibration of the upstream anchor in BARRIER VII was again satisfied by using two 
measurements: (1) post-test field book measurements versus the simulation displacements and 
(2) the farthest visible upstream target in the overhead film analysis. BARRIER VII predicted a 
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maximum displacement of 1.31 in. (33 mm), resulting in a 1.0-percent difference compared to 
the full-scale test. The simulated downstream anchor displacement was -0.62 in. (-16 mm). 
Values for the x- and y-deflection for the BARRIER VII simulation are shown in Table 9. 
Likewise, LS-DYNA was also used to calculate anchor displacement; those values are also 
shown in Table 9. LS-DYNA did a considerably poorer job predicting anchor displacement than 
BARRIER VII with approximately twice the anchor deflection calculated in the full-scale test. 
Table 9. Simulation Anchorage Calculations with 1100C 
 
The BARRIER VII and LS-DYNA simulation results are shown in Figure 14 for anchor 
displacements on both the upstream and downstream ends. For BARRIER VII, the upstream 
anchor displacements were measured at node no. 1 and the downstream anchor displacements 
were measured at node no. 225. These nodes corresponded to the furthest ends of the system at 
an impact height of 25.875 in. (657 mm) for the 32-in. (813-mm) tall system.  
When the small car impacted a guardrail, a decreased lateral load was imparted on the rail 
compared to impacts involving pickup trucks; thus a decreased force was transmitted to the 
anchorage, leading to decreased anchorage deflection. However, the anchor deflections exhibited 
by the LS-DYNA model were closer to that of the expected anchorage deflection caused by the 














Time of Maximum Deflection ms 130 220 171 180 
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properly in order to simulate guardrails at increased rail heights. Therefore, a redesign of the LS-
DYNA anchorage model was necessary before increased rail heights could be simulated. 
 
Figure 14. Upstream and Downstream Anchor Displacements 
Further analysis was performed to determine the upstream and downstream anchor force. 
The anchor force in the upstream and downstream anchor versus time for both LS-DYNA and 
BARRIER VII is shown in Figure 15. For BARRIER VII, the upstream anchor forces were 
measured at member no. 1, and the downstream anchor forces were measured at member no. 
224. These locations corresponded to the farthest upstream and downstream ends of the system0 
at an impact height of 25.875 in. (657 mm). The members were measured at 0 and 25.875 in. (0 
and 657 mm) which corresponded to the ground level and the impact height. In BARRIER VII, 
the peak force through the upstream anchor post was 15.76 kips (70.1 kN), while the downstream 
anchor post experienced a peak force of 7.17 kips (31.9 kN). These values did not correspond as 
well to the LS-DYNA simulation results as would be expected considering the difference in 
displacements that was previously noted. 
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Figure 15. Force through Anchor Members 
Because LS-DYNA did not predict anchor displacements well, it was believed that the 
BARRIER VII force results were more accurate. However, anchor force data for the full-scale 
test were not available for comparison. 
3.5 Maximum Rail Height Models 
3.5.1 Development and Validation of the Test No. MGSMRH-1 Model 
Similar to the 2214MG-3 model, a BARRIER VII model of test no. MGSMRH-1 was 
developed. This model allowed for comparison with LS-DYNA to validate another model's 
results for parameters such as anchor force and displacement. The top rail height was increased 
to 34 in. (864 mm) for this system [9]. The validation method for this model involved a graphical 
comparison of the simulations, using BARRIER VII and physical crash test barrier overhead 
photos. The BARRIER VII input parameters are provided in Table 10 [23, 24]. The kinetic 
friction coefficient was calibrated using full-scale results for the length of contact and exit times. 
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It should be noted that as the soil compaction methods at the MwRSF became more 
stringent with the introduction of MASH performance specifications. In test nos. 2214MG-2 and 
2214MG-3, the guardrail posts were embedded in a moderately compacted soil. However, in test 
nos. MGSMRH-1 and MGSMRH-2, the posts were embedded in a highly compacted soil. 
Therefore, although the increased rail height would suggest a reduced strong axis bending 
moment, in reality the strong axis bending moment increased due to the denser soil and resulting 
increased post-soil resistance. 
Table 10. BARRIER VII Simulation Parameters for Test No. MGSMRH-1 [23, 24] 
 BARRIER VII Parameters Units Input Values 




















 F - Failure Displacement Along B in. (mm) 
15 
(381) 
 k - Kinetic Friction Coefficient Vehicle to Barrier 0.35 
 
The BARRIER VII simulation was compared directly to full-scale crash test data to 
evaluate the barrier at an increased mounting height. A graphical comparison of the simulations 
for test no. MGSMRH-1 is shown in Figure 16. In the actual full-scale crash test, the right-front 
corner of the vehicle impacted the barrier. However, to generate a visual comparison with the 
models, sequential photos of the full-scale test were mirrored about the vertical axis, giving the 
indication of a left-front impact. It was assumed that an actual right-front wheel separation ws 
identical to a virtual left-front wheel separation. BARRIER VII did an excellent job predicting 
the redirection of the 1100C vehicle at this top-rail height, with only minor discrepancies shown 
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in comparison to the full-scale test as the rail springs back after impact. The over-stiffness issue 
detailed in the baseline model was not found to be an issue at this height due to the reduced input 
parameters.  
 
t = 0 ms 
 
t = 100 ms 
 
t = 200 ms 
 
Figure 16. Sequential Figures from BARRIER VII and Test No. MGSMRH-1 
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t = 300 ms 
 
t = 400 ms 
 
t = 500 ms 
 
Figure 16. Sequential Figures from BARRIER VII and Test No. MGSMRH-1 (continued) 
In general, LS-DYNA did a better job of predicting guardrail behavior than BARRIER 
VII. LS-DYNA has the added benefit of being able to simulate, and closely predict, vehicle 
behavior at exit. The full-scale crash test resulted in wheel snag near the vehicle exit from the 
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system, causing the vehicle to yaw towards the barrier rather than redirect away. LS-DYNA 
simulated this snag and yaw, whereas BARRIER VII predicted a smooth redirection away from 
the system at exit. 
3.5.2 Comparison of Test Conditions and Simulation Results 
BARRIER VII calculated a number of useful parameters for determining the 
effectiveness of the guardrail to redirect a vehicle. Output data from BARRIER VII and data 
collected from test no. MGSMRH-1 are shown in Table 11. 
BARRIER VII performed very well at estimating the parallel time and exit speed and 
angle for test no. MGSMRH-1. Use of BARRIER VII at this height was deemed acceptable and 
used to simulate a top-rail rail height of 36 in. (914 mm). 
3.5.3 Development and Validation of the Test No. MGSMRH-2 Model 
A BARRIER VII model of test no. MGSMRH-2 was developed. The top rail height was 
increased to 36 in. for this system [9]. BARRIER VII and photos of the physical crash test were 
compared. The BARRIER VII input parameters are provided in Table 12.  
The BARRIER VII simulation was compared directly to full-scale crash test data to 
evaluate the barrier at an increased mounting height. A graphical comparison of the simulations 
and physical test for test no. MGSMRH-2 is shown in Figure 17. In the actual full-scale crash 
test, the right-front corner of the vehicle impacted the barrier. However, to generate a visual 
comparison with the models, sequential photos of the full-scale test were mirrored about the 
vertical axis, giving the indication of a left-front impact. It was assumed that an actual right-front 
wheel separation was identical to a virtual left-front wheel separation. 
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Table 11. Test and BARRIER VII Simulation Results 
Evaluation Parameters Units 
Test Results 
Test No.  
MGSMRH-1 B7 Simulation 
Parallel Time ms 236 239 





Exit Angle deg -12.3 -11.1 















Table 12. BARRIER VII Simulation Parameters for Test No. MGSMRH-2 
 BARRIER VII Parameters Units Input Values 




















 F - Failure Displacement Along B in. (mm) 
15 
(381) 
 k - Kinetic Friction Coefficient Vehicle to Barrier 0.35 
 
December 5, 2012  




t = 0 ms 
 
t = 100 ms 
 
t = 200 ms 
 
Figure 17. Sequential Figures from BARRIER VII and Test No. MGSMRH-2 
December 5, 2012  




t = 300 ms 
 
t = 400 ms 
 
t = 500 ms 
 
Figure 17. Sequential Figures from BARRIER VII and Test No. MGSMRH-2 (continued) 
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BARRIER VII adequately predicted the redirection of the 1100C vehicle at this top-rail 
height, with only minor discrepancies compared to the full-scale test, where the rail sprung back 
after impact. At this top-rail height, the rail deflected more in BARRIER VII than in the full-
scale test. This was due to the fact that the car was beginning to underride slightly more than in 
previous simulations. This BARRIER VII simulation still gave reasonably accurate results, 
which can assist in evaluating maximum rail heights. As a 2-D program, BARRIER VII cannot 
predict the propensity for underride, which was necessary to properly evaluate barrier height. At 
any reasonable top-rail height prescribed in BARRIER VII, the car will always impact the barrier 
and will never underride the system. For this reason, the maximum height evaluations at higher 
top-rail heights had limited benefits with this program. However, they did show that the 
decreased post embedment depths still provided adequate containment forces to redirect the 
vehicle if underride was not an issue.  
3.5.4 Comparison of Test Conditions and Simulation Results 
BARRIER VII calculated many useful parameters for determining the effectiveness of 
guardrail at redirecting a vehicle. Output data from BARRIER VII and data collected from test 
no. MGSMRH-1 are shown in Table 13. BARRIER VII was shown to perform very well in 
calculating the parallel criterion for test no. MGSMRH-2. However, exit angles were 
significantly different due to the inability of BARRIER VII to predict snag or underride. 
While BARRIER VII showed good redirection effectiveness for the 36-in. (914-mm) 
MGS barrier, the program's effectiveness was minimal at these increased heights due to its 
inability to predict underride. The decreased embedment depths of the posts did not sufficiently 
decrease the resistive force capabilities of the system at this top-rail height for 1100C cars. The 
vehicle did not pull the barrier free until the top-rail height reached 40 in. (1016 mm), at which 
point massive rail deflections occurred. The redirection of a small car at a top-rail height of 40 
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in. (1016 mm) was highly unlikely because of the geometry of standard 1100C passenger 
vehicles.  
Table 13. Test and BARRIER VII Simulation Results  
Evaluation Parameters Units 
Test Results 
Test No.  
MGSMRH-2 B7 Simulation 
Parallel Time ms 262 243 





Exit Angle deg 21.9 11.3 

















Although BARRIER VII is a 2-D simulation program, it performed remarkably well in 
comparison with the more robust LS-DYNA.  LS-DYNA did perform better in the prediction of 
exit angles and dynamic rail deflections, but it was difficult to conclude that LS-DYNA was far 
better at simulating vehicle impacts at standard top-rail heights. LS-DYNA has far better 
visualization abilities, making it easier to interpret the results of the simulation. It was also able 
to predict the yaw of the vehicle into the barrier due to wheel snag – a critical part of this 
simulation that significantly affected some results. However, BARRIER VII made reasonably 
accurate predictions of the barrier shape, especially when the limitations of the 2-D program 
were recognized, and it was far less expensive to use.  
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This analysis showed that in some cases BARRIER VII performed well in predictive 
capabilities for parameters such as post failure, anchor displacement, and pocketing [24]. These 
are three critical system parameters that affect barrier performance. The inability to predict 
vehicle underride, vehicle suspension failure, or vehicle occupant compartment damage limited 
the effectiveness of BARRIER VII. The program did provide a good basis for comparison and 
verification for LS-DYNA where full-scale crash test data were limited. A baseline expectation 
of maximum barrier height could not be determined using the predictive capabilities of 
BARRIER VII. The lack of its ability to simulate underride did not provide enough data to make 
a valid conclusion on maximum rail height for small cars. 
Therefore, it was determined that LS-DYNA simulations were the best method for 
determining a maximum guardrail height with respect to underride. However, the LS-DYNA 
simulation used in the study described in this chapter was less effective than BARRIER VII in 
some regards. Therefore, the LS-DYNA MGS model was replaced with a newer version of the 
model that was being developed in parallel with this study. In the new model, the anchors were 
updated to match the physically tested components to more accurately represent the full-scale 
test design [24]. This updated LS-DYNA model was used in all subsequent analyses described 
herein. 
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4 MODELING AND SIMULATION 
4.1 Introduction 
Finite element modeling can be an extremely useful tool in evaluating roadside hardware. 
An accurate model can be used in place of expensive physical testing to evaluate potential design 
changes. A finite element model of the MGS was used and altered to evaluate the potential for 
systems with increased top-rail heights to effectively redirect small cars and to adequately 
contain pickup trucks. Full-scale vehicle crash test data were used to validate the finite element 
model results. 
4.2 Midwest Guardrail System Model 
An improved, second generation MGS LS-DYNA model was developed by researchers at 
the MwRSF. Goals of the new model were to: (1) improve end anchorage design to better match 
full-scale system construction and results; (2) refine the system mesh for improved barrier 
deflection performance; and (3) improve vehicle-to-barrier interaction and results. This new 
model improved performance in simulating full-scale vehicle crash tests [25]. An abbreviated list 
of guardrail model parts and the associated LS-DYNA modeling parameters is shown in Table 
14. A comparison of the physical barrier system and the finite element model of the simulated 
end anchorage and overall barrier system is shown in Figures 18 and 19. 
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Table 14. Summary of MGS Model Part Properties 
Part Name Element  Type Element Formulation Material Type Material Formulation 
Anchor Cable Beam Belytschko-Schwer, Resultant Beam 




Anchor Post Bolt Solid Constant Stress Solid Element ASTM A36 Rigid 
Anchor Post Bolt 
Heads Shell Belytschko-Tsay ASTM A36 Rigid 
Anchor Post 
Washers Solid 
Constant Stress Solid 
Element ASTM A36 Rigid 
BCT Anchor Post Solid Fully Integrated, S/R Wood Plastic Kinematic 
Bearing Plate Solid Constant Stress Solid Element ASTM A36 Rigid 
Blockout Solid Fully Integrated, S/R Wood Elastic 
Blockout Bolts Shell Belytschko-Tsay ASTM A36 Rigid 
Bolt Springs Discrete DRO=Translational Spring/Damper ASTM A36 
Spring,  
Non-Linear Elastic 
Ground-Line Strut Shell Belytschko-Tsay ASTM A36 Piecewise,  Linear Plastic 
Post Soil Tubes Shell Belytschko-Tsay Equivalent Soil Rigid 




Guardrail Section Shell 
Fully Integrated, 
Shell Element 




W6x9 Post Shell Fully Integrated, Shell Element 
ASTM A992  
Gr. 50 Piecewise, Linear Plastic 
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4.2.1 Increased Mounting Height Modeling 
A standard 31-in. (787-mm) rail height system was originally developed. Then, it was 
necessary to increase the top rail height to 32, 34, 36, and 37 in. (813, 864, 914, and 940 mm). 
This change was completed by the following methods: 
 Translating the W6x9 (W152x13.4) system posts in the z-direction to decrease 
post embedment; 
 Translating corrugated rail and mounting hardware vertically to align with 
increased height of the W6x9 (W152x13.4) posts; 
 Scaling the W6x9 (W152x13.4) post soil tubes vertically to align the base of the 
soil tube with the bottom of the post; 
 Scaling the BCT anchor post elements between the rail mounting hole and the 
ground-line hole vertically to align the mounting holes with the rail; and 
 Re-aligning the upstream and downstream anchor cables with the rail mounting 
and ground-line mounting locations. 
Each of these processes was performed for each rail mounting height to create five 
different MGS models with rail heights of 31, 32, 34, 36, and 37 in. (787, 813, 864, 914, and 940 
mm). The corresponding post embedment depths became 40, 39, 37, 35, and 34 in. (1016, 991, 
940, 889, and 864 mm), respectively. 
4.2.2 Anchor Geometry Effects at Increased Mounting Height 
Due to the increased rail mounting height, the end anchorage geometry was subsequently 
changed, which required that the BCT anchor posts be scaled vertically for each system height to 
line up the rail mounting hole geometry.  
Scaling of the BCT posts increased the aspect ratio of the elements in the affected area 
with a maximum aspect ratio of 1.654 for the 37-in. (940-mm)top- rail height. This scaling was 
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deemed minor. All elements were scaled uniformly and this aspect ratio was not deemed unsafe. 
The scaled 34-, 36-, and 37-in. (864-, 914-, and 940-mm) mounting height BCT posts were 
compared to the 32-in. (813-mm) BCT post in Figure 20. Scaling the BCT posts in this manner 
allowed the total number of elements in the posts to remain constant. 
Changing the rail mounting height altered the geometry of the cable anchorages. A 
comparison of these cable geometry changes is shown in Figure 21. The rail increased in height 
and the angle the cable created with the ground-line strut increased. The angle of the cable 
increased from an angle of 28.84 degrees at a 31-in. (787-mm) top-rail height to 35.13 degrees at 
a 37-in. (940-mm) top-rail height, roughly increasing by a degree for every 1 in. (25.4 mm). 
Similarly, the higher top-rail height increased the length of the end anchorage cable. The 
increased angle coupled with the increased cable length had the potential to alter the impact force 
in the anchorage system. 
4.3 Vehicle Models 
4.3.1 Geo Metro Vehicle Model 
Several vehicle models were used for the purpose of validating and simulating increased 
mounting height guardrail systems. Primarily, for underride studies, a Geo Metro vehicle model 
was used as the impacting vehicle. The Geo Metro vehicle model (820C), originally created by 
the National Crash Analysis Center (NCAC), was improved upon and obtained from Politecnico 
di Milano, Italy. This model was later modified by MwRSF personnel for use in roadside safety 
applications. The Geo model is shown in Figure 22.  
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Anchor Cable Angle 
Comparison Θ
 
Figure 21. Anchor Cable Geometry Changes 
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Figure 22. Geo Metro Vehicle Model 
4.3.2 Dodge Neon Vehicle Model 
Additionally, in order to study vehicle front-end geometry effects on the effectiveness of 
the system to redirect small cars, a Dodge Neon vehicle model (1100C) was used as the 
impacting vehicle. The Dodge Neon vehicle model was originally created by the NCAC and later 
modified by MwRSF personnel for use in roadside safety applications. The Dodge Neon vehicle 
model is shown in Figure 23. 
 
Figure 23. Dodge Neon Vehicle Model 
4.3.3 Chevrolet Silverado Vehicle Model 
Finally, to analyze anchor displacements and forces as well as override effects when the 
MGS was placed on approach slopes, a Chevrolet Silverado vehicle model (2270P) was used as 
the impacting vehicle. The Silverado vehicle model was originally created by the NCAC and 
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later modified by MwRSF personnel for use in roadside safety applications. The Silverado 
vehicle model is shown in Figure 24. 
 
Figure 24. Chevrolet Silverado Vehicle Model 
4.4 Modeling Issues 
In the course of creating and validating a model using LS-DYNA, multiple simulation 
issues and model creation problems occurred which required careful consideration and tuning in 
order to provide the best representation of physical results. This section documents the issues 
encountered in generating the models for use in determining the maximum guardrail height. 
Problems encountered included scale factor issues, contact issues, and blockout failure criterion 
refinement. 
4.4.1 Surface Contact Scale Factors 
The penalty stiffness was adjusted to scale the stiffness of each interacting pair of masses 
(segments) separated by springs (penalty stiffness) to an optimum level so that the system 
remained stable with minimal penetration. Penalty stiffness, in essence, added massless springs 
that depended on segment mass for stability [26, 27]. Since the segment mass was already 
considered in element time-step calculations, there was no way to ensure stability with any added 
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penalty stiffness, so the stiffness was scaled back to a small fraction of the calculated stability 
limit. Initially, penetrated nodes were not moved during initialization; rather, the initial 
penetration for each segment pair was stored and subtracted from the current penetration before 
calculating penalty forces [26, 27]. The disadvantage of this method was that some parts may 
penetrate too much. In this case, where a great deal of sliding ocurred as one segment of the 
vehicle fender slid along the rail, the vehicle fender penetrated a little deeper each time it passed 
from one segment to another because it entered the new segment from the side. At this point, the 
penetrated nodes became "trapped" behind the rail and a sort of induced snagging occurred 
where the fender caught and rotated the car.  
 Simulation at 34-in. (864-mm) Rail Height 4.4.1.1
At a contact scale factor of 1.0, the 34-in. (864-mm) MGS simulation errored out after 
200 ms; the scale factors on the slave penalty stiffness (SFS) were changed to 0.5 from a default 
value of 1.0. This provided a stable simulation which was able to run to completion. Good 
similarity was exhibited up to 200 ms, as shown in Figure 25. Therefore, the change to SFS did 
not significantly alter the simulation results at this height; however, at a 36-in. (914-mm) rail 
height, significant differences were shown.  
SFS was set in the *CONTACT card and scaled the SLSFAC parameter, which was set in 
the *CONTROL_CONTACT card. The SLSFAC for all simulations was set to 0.1. Thus, an SFS 
set to 0.5 and 1.0, as used here, created an overall scale factor of 0.05 and 0.1, respectively. 
 Simulation at 36-in. (914-mm) Rail Height 4.4.1.2
Using a contact scale factor of 1.0, in the 36-in. (914-mm) MGS model allowed the simulation to 
run to completion, but the vehicle showed significant snagging and incurred major occupant 
compartment damage. This simulation was not deemed realistic due to the major vehicle twisting 
throughout the occupant compartment. Similar to the 34-in. (864-mm) simulation, the contact 
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scale factor was reduced to 0.5 and the simulation was re-run. A comparison between the contact 
scale factors is shown in Figure 26 for the 36-in. (914-mm) systems. 
 
SFS = 1.0  t = 0 ms  SFS = 0.5 
 
 
SFS = 1.0  t = 60 ms  SFS = 0.5 
 
 
SFS = 1.0  t = 120 ms  SFS = 0.5 
 
 
SFS = 1.0  t = 200 ms  SFS = 0.5 
 
Figure 25. Comparison of 820C impact with SFS=1.0 and 0.5 at 34 in. (864 mm) 
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    t = 0 ms  t = 150 ms            t = 300 ms           t = 450 ms 
SFS = 1.0 
 
    
    t = 0 ms  t = 150 ms            t = 300 ms           t = 450 ms 
SFS = 0.5 
Figure 26. Comparison of 820C impact with SFS=1.0 and 0.5 at 36 in. (914 mm) 
The perceived realism of decreasing the contact scale factor in the 36-in. (914-mm) 
simulations and the instabilities shown at SFS = 1.0 induced the decision to use SFS = 0.5. This 
scale factor was used in all simulations. 
4.4.2 Contact Formulation 
From the LS-DYNA Theory Manual, the contact formulation was applied in 
*CONTACT cards by setting SOFT = 0, 1, or 2 [26]. In this study, only SOFT=0 or 2 was used. 
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The SOFT = 0 formulation is a nodal-based contact and is the default setting [26,27]. For 
SOFT = 0, contact formulation of the surface timestep is proportional to ට௠௞ , where m is 
essentially the mass attached to the contact "spring" and k is the contact spring stiffness, which is 
a function of the material bulk modulus and element size. The simplest way to increase the 
surface timestep is to reduce the contact stiffness by reducing SFS and the scale factor on the 
master penalty stiffness (SFM) on card 3 of *CONTACT. SFM is used for two-way contacts 
such as *CONTACT_AUTOMATIC_SURFACE_TO_SURFACE, which was used for the 
vehicle-to-rail contacts in all simulations. 
 SOFT=2 4.4.2.2
The contact formulation SOFT = 2 is segment based and is a general purpose shell and 
solid element penalty-type contact algorithm. Contact detection between segments prevents 
penetration of undetected nodes, which can happen with SOFT = 0 when nodes slip behind and 
between segments at edges and corners. For SOFT = 2, the contact stiffness is calculated based 
on the actual timestep. The contact timestep reported in the d3hsp file is not meaningful for 
SOFT = 2 contact. Initial penetrations exhibited by SOFT = 0 and SOFT = 1 are not eliminated 
by the use of SOFT = 2; Instead, they become a baseline from which added penetration is 
measured and from which contact forces are calculated. 
 Graphical Comparison of Cases 4.4.2.3
Contact with SOFT = 2 was expected to give the best results because segment-based 
contact is generally better at detecting edge-to-edge contact, which exists between the edges of 
the W-beam rail and many of the vehicle parts. However, setting SOFT = 2 trapped nodes behind 
the rail and allowed for induced mesh tangling, whereas setting SOFT = 0 had none of these 
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effects, as shown in Figure 27. Therefore, SOFT = 0 was used for all simulations used in 
drawing conclusions with respect to maximum guardrail height. 
 
SOFT = 0 at t = 70 ms 
 
 
SOFT = 2 at t = 70 ms 
 
Figure 27. Contact Formulation Differences 
4.4.3 Blockout Bolt Failure Deflection 
The MGS is built with wood blockouts placed between the rail and the posts.  During 
experimental tests, blockouts in the impact zone have been shown to split or be ejected intact 
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away from the system. The failure of these components may affect the dynamic deflection of the 
rail and, eventually, the vehicle kinematics. When considering the proper contact between the 
vehicle and the blockouts, a high failure mode caused an unrealistic snagging of the front bumper 
into this component of the barrier, whereas a low failure mode caused the rail-blockout-post 
connection to release outside of the impact zone.  
Long bolts, used to attach blockouts to posts, were modeled using Belytschko-Tsay rigid 
shell elements (for the bolt surface, head, and nut) tensioned with discrete nonlinear elastic 
spring beam elements with nodes constrained to the bolt ends. The discrete beam elements were 
prescribed a failure deflection to simulate bolt failure. The optimal prescribed failure deflection 
defined in the section discrete card for the blockout bolts was 0.02 in. (0.5 mm) and positive for 
tension. This provided good blockout behavior with both the small car and pickup truck and 
compared well to full-scale vehicle crash test results.  
Two primary modes of blockout and blockout bolt failure were shown: (1) the blockout 
bolt sheared and (2) the blockout bolt bent and the blockout ruptured. These failure modes are 
shown in Figure 28. Modeling of wood fracture in LS-DYNA is still a gross approximation, but 
is reasonably accurate in several applications. However, engineering judgment is still necessary 
when using these results.  
 Rather than attempt to model any wood fracture of the blockout, the blockout bolt springs 
were prescribed a failure deflection (FD). This provided a reasonable facsimile of the overall 
blockout failure and ejection of the blockout from the guardrail system. A comparison of the full-
scale crash test blockouts post-test and the simulation are shown in Figure 29. 
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(1)                  (2) 
 
Figure 28. Blockout Bolt Failure Modes 
 
 
Figure 29. Blockout and Bolt from Test No. MGSMRH-1 and Simulation 
An analysis of the blockout bolt failure was done to ensure realistic rail-blockout-post 
release in the impact region. This blockout bolt failure criterion eventually affected the 
anchorage behavior. The blockout bolt displacement was parametrically studied to find a 
reasonable failure deflection criterion using anchorage displacements and a rail-blockout-post 
release comparison. 
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 Failure Deflection = 0.3 4.4.3.1
The displacement of the top center of anchor post nos. 1 and 29, of the 36-in. (914-mm) 
top-rail height system from an impact with the 820C vehicle using a failure deflection of 0.01 in. 
(0.3 mm) is shown in Figure 30. As expected, the upstream anchor displaced significantly more 
than the downstream anchor with a peak displacement of roughly 2.6 in. (67 mm) and 2 in. (52 
mm), respectively. 
 
Figure 30. Anchor Displacement for 820C with FD=0.3 
Initially, these anchor displacements seemed reasonable. However, as the rail height 
increased, an increased moment would result in slightly higher anchor deflections. However, the 
degree of anchor displacements shown here was similar to the anchor deflection in the simulation 
of the 2270P pickup truck impacting the same system. The increased loading of the larger 
vehicle should cause higher displacements than the small car.  
 Failure Deflection = 0.5 4.4.3.2
Anchor displacements of the system with a failure deflection of the blockout bolt set to 
0.02 in. (0.5 mm) provided lower, and seemingly much more reasonable, anchor displacements, 
as shown in Figure 31.  
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It was determined that at a failure deflection of 0.01 in. (0.3 mm) the rail detached from 
the posts downstream of the impact zone. This detachment caused a greater pulling force on the 
anchorages, accounting for the increased displacement and for the high oscillations of the 
displacement. This did not occur, nor is likely to occur, in full-scale vehicle crash testing. 
 
Figure 31. Anchor Displacement for 820C with FD=0.5 
 Failure Deflection= 0.75 4.4.3.3
At a failure deflection of 0.03 in. (0.75 mm) and a top-rail height of 36 in. (914 mm) the 
blockouts did not disengage as desired, causing the car to snag on the blockout of a bent-over 
post, stopping the car and sending the car into a yaw rotation about the blockout. This again was 
very unlikely since the blockout should fail. The stiffer blockout bolts held the blockouts to the 
posts throughout the impact event, thus preventing vehicle-post interaction as observed in full-
scale crash tests. While not an issue at the standard mounting height, this was a critical issue at 
increased W-Beam guardrail mounting heights. Higher deflections prevented blockout 
detachment from the posts in the desired conditions. Failure was defined to simulate blockout 
failures shown in physical tests from wood splitting and/or bolt failure.  
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 Graphical Comparison of Failure Deflections 4.4.3.4
A failure deflection of 0.02 in. (0.5 mm) provided adequate blockout detachment without 
allowing the car's redirection to be influenced by snagging on the blockout. A comparison of the 
altered failure deflections at a top-rail height of 36 in. (914 mm) and SFS set to 0.5 is shown in 
Figure 32. 
 
FD = 0.3 at t = 0.600 s 
 
FD = 0.5 at t = 0.600 s 
 
FD = 0.75 at t = 0.180 s (back)               FD = 0.75 at t = 0.600 s (front)  
 
Figure 32. Blockout Bolt Failure Deflection Comparison 
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A failure deflection of 0.02 in. (0.5 mm) was the most reasonable, provided the best 
results, and most closely simulated full-scale tests. In comparison, FD = 0.3 allowed the rail to 
detach from the blockouts downstream of impact; and FD = 0.75 completely stopped the car and 
the rail did not detach from the post. 
4.5 Modeling Instabilities of 1100C (Neon) Vehicle Model 
Simulations using the 1100C (Neon) vehicle encountered significant issues with run 
completion and errors due to failed shell elements along the front bumper cover. The model 
became unstable and would error out. Additionally, when the bumper cover was taken out of the 
contact definition, further element failures along the fender of the vehicle would cause additional 
errors. The exact source of the errors in this simulation was unknown, but this model has 
exhibited instabilities in a variety of simulations. It is recommended that the current Toyota 
Yaris 1100C model being produced by NCAC be used to simulate impacts at the raised 
mounting heights when a usable version is available.  
The simulations using the Neon model became unstable at roughly 140 ms. At this point, 
vehicle underride and whether or not the vehicle would satisfy test standards can be determined. 
The partial results were compared to the 820C simulations in Chapter 7. Furthermore, as shown 
in Section 7.2, the front-end geometry of the 820C Geo more closely matched that of the Kia Rio 
that was used in test nos. MGSMRH-1 and MGSMRH-2. For these reasons, it was determined 
that the Geo model was acceptable for use in examining maximum rail height and for comparing 
to full-scale crash tests. 
4.6 Summary of Parameters 
The 820C Geo models used in these studies were modified for use in roadside safety 
applications by researchers at the MwRSF [28]. Self-contact between the Geo Metro model parts 
was defined using a single-surface contact inclusive of the vehicle parts. Contact between the car 
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and barrier was defined using an automatic single surface contact. Additionally, the scale factor, 
SFS, was defined as 0.5 to prevent vehicle-barrier part penetration and subsequent simulation 
failure and was used to scale the SLSFAC. The SLSFAC for these models was set to 0.1; thus an 
SFS set to 0.5 created an overall contact scale factor of 0.05. The SOFT parameter of the contact 
card was set to zero. This prescribed a nodal contact penalty formulation and helped to provide 
the best representation of full-scale crash data. In order to provide good guardrail-blockout 
connection performance and behavior, a failure deflection of 0.02 in. (0.5 mm) was defined for 
the blockout bolt. These parameters are summarized in Table 15. 
Table 15. Summary of 820C - Barrier Model 
Parameter Input 
Contact between Geo Metro Model Parts Single Surface 
Contact between Car and Barrier Automatic Single Surface 
SFS 0.5 
SLSFAC 0.1 
Overall Contact Scab Factor 0.05 
SOFT 0 
FD, in. (mm) 0.02 (0.5) 
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5 BASELINE SIMULATION AT 32-IN. (813-MM) RAIL HEIGHT 
5.1 Introduction 
Simulations of the standard height MGS were performed to provide a basis for 
understanding of the 820C vehicle redirection behavior. Validation of the results was done with 
comparisons to the full-scale vehicle crash test no. NPG-1 [2, 12]. The MwRSF has generally 
tested small cars (1100C and 820C) at a nominal top-rail height of 32 in. (813 mm) to examine 
the potential for vehicle underride and snagging. This height is currently designated as the 
acceptable upper limit for the MGS system.   
5.2 Simulation at 32-in. (813-mm) Rail Height 
Test no. NPG-1 was performed June 29, 2001 with an 820C small car at a targeted impact 
angle of 20 degrees and speed of 62.1 mph (100 km/h). Impact was to occur 57½ in. (1461 mm) 
upstream from the center of the splice between post nos. 14 and 15. Complete targeted and tested 
criteria for test no. NPG-1 are shown in Table 16 along with the simulation parameters. These 
impact conditions met NCHRP Report No. 350 crash test standards [1]. 
Table 16. Test No. NPG-1 and Simulation Conditions 
MGS at  
























Impact Angle deg 20 20.0 20 
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Simulations were performed at this top rail height to verify and validate the model prior 
to examining increased rail mounting heights. Simulations were carried out using the 820C (Geo) 
vehicle model. 
5.3 Comparison of Test Conditions and Simulation Results 
Excellent correlation between the simulation and the full-scale vehicle crash test no. 
NPG-1 was demonstrated, as shown in Figure 33. The visual assessment along with a numerical 
comparison between the simulation and the full-scale vehicle crash test provided verification for 
use of this model with increased rail mounting height simulations.  
A complete verification of the model was carried out using the procedures for verification 
and validation of computer simulations used for roadside safety applications per NCHRP Report 
No. W179 [29]. The simulation satisfied the standardized criteria. The full verification report can 
be found in Appendix E. 
General comparisons between the simulation results and the crash test results are shown 
in Table 17. Maximum deflection, parallel time and parallel velocity compared very well 
between the simulation and the full-scale test which aided in validating the model and 
encouraged its use for increased heights. 
5.3.1 Anchor Displacement 
System anchor displacement was of particular interest for all vehicle impacts. While 
anchor movement was more pronounced with 2270P impacts, the anchor displacement involving 
the 820C vehicle was also examined. The simulated displacements of the top center of the 
anchors, post nos. 1 and 29, of the 32-in. (813-mm) system from an impact with the 820C 
vehicle is shown in Figure 34. As expected, the upstream anchor displaced significantly more 
than the downstream anchor with a peak displacement of about 1.10 in. (28 mm) and 0.51 in. (13 
mm), respectively. 
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t = 0 ms 
 
t = 60 ms 
 
t = 160 ms 
 
t = 200 ms 
Figure 33. Sequential Figures from Simulation and Test No. NPG-1 
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t = 260 ms 
 
t = 300 ms 
 
t = 400 ms 
Figure 33. Sequential Figures from Simulation and Test No. NPG-1 (continued) 
Table 17. Test No. NPG-1 and Simulation Results 
MGS at 
32 in. (813 mm)  
Top Rail Height 
Units 
Results 
Test No. NPG-1 LS-DYNA Simulation 





Vehicle Parallel Time ms 201 220 
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Figure 34. Anchor Displacement for 32-in. (813-mm) Top-Rail Height MGS 
These anchor displacements were reasonable when compared to full-scale crash tests. 
While no overhead cameras were present on test no. NPG-1, some simple estimates can be made 
to determine a reasonable maximum displacement of the top of the anchor posts. Using a 2/3 
embedment depth rotation point estimate for the upstream and downstream anchorages and soil 
gap measurements, an estimate can be formed from simple geometry to determine the maximum 
movement of the top of the anchor posts. From test no. NPG-1, there was an estimated ¼-in. (6-
mm) soil gap on the  upstream and downstream anchors which would correspond to a 0.59-in. 
(15-mm) top-of-post displacement. This estimate corresponds well to the downstream anchorage. 
Although this was an estimate, it provides some validation that the anchor displacements were 
reasonably accurate. 
5.3.2 Vehicle-Rail Interaction 
Several parameters were examined to validate the simulation model with full-scale 
vehicle crash test data using test no. NPG-1 [12]. A time history of the full-scale test and the 
simulation is shown in Table 18. 
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Table 18. Event History of Test No. NPG-1 and Simulation 
Event Units Test No. NPG-1 Simulation 
Impact ms 0 0 
Post No. 14 (Post No. 12 for simulation)  
begins to deflect. Left front of car under rail. ms 12 10 
Post No. 15 (Post No. 13 for simulation)  
begins to visibly rotate back ms 44 40 
Post No. 16 (Post No. 14 for simulation)  
begins to visibly rotate back ms 76 70 
Car begins to roll away from rail ms 78 74 
Left front at Post No. 15  
(Post No. 13 for simulation) ms 148 90 
Bumper cover begins to come off ms 150 100 
Blockout bolt on Post No. 15  
(Post No. 13 for simulation)  
begins twisting and knocked loose from rail 
ms 152 120 
Maximum Dynamic Deflection Occurs ms 131 150 





Car becomes parallel with system ms 201 224 





Car out from under rail ms 208 230 
Left front is at Post No. 16  
(Post No. 14 for simulation) ms 236 175 
Left front is at Post No. 17  
(Post No. 15 for simulation) ms 252 250 
Car exits system ms 450 410 






The simulation showed that the vehicle did not reach parallel with the system as quickly 
as observed in the full-scale crash test. This difference was possibly due to the bumper cover 
failing sooner and subsequently allowing the car to pass behind and remain under the rail longer. 
This behavior kept the vehicle yawing into the system and increased the parallel time. 
Additionally, the exit time of the vehicle was 40 ms less in the simulation than in the full-scale 
test. Thus, some shifting and shortening of the series of events occurred. 
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5.3.3 Energy Balance 
The energy balance analysis provided an indication of the energy distribution in the 
system. This energy balance will vary depending upon the barrier configuration, member 
properties, and time within a given impact simulation. The energy balance data of the 820C 
vehicle simulation at a 32-in. (813-mm) top-rail height is shown in Figure 35.  The various 
energies will be described in Section 6.5.7. 
 
Figure 35. Energy Balance of 820C Vehicle Simulation 
5.4 Discussion 
The graphical assessment with overhead images from the full-scale vehicle crash test, 
along with a numerical comparison, provided verification for use of this model with increased 
rail mounting height simulations. Overall, it was shown that the finite element model was 
reasonably well verified by the procedures set forth in NCHRP Report No. W179 [29]. The 
visual validation and verification provided confidence that the barrier model was capable of 
accurately predicting the ability of increased rail-height MGS systems to safely redirect vehicles. 
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6 MAXIMUM SAFE GUARDRAIL HEIGHT EVALUATION WITH LS-DYNA 
6.1 Introduction 
Two relevant full-scale vehicle crash tests have been performed at increased rail 
mounting heights. In 2011, the MwRSF published a report that examined maximum height 
parameters for the MGS [9]. Two tests were performed on 175-ft (53.3-m) long systems with an 
1100C small car at top-rail mounting heights above a 32-in. (813-mm) nominal mounting height. 
Test no. MGSMRH-1 was performed on the MGS with a 34-in. (864-mm) nominal top-rail 
mounting height, and test no. MGSMRH-2 had a 36-in. (914-mm) nominal top-rail mounting 
height. Both tests passed according to MASH standards. An LS-DYNA simulation study was 
undertaken to determine how much farther the MGS rail height could be safely raised. First, 
simulations were run to validate the vehicle-to-barrier interactions. Then, interpolation of the 
top-rail height was undertaken to determine the minimum safe guardrail mounting height. 
6.2 Simulation at 34-in. (864-mm) Rail Height 
A top-rail mounting height of 34 in. (864 mm) was used to examine underride and 
redirection effectiveness with an 820C vehicle. An increased impact angle from 20 degrees to 25 
degrees was made to account for the increased impact severity from the  NCHRP Report No. 350 
standards to that of MASH standards. Though there was no designation for an 820C vehicle in 
MASH, this made the simulation analysis slightly more comparable to test no. MGSMRH-1. The 
front-end geometry of the 820C vehicle more closely matched that of the Kia Rio used in the 
full-scale test with the MGS at a 34-in. (864-mm) nominal top-rail height. Primarily, the cowl 
height of the 820C (Geo) small car model more closely matched that of the crash-tested vehicle. 
However, the flatter hood of the Neon model was shown to underride the guardrail system, 
whereas the Kia Rio did not when tested at the same rail heights. 
December 5, 2012  
MwRSF Report No. TRP-03-274-12 
 
76 
Sequential images of the 820C impacting the MGS system with a 34-in. (864-mm) 
nominal top-rail height are compared to test no. MGSMRH-1 in Figures 36 and 37. Note that the 
simulation images have been mirrored for better comparison with the full-scale test. Good 
correlation was shown in the reaction of the front of the vehicle as it impacted the rail. Slightly 
more penetration occurred in the full-scale vehicle crash test due to the increased mass of the 
larger vehicle. The resulting load caused the posts in the impact zone to bend to the ground, and 
for the vehicle to exit later in the full-scale test than was shown in the simulation. 
As mentioned, front-end geometry was a primary area of concern and in this case was 
shown to be a contributor to how the vehicle reacted to the increased rail height. As the front, 
impacting corner of the vehicle pushed into the lower corrugation of the W-beam, the rail 
detached from the blockouts. As this occurred, the rail pushed up and back. The front corner of 
the vehicle remained in the W-beam valley as the rail was pushed up and back causing the 
vehicle to roll away from the system. The valley of the W-beam rode along the hood-line of the 
vehicle and caught at the lower portion of the A-pillar. As the W-beam valley rode along the 
hood-line, the rail did not ride farther up the A-pillar or intrude into the occupant compartment. 
In a certain range, based on the hood and front-end geometry, the guardrail valley will fold 
around the hood corner up to the cowl line, causing the car to roll back. If the guardrail was 
mounted too high in comparison to the cowl height and outside of this range, the front of the car 
will underride the barrier instead of redirect away from it. 
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t = 0 ms 
 
t = 80 ms 
 
t = 160 ms 
 
t = 240 ms 
 
t = 320 ms 
 
Figure 36. Backside Sequential Figures from Simulation and Test No. MGSMRH-1 
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t = 0 ms 
 
t = 100 ms 
 
t = 200 ms 
 
t = 300 ms 
 
t = 400 ms 
 
Figure 37. Overhead Sequential Figures from Simulation and Test No. MGSMRH-1 
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6.3 Simulation at 36-in. (914-mm) Rail Height 
A simulation at a 36-in. (914-mm) top-rail mounting height was performed with an 820C 
vehicle. The increased rail height was used to further examine its effects on vehicle redirection 
and safety. The results of this simulation were compared to full-scale vehicle crash test no. 
MGSMRH-2. The impact speed and angle were 62.1 mph (100 km/h) and 25 degrees. Time 
sequential images of the impact are shown in Figures 38 and 39. Again, the similarity of the 
front-end geometry of the Geo Metro vehicle and the Kia Rio used in test no. MGSMRH-2 made 
the simulation and test results comparable. 
Much like the 34-in. (864-mm) top-rail height simulation, good correlation was shown in 
how the vehicle pushed the rail up and back, thus causing the car to roll away from the barrier. 
This caused the rail to slide along the hood corner up to the cowl line and smoothly redirect the 
vehicle. 
6.4 Simulation at 37-in. (940-mm) Rail Height 
Again, using an 820C vehicle, a simulation was run at a 37-in. (940-mm) nominal top-rail 
height to examine underride and guardrail redirection effectiveness. The impact speed and angle 
were 62.1 mph (100 km/h) and 25 degrees. Time sequential images of the small car impacting 
the 37-in. (940-mm) top-rail height system are shown in Figure 40. Severe underride of the 
system occurred at this mounting height, and failure to redirect the vehicle was obvious. The 
820C vehicle passed under the barrier causing the rail to deform the A-pillar and intrude into the 
occupant compartment, creating clear occupant risk and ultimately a test failure at this height. No 
further analysis was necessary, and this height was deemed to be over the rail height 
performance limit for the MGS on flat terrain. 
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t = 0 ms 
 
t = 80 ms 
 
t = 160 ms 
 
t = 240 ms 
 
t = 320 ms 
Figure 38. Back Side Sequential Figures from Simulation and Test No. MGSMRH-2 
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t = 0 ms 
 
t = 100 ms 
 
t = 200 ms 
 
t = 300 ms 
 
t = 400 ms 
 
t = 500 ms 
Figure 39. Overhead Sequential Figures from Simulation and Test No. MGSMRH-2 
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t = 0 ms 
 
t = 150 ms 
 
t = 300 ms 
 
t = 450 ms 
 
t = 600 ms 
 
Figure 40. Sequential Figures from 37-in. (940-mm) Top-Rail Height Simulation 
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6.5 Comparison of Test Conditions and Simulation Results 
The simulations with the 820C vehicle at varying top-rail mounting heights were 
compared to understand and analyze the differences in a variety of parameters, as shown in Table 
19. The 32-in. (813-mm) top-rail height simulation compared very well to test no. NPG-1 in all 
available parameters.  
The underride distance was found by measuring the deepest penetration of the front 
impact corner of the vehicle and the maximum rail deflection. The rail deflection was subtracted 
from the vehicle corner penetration distance to yield an underride distance for comparison in this 
study. Consequently, the working width of the system increased due to the increased propensity 
for underride at increased heights. 
6.5.1 Rail Deflection Analysis 
A comparison of test nos. MGSMRH-1 and MGSMRH-2 was necessary based on the 
geometric similarities of the as-tested and simulated vehicle front-ends. An anomaly was shown 
in test no. MGSMRH-2: the increased rail height resulted in lower dynamic rail deflection and a 
decreased working width. The cause of this decreased rail deflection was unclear. The 
simulations showed that an increased propensity for underride exhibited by the higher rail was 
accompanied by greater rail deflection, as shown in Figure 41. It would be expected that full-
scale vehicle crash tests would exhibit the same characteristics. 
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Table 19. Test and Simulation Conditions and Results Comparison 
Evaluation 
Parameters Units 
Physical Test Conditions and 


























































































































Impact Angle deg 18.7 24.97 25.6 20 25 25 25 
Parallel  





















































Working Width  




Corner Post Post Post 
Hood  
Corner 
Exit Time ms 450 518 562 410 410 430 n/a 
Resultant  













Exit Angle deg -10.3 -12.34 -21.85 -14.5 -22.9 -23.7 n/a 
Max Roll deg -2.69 -11.4 -11.1 -2.5 5.56 7.16 n/a 






























Figure 41. Simulated Rail Deflection Comparison at 600 ms for 820C Vehicle Impact
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6.5.2 Lateral Velocity 
The lateral and velocities were compared for the 820C vehicle impact at various rail 
heights. These plots provided a good basis for understanding the reaction of the vehicle 
throughout the impact. In general, as the impact angle was increased from 20 degrees, the 32-in. 
(813-mm) system, to 25 degrees, the 34- and 36-in. (864- and 914-mm) systems, the lateral 
velocity increased. The lateral velocity versus time for the increased rail height systems followed 
a very similar trend for each rail height, as shown in Figure 42. 
 
Figure 42. Comparison of Lateral CG Velocity of 820C Vehicle 
6.5.3 Longitudinal Velocity 
The increased impact angle resulted in lower longitudinal velocities throughout impact. 
However, the deceleration rate was slightly higher throughout impact causing more deceleration 
of the vehicle in the longitudinal direction. The longitudinal CG velocity versus time for all 
systems was consistent throughout impact, as shown in Figure 43. 
Impacts into the 34- and 36-in. (864- and 914-mm) rail height systems followed similar 
trends due to the similar propensity for underride and wheel snag. The vehicle exhibited a similar 
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reaction at both heights with slightly more underride at a 36-in. (914-mm) top-rail height. As a 
result, the velocity throughout impact was similar for both the 34- and 36-in. (864- and 914-mm) 
top-rail heights, as shown in Figure 44. 
 
Figure 43. Comparison of Longitudinal CG Velocity of 820C Vehicle 
 
Figure 44. Comparison of Resultant CG Velocity of 820C 
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Yaw rotation of the vehicle throughout impact gave further insight into the behavior of 
the vehicle and was a useful comparison tool, as shown in Figure 45. These angles were in 
relation to the barrier. Therefore, the vehicle started at a 20-degree impact angle for the 32-in. 
(813-mm) top-rail height simulation, and a 25-degree impact angle for the 34- and 36-in. (864- 
and 914-mm) top-rail height impacts. Again, the reactions of the vehicle from impact with the 
34- and 36-in. (864- and 914-mm) top-rail height systems were very similar.  
 
Figure 45. Yaw of 820C in Relation to Rail 
6.5.5 Roll 
One area that did differ between the simulations was the pitch and roll behavior of the 
cars. The roll of the vehicle increased according to the system height. At increased heights, the 
barrier caught the corner of the impacting hood of the vehicle, and as the rail deformed, the 
vehicle essentially rolled away from the barrier. Upon exit, the car rolled back to normal, 
overshot 0 degrees of roll, and rolled in the direction of the barrier. The deformed front-end of 
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the vehicle caused the vehicle to sit slightly askew of flat, at roughly a -2 degree roll angle, as 
shown in Figure 46. 
 
Figure 46. Roll of 820C 
6.5.6 Pitch 
As the car was redirecting, increased vehicle pitch occurred at increased rail heights, as shown in 
Figure 47. The increased roll angle showed that the redirection of the car was dependent on the 
deformation characteristics of the guardrail and its ability to essentially "bank" the car and 
redirect the vehicle away from the hazard. While this "banking" effect was a desirable 
characteristic that allowed for the use of increased rail height, it provided complications with 
vehicles of varying front-end geometries. A car with low hood height, such as that of sports cars, 
may likely allow unacceptable barrier underride. Higher car hood heights, such as those of 
crossovers and minivans, will easily redirect at the increased rail heights. A limit for every car 
exists at which point the guardrail is capable of causing this "banking" effect to redirect the 
vehicle. 
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A clearer picture of the vehicle redirection behavior at increased rail heights can now be 
developed. As the vehicle impacted the barrier, the following was shown to occur: (1) the front 
impacting corner of the vehicle crushed into the rail up to the cowl line of the car before the 
vehicle began to redirect; (2) the rail folded over the fender and hood up to the cowl, and the 
bottom of the rail rotated back and up; (3) the rotation of the rail forced the front-end of the car 
to roll away from the barrier and pulled the front impacting wheel off the ground, increasing 
pitch; and (4) once the lateral CG velocity reached zero and the car began to exit the system, the 
car slowly returned to level trajectory. Maximum roll occurred at roughly 170 ms across all 
simulations. This approximate time of maximum roll was shown from the front in Figure 48. 
It should be noted, however, that the absolute value of both roll and pitch angles were all 
relatively small and posed no significant concern to overall vehicle behavior. 
 
 
Figure 47. Pitch of 820C 
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32 in. (813 mm) 
 
 
34 in. (864 mm) 
 
 
36 in. (914 mm) 
Figure 48. Roll Behavior of 820C Vehicle 
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6.5.7 Energy Balance 
The energy balance analysis provided an indication of the energy distribution in the 
system. The energies examined included:  
 Kinetic Energy: energy due to motion; 
 Internal Energy: energy needed to create the system including kinetic and   
potential energy; 
 Total Energy: sum of energy in all forms in the system; 
 Hourglass Energy: nonphysical, zero-energy modes of deformation that produced 
zero strain and no stress which occurred in under-integrated solid, shell, and thick 
shell elements [26]; and 
 Sliding Energy: sum of slave, master, and frictional contact energy [26]. 
This energy balance varied depending on the barrier configuration, member properties, 
and time within a given impact simulation. The energy distribution was fairly consistent across 
simulation runs, as shown in Figure 49. The 32-in. (813-mm) top-rail height simulation showed a 
slightly lower internal energy peak and a slightly higher kinetic energy valley due to the 
decreased impact angle. 
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Figure 49. Energy Balance of 820C Vehicle Simulations 
6.6 Discussion 
Post snagging of the small car had previously been considered an issue as they underrode 
a system. These simulations showed that as the rail height was increased, a corresponding 
increase in underride did not occur. Rather, as the rail height was increased, to a certain degree, 
the car pitched up into the rail and rolled away from the system, thus preventing underride. The 
disconnection of the rail away from the blockouts as the vehicle came in contact with the lower 
corrugation of the W-beam caused the bottom of the rail to push up and out. This action rotated 
the W-beam. As it rotated, the corner of the vehicle hood counteracted this rotation by rolling 
away from the system. For the 820C vehicle model, the maximum safe guardrail mounting 
height was 36 in. (914 mm). The extent to which the guardrail can be raised and still show safe 
redirection of the vehicle was dependent on the front-end geometry of the vehicle. Furthermore, 
where post snagging occurred, no adverse behavior of the vehicle was observed. 
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7 ANALYSIS OF GEOMETRY AND RAIL HEIGHT EFFECTS 
7.1 Vehicle-to-Rail Geometry Effects 
As the rail height was increased, the relationship between the bumper height of the test 
vehicles and the rail changed, as shown in Figure 50. At a 32-in. (813-mm) top-rail mounting 
height, the windshield cowl of both the 820C and 1100C vehicles were above the top of the rail. 
As the height was increased to 34 in. (864 mm), the 820C model cowl was slightly above the top 
of the rail, whereas the 1100C model cowl was slightly below. At a 36-in. (914-mm) top-rail 
height, the front corner of the 820C model was higher than the bottom corrugation of the W-
beam, whereas the corner of the 1100C model was slightly below. 
 
32-in. (813-mm) top-rail mounting height 
 
34-in. (864-mm) top-rail mounting height 
 
36-in. (914-mm) top-rail mounting height 
 
Figure 50. Vehicle-to-Rail Geometry - 820C and 1100C Profiles 
The differing cowl heights had the potential to affect the success and failure of a 
simulation and full-scale crash test. The ability of the W-beam guardrail to contain the small car 
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relied on two factors: (1) the bottom W-beam corrugation had to be lower than the fender corner 
so as not to allow for severe underride and (2) the top W-beam corrugation had to be lower than 
the cowl so as not to cause severe A-pillar damage. 
Although errors occurred in the Neon simulations, they were valid up to approximately 
140 ms and were still very useful to examine the projection of the hood under and behind the 
system. In TL-3 full-scale tests, an 1100C vehicle could pass with a cowl height above 34 in. 
(864 mm) at top-rail mounting heights of 36 in. (914 mm). The difference in cowl heights 
between the Neon and the Geo Metro accounted for the difference in the failure heights for the 
two models. The Geo Metro was 1.2 in. (30 mm) taller at the cowl than the Neon and 
subsequently passed at a top-rail mounting height 1 in. (25 mm) higher than the Neon. A 
comparison of the Neon and Geo Metro models’ hood corner projection into and under the 
system at varying rail heights is shown in Figures 51 and 52, respectively. At 130 ms, the 
vehicles began to redirect and/or the hood corner was extending under and behind the system. 
The Neon began to underride at a 36-in. (914-mm) top-rail mounting height, whereas the Geo 
Metro was being redirected at this height but underrode at a 37-in. (940-mm) top-rail height.  
The underride exhibited by the Neon at a 36-in. (914-mm) top-rail height and Geo Metro 
at a 37-in. (940-mm) top-rail height caused severe occupant compartment deformation and 
would likely result in a test failure. Although the failure of the Neon simulation at a 36-in. (914-
mm) top-rail height was a concern, an analysis in the following section of the front-end geometry 
of the Neon and recent model year vehicles alleviated these concerns. 
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Figure 51. 1100C Neon Underride Comparison at 130 ms 
 
 
Figure 52. 820C Geo Metro Underride Comparison at 130 ms 
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7.2 Front-End Geometry Comparison 
A better understanding of the geometry of current model year vehicles was needed to 
make relevant recommendations regarding rail heights for cars. A 36-in. (914-mm) top-rail 
height was passable according to MASH standards for the vehicles tested and simulated with the 
front-end geometry shown in Figure 53, but it may not be passable for all 1100C test vehicles. 
Vehicle cowl heights below that of the tested Kia Rio and simulated Geo Metro would be of 
concern due to the propensity for underride exhibited by the Neon model.  
A survey of current model year vehicles was conducted. The front-end geometry of 
recent model year vehicles was measured to find those with the lowest front-end geometry 
profile. Vehicles with low front-end geometry were at risk for underride at increased rail heights. 
However, in recent years, vehicle front-end geometry has been progressing towards a more 
raked, wedge-shaped hood profile with an increased "beltline" and cowl height, as shown in 
Table 20. This suggested that the vehicles tested and simulated are at the low end of cowl heights 
and front-end geometry and may be considered a worst or near-worst case scenario. The lowest 
cowl geometry found was still higher than the tested and simulated vehicles with a range varying 
from 36 in. (914 mm) to 39.75 in. (1,010 mm). Therefore, the recommendations made with the 
vehicles tested and simulated are valid across the majority of new small cars in production and 
for sale in the U.S. today. 
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820C Simulation Model and Test No. NPG-1 test vehicle 
 
1100C Simulation Model and Test No. MGSMRH-2 test vehicle 
*Top of hood measurements were not in the field book and were taken from similar vehicles 
 
Figure 53. Simulation Model Vehicle and Test Vehicle Dimension Comparison 
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Table 20. Recent Model Year Vehicle Front-End Geometry Profiles 
 
Model 
Year Make Model 
a b c d 
in. mm in. mm in. mm in. mm 
2012 Chevrolet Cobalt 36 914 27 686 21 533 8 203 
2012 Honda Insight 36.5 927 26.5 673 21.5 546 8 203 
2011 Kia Rio 36.5 927 28 711 23 584 8.5 216 
2012 Honda Civic 37.25 946 27.5 699 20.5 521 9 229 
2012 Hyundai Accent 37.5 953 29 737 23 584 6.75 171 
2012 Ford Fusion 37.75 959 30.25 768 20.5 521 9 229 
2012 Chevrolet Cruze 38 965 30 762 24.5 622 6.75 171 
2012 Honda Accord 38 965 28.5 724 21.5 546 8 203 
2012 Nissan Altima 38 965 29 737 23 584 8 203 
2012 Ford Focus 38.25 972 28.5 724 23.5 597 7.75 197 
2012 Mazda 3 38.25 972 29 737 21 533 7.75 197 
2010 Volkswagen Jetta 38.25 972 27 686 21 533 8.5 216 
2012 Ford Fiesta 38.5 978 28.25 718 23 584 8 203 
2012 Honda Fit 38.5 978 26 660 20.5 521 7.5 191 
2012 Hyundai Elantra 38.5 978 29.25 743 23.5 597 8 203 
2012 Nissan Sentra 38.75 984 28.25 718 22.5 572 8 203 
2012 Subaru Legacy 38.75 984 28.5 724 22 559 9 229 
2012 Toyota Corolla 38.75 984 31 787 21.75 552 9 229 
2012 Chrysler 200 39 991 28 711 23 584 8 203 
2012 Toyota Yaris 39.25 997 31.5 800 21 533 7.5 191 
2011 Chevrolet Aveo 39.5 1003 28 711 22 559 8 203 
2012 Chevrolet Sonic 39.5 1003 32 813 25.5 648 7 178 
2012 Dodge Avenger 39.5 1003 32 813 23 584 9.5 241 
2012 Nissan Versa 39.5 1003 29 737 20.5 521 7 178 
2013 Hyundai Sonata 39.75 1010 29.75 756 21.5 546 7 178 
2012 Nissan Maxima 39.75 1010 29 737 23 584 8 203 
2012 Toyota Prius 39.75 1010 32 813 22 559 8.5 216 
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8 ANCHORAGE AND RAIL DEFLECTION ANALYSIS 
8.1 Purpose of 2270P Pickup Truck Analysis 
Raising the rail height benefitted large-vehicle impacts because a higher rail placed the 
barrier closer to the center of gravity and theoretically provided better redirection properties. 
This can result in increased barrier performance by reducing the potential for rollover or barrier 
override. A concern with this increased rail height was anchorage performance. No full-scale 
crash tests have been performed with 2270P pickup trucks on W-beam barriers with top-rail 
mounting heights over 31 in. (787 mm). For this reason, simulations were performed at varying 
mounting heights to compare anchor forces, anchor deflections, and overall system rail 
deflections using the 2270P pickup model. 
 A complete verification of the model was carried out using the procedures for 
verification and validation of computer simulations used for roadside safety applications per 
NCHRP Report No. W179 [29]. The simulation satisfied the standardized criteria. The full 
verification report can be found in Appendix F. 
8.2 Anchorage Force Analysis 
Comparison of the upstream anchor was of primary concern since it underwent greater 
deflection and higher forces during impacts as found in previous full-scale vehicle crash tests. A 
comparison of the anchor cable cross section force with truck impacts at post no. 12 is shown in 
Figure 54. The higher top-rail mounting heights provided some differences in anchor cable force 
but were generally in the same range. This suggested that the higher rail height, and subsequently 
changed cable geometry, may not significantly affect the performance of the barrier anchorage in 
regard to large trucks. A limiting effect may be induced by the end anchorage ground-line strut 
which prevented a significant increase in anchor cable forces. 
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Figure 54. US Anchor Cable Cross Section Forces 
Similarly, the downstream anchorages did not show large differences in the cross 
sectional force, as shown in Figure 55. The upstream cable anchorage showed a slight decrease 
in the initial peak cable force at increased rail mounting heights. This was followed by a slightly 
higher force as the vehicle reached parallel with the system and exited the system. The 
downstream anchorage displayed an inverse trend of decreased initial peak cable force followed 
by a higher sustained force throughout the impact and as the vehicle exited the system. This was 
due to the impact location being nearer to the upstream end of the system. As the vehicle moved 
through the impact zone, it moved closer to the downstream end anchorage, and an increased 
force was imparted to that anchorage.  
In addition, the forces through the cross-sections of the rail after post no. 1, before post 
no. 2, and after post no. 2 were similar across all three impact heights at each individual location 
along the rail. These cross-sections locations are shown in Figure 56. However, loads at the three 
locations were not similar to one another. This was expected as the rail impact force did not 
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significantly change and the hardware connections and the rail materials did not change. 
Additionally, the anchor cable absorbed a majority of the force before it reached the section after 
post no. 1. Minor increases in rail force were expected only due to the increase in load placed on 
the rail from the increased system deflection. 
 
Figure 55. Downstream Anchor Cable Cross Section Forces 



























Figure 56. Upstream Anchor Cross-Sections 
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The load along the rail was transferred from the rail through the anchor cable and 
ultimately to the ground. This was evidenced by the relatively higher loads before and after post 
no. 2 and through the anchor cable as compared to the force through the rail after post no. 1. The 
forces through the rail cross-sections after post no. 1, before post no. 2, and after post no. 2, are 
shown in Figure 57.  
The similarities in force were attributed to the relationship between the rail center and the 
height of the truck center of gravity, which was 28.5 in. (724 mm). At a 31-in. (787-mm) top-rail 
mounting height, the center of the rail was at 24 7/8 in. (632 mm), below the truck CG height. 
This meant that more force was being exerted on the top corrugation of the rail, subsequently 
introducing roll into the system and torque in the rail about its length. Additionally, reduced rail 
height meant more wheel contact area with the lower corrugation, generating the higher initial 
peak force as a slight torque was applied to the rail, flexing the anchorage cable. 
As the rail height increased to 34 in. (864 mm), the CG was near the rail center causing a 
similar force to be exerted in both the top and bottom corrugations, resulting in a more stable, 
level vehicle response. At this height, the apparent cable force peak was slightly lower but 
maintained a slightly higher force throughout the simulation as energy was being absorbed more 
evenly across the rail. The initial decrease in peak force was attributed to the decreased contact 
area between the tire and lower rail corrugation, which reduced the kinetic energy transfer from 
the stiffer suspension and wheel components by replacing that contact space with the relatively 
softer fender components. As the vehicle came farther into contact with the rail, this effect was 
reduced and the force increased.  
When the rail height was raised to 36 in. (914 mm), the CG of the vehicle was slightly 
below the rail center. This generated a higher force along the bottom corrugation, causing it to 
fold under and result in some wheel underride as the truck tire passed behind the back side of the 
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rail. Once behind the rail, the tire was trapped and subsequently, the truck pitched down when 
suspension failure was not prescribed to the pickup truck. 
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Force through Rail After Post No. 1 
 
Force through Rail Before Post No. 2 
 
Force through Rail After Post No. 2 
Figure 57. Force through Rail from a 2270P Impact 
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8.3 Anchorage Displacement Analysis 
The displacement of the top center of anchor post nos. 1 and 29 for the 31-, 34-, and 36-
in. (787-, 864-, 914-mm) systems from an impact with the 2270P pickup truck is shown in 
Figures 58 and 59.  
 
Figure 58. Upstream Anchor Displacement (2270P Pickup Truck) 
 
Figure 59. Downstream Anchor Displacement (2270P Pickup Truck) 
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As expected, the upstream anchor displaced significantly more than the downstream 
anchor, and the peak displacement increased as the rail mounting height increased. The increased 
displacement was expected due to the increased height of the system and elongated moment arm 
applied to the anchor posts. The maximum deflections occurred at a 36-in. (914-mm) top-rail 
height. The maximum deflections of the upstream and downstream anchors were 3.2 in. (81 mm) 
and 1.8 in. (46 mm), respectively. 
8.4 Impact Variations Due to Suspension Failure 
During the rail height analysis, it was noted that different vehicle reactions occurred from 
an impact with the 31- and 34-in. (787- and 864-mm) top-rail heights as compared to an impact 
with a 36-in. (914-mm) top-rail height. While the impacts on systems of 34 in. (864 mm) or less 
produced similar body roll reactions, the 36-in. (914-mm) top-rail height system caused the 
2270P pickup truck wheel to ride under the rail. Once under the rail, the truck was pulled toward 
the system. Subsequently, snagging occurred, pulling the vehicle further into the rail. Prescribing 
suspension failure to the model created better vehicle behavior and prevented this snagging. The 
initial and parallel states, without suspension failure prescribed, of the 2270P pickup truck next 
to 31-, 34-, and 36-in. (787-, 864-, 914-mm) rail height systems are shown in Figure 60. 
The 31- and 34-in. (787- and 864-mm) top-rail height systems adequately redirected the 
2270P pickup truck. However, at a 36-in. (914-mm) top-rail height, the left-front wheel was 
trapped behind the rail, as mentioned. This resulted in wheel snag upon exit and hindered the 
effective redirection of the truck. Prescribed suspension failure of the left-front wheel led to 
different results, as shown in Figure 61. Suspension failure did little to change the response of 
the 31- and 34-in. (787- and 864-mm) top-rail height systems.  
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31-in. (787-mm) System 
 
34-in. (864-mm) System 
 
36-in. (914-mm) System 
Figure 60. 2270P Pickup Truck Impact without Prescribed Suspension Failure 
 
31-in. (787-mm) System 
 
34-in. (864-mm) System 
 
36-in. (914-mm) System 
Figure 61. Prescribed Suspension Failure Impact Variations 
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The small differences in the simulations with suspension failure for the 31-in. (787-mm) 
tall system were noted while selecting a model for the simulation [25]. However, the increased 
barrier height and suspension failure allowed the left-front tire to become disengaged from the 
truck after passing behind the rail. This caused the left-front corner of the truck to drop down and 
lean into the barrier, which also allowed smoother redirection of the truck since the wheel did not 
snag on the posts. Full-scale tests showed that suspension failure and wheel disengagement were 
likely to occur in a high percentage of vehicle crash tests. Therefore, the suspension failure 
shown was a more likely scenario. Aside from the improved vehicle redirection of the 
suspension failure, significant differences were not shown in any of the parameters of interest in 
relation to the anchorage displacements and forces. 
8.5 Comparison of Test Conditions and Simulation Results 
The simulations with the 2270P at varying top-rail mounting heights were compared to 
understand and analyze the differences in a variety of parameters, as shown in Table 21. 
Prescribed suspension failure did not significantly affect major redirection parameters with the 
exception of vehicle roll, which was expected. Suspension failure did provide improved vehicle 
behavior. At higher rail heights, the wheel snagged on posts and caused yawing of the vehicle 
toward the barrier, as indicated by the exit angle at 36-in. (914-mm) top-rail heights. As the rail 
height increased, corresponding and consistent increases in rail deflections were shown. 
However, the working width decreased slightly due to the angle at which posts were impacted 
and folded to the ground. At a 36-in. (914-mm) top-rail height, post rotation increased slightly in 
the impact zone, post nos. 11 through 18, which decreased the working width. In all cases the 
posts were the working width indicators.  
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Impact Angle deg  25.49 25 25 25 25 25 25 
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 Exit Angle deg -13.5 -15.5 -16.2 -15.0 -16.0  -1.6* -2.8* 
Max Roll deg -4.08   -5.5   -10.2 -1.8 -4.0 2.6 -4.1  
Max Pitch deg -1.8 -2.4 -1.9 -1.6 -2.2 3.2 -2.0 
Pass/Fail - Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
*Truck did not exit system in simulation, value is end of simulation.
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A concern with increased rail heights was the potential for increased rail deflection due to 
decreased post embedment depth and resulting decreased resistance. An overhead view of a post 
on impact on the 31-, 34-, and 36-in. (787-, 864-, and 914-mm) top-rail height MGS systems is 
shown in Figure 62. While there were differences in rail deflection between the three rail heights, 
the decreased post stiffness and increased rail deflection were not sufficient to cause failure. 
8.6 Discussion 
For 2270P vehicle impacts, the increase in rail deflection and anchorage displacement 
with decreased post embedment depth and raised rail height was not severe enough to warrant 
concern with the taller MGS systems in the field. In design and use, due to the increased rail 
deflection, the working width of the system would also increase. Proper placement and lateral 
offsets should be adjusted accordingly to ensure that traffic is guarded from the fixed objects for 
which these barrier systems are designed to shield. 
The minor increase in anchor displacement at increased rail heights relative to standard 
height systems led to two possible conclusions: (1) the model did not accurately predict the 
system anchor displacement or (2) there was a limiting factor of the anchor that prevented larger 
deflection, such as the ground-line strut. Due to the validation procedures undertaken for these 
models and their ability to accurately predict many other aspects of the impacts, the former 
seems less likely. It was believed that the latter may be a more apt conclusion. Due to the 
geometry of the anchor, the ground-line strut, and the anchor cable, there was a limiting factor 
that prevented the anchor posts from displacing to a much greater degree, though there was 
decreased lateral resistance from the system posts. As the force of impact displaced the anchor, 
the coupling of the two anchor posts caused a moderate displacement increase of the farthest 
upstream anchor post and a larger increase in displacement of the second anchor post, post no. 2, 
as shown in Figure 63. 
 
 














Figure 62. Simulated Rail Deflection Comparison at 600 ms for 2270P Pickup Truck Impact 
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Figure 63. Anchor Post No. 2 Displacement 
This showed that force was transferred to post no. 2 at a greater rate as rail height was 
increased and post embedment was decreased. However, for the systems simulated, deflections 
were not large enough tocause post failure or to limit the effectiveness of the system. 
Modeling of soil and wood post fracture in LS-DYNA is still a gross approximation. 
These approximations have been shown to be reasonably accurate in several applications; 
however, engineering judgment is still necessary when using these results. 
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9 CRITICAL HEIGHT WITH APPROACH SLOPES 
9.1 Background on Approach Slopes 
According to the recommendation in AASHTO’s Roadside Design Guide (RDG), 
standard W-beam guardrails should not be installed in combination with approach slopes of 8:1 
or steeper [30]. Due to these slope limitations, designers often must place guardrails near the 
edge of the shoulder, which often increases accident frequency with guardrail systems. The 
development of the MGS with increased mounting height and deeper blockouts has been shown 
in full-scale crash tests to provide sufficiently improved performance to permit placement on 
slopes of 8:1 [31, 32]. The advent of further increased MGS mounting height has the potential to 
improve light truck performance on slopes and still allow for proper redirection of small cars on 
steeper slopes.  
In previous research, an 8:1 approach slope was identified as a critical slope condition for 
pickup truck impacts at a guardrail offset of 5 ft (1.5 m) down from the slope break point to the 
front face of the MGS. Separate research has shown that on 6:1 approach slopes, a 2270P 
Silverado reached a maximum height above the ground at roughly 8.7 ft (2.7 m) from the slope 
break point when traversing a V-ditch [33]. At this point, the propensity for override was 
greatest; however, it was unlikely that a guardrail would be placed this far down a slope. The 
same research found that an 820C small car would reach its maximum suspension compression 
at a lateral distance of roughly 21.5 ft (6.6 m) to 25.4 ft (7.7 m) away from the slope break point 
[33]. Again, it was even more unlikely that a guardrail would be placed this far from the road 
edge.  
In order to match previous crash test data and to use a lateral offset similar to the 
maximum truck trajectory height, a lateral offset distance of 5 ft (1.5 m) was deemed acceptable 
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to determine the effects of rail height on approach slopes. In addition, a lateral offset of 5 ft (1.5 
m) was comparable for 8:1 and 6:1 approach slopes for both the small car and pickup truck, and 
it provided a reasonable lateral offset for barrier placement. Additionally, this lateral offset 
occurred prior to reaching the maximum trajectory height for an 820C vehicle. 
Two full-scale vehicle crash tests were performed on the MGS system on approach 
slopes at a 31-in. (787-mm) top-rail mounting height. The first, test no. MGSAS-1, was with a 
¾-ton pickup truck, impacting the system at a speed and angle of 62.4 mph (100.4 km/h) and 
25.9 degrees, respectively, on an 8:1 approach slope and 5-ft (1.5-m) lateral offset [31, 32]. The 
second, test no. MGSAS-2, was performed using a small car, impacting the system with a speed 
and angle of 61.9 mph (99.6 km/h) and 21.6 degrees, respectively, on an 8:1 approach slope and 
5-ft (1.5-m) lateral offset [31, 32]. Both tests were conducted, reported, and deemed acceptable 
in accordance with TL-3 requirements specified in the NCHRP Report No. 350, Recommended 
Procedures for the Safety Performance Evaluation of Highway Features. 
9.2 Overview of Simulation Study 
An LS-DYNA simulation study was performed to examine the effects of the increased 
MGS mounting height on slopes in regard to small car redirection performance and specifically 
underride [7]. Current MASH standards utilize a 25-degree impact angle with small cars when 
testing for barrier performance to provide an increased impact severity. However, the NCHRP 
Report No. 350 indicated that standard impact angles of 20 degrees may be more severe at these 
increased heights. As the small car traverses the slope break and continues down the 
embankment to the barrier, the smaller angle of impact provides a greater distance of travel 
before striking the barrier and allows for the suspension to compress more, thus effectively 
lowering the frontal geometry of the car. This decreased front-end height may provide 
unacceptable impact conditions and redirection properties.  
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Simulations were performed on both 8:1 and 6:1 approach slopes with top rail mounting 
heights of 31, 34, and 36 in. (787, 864, and 914 mm) with test impact angles of both 20 and 25 
degrees in order to determine a failure limit. Typically, an MGS rail height of 32 in. (813 mm) is 
used to test and evaluate small cars; however, the research performed by the MwRSF used a 31-
in. (787-mm) rail height, so LS-DYNA simulations were also performed to validate the model at 
this height.  
9.3 Underride on 8:1 Approach Slope with 820C 
9.3.1 Simulation at 31-in. (787-mm) Rail Height 
Using test no. MGSAS-2 as a baseline and reference, crash test simulations were 
performed to find a failure condition for the small car with respect to underride and barrier 
height. An initial simulation was performed using the NCHRP Report No. 350 target impact 
conditions of test no. MGSAS-2, which had a 5-ft (1.5-m) offset measured from the beginning of 
the approach slope to the front of the blockout. The speed and angle of the impact were 62.1 mph 
(100 km/h) and 20.0 degrees, respectively. A time sequential of test no. MGSAS-2 in 
comparison with the simulation results is shown in Figure 64, which provided visual validation 
of the model. Note that the simulation images have been mirrored for best comparison with the 
full-scale test images. 
A complete verification of the model was carried out using the procedures for verification 
and validation of computer simulations used for roadside safety applications per NCHRP Report 
No. W179 [29]. The simulation satisfied the standardized criteria. The full verification report can 
be found in Appendix G. 
The simulation showed excellent correlation to test no. MGSAS-2 in vehicle behavior, 
post rotation, and blockout behavior, providing good validation for the model. The full-scale 
crash test did exhibit some yawing toward the barrier at exit which was not present in the
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t = -170 ms 
 
t = -70 ms 
 
t = 0 ms 
 
t = 60 ms 
Figure 64. Time Sequential of Test No. MGSAS-2 and Simulation 
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t = 120 ms 
 
t = 180 ms 
 
t = 240 ms 
 
t = 300 ms 
Figure 64. Time Sequential of Test No. MGSAS-2 and Simulation (continued) 
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t = 360 ms 
 
t = 420 ms 
Figure 64. Time Sequential of Test No. MGSAS-2 and Simulation (continued) 
simulation. However, this behavior was deemed acceptable for future use of this model as it 
would not affect the acceptability of the test. The primary difference came from suspension 
modeling differences, where the wheels in the simulation to steered away from the barrier 
whereas the wheels in the full-scale crash test steered toward the barrier. 
9.3.2 Simulation at 34-in. (864-mm) Rail Height 
Using the validated test no. MGSAS-2 baseline simulation, crash test simulations were 
performed to find a failure condition for the small car with respect to underride for each barrier 
height. Two additional respective heights were used based on previous research on acceptable 
maximum rail height. The NCHRP Report No. 350 standard impact speed and angle of 62.1 mph 
(100 km/h) and 20.0 degrees were used. In addition, an impact angle of 25 degrees was 
investigated per AASHTO MASH standards. Front-end geometry was a primary factor in 
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redirection effectiveness at increased rail heights. Specifically, the cowl height had a significant 
effect on the redirection behavior of the vehicle. A time sequential comparison of the 20-degree 
and 25-degree impact angles on the 8:1 approach slope at a 34-in. (864-mm) top-rail height is 
shown in Figure 65. 
Differing impact angles on a slope can change the vehicle’s suspension reaction when 
impacting a barrier based on the available distance the car has to traverse the slope. Differences 
between the 20-degree and 25-degree trajectories were noted as the vehicle traversed the 
approach slope at the 34-in. (864-mm) top-rail height. However, these differences did not 
contribute to significant differences in the redirection effectiveness, and both simulations 
exhibited characteristics that would be acceptable per NCHRP Report No. 350 and MASH 
standards.  
9.3.3  Simulation at 36-in. (914-mm) Rail Height 
At a further increased rail height, the effects of the decreased impact angle on the slope 
were noticeable. The decreased impact angle allowed for greater body roll down the slope 
causing suspension compression and the potential for the nose of the vehicle to penetrate under 
the barrier, form a wedge, and push the rail up the hood and into the A-pillar. Simulations at 
increased rail heights showed that the cowl height was an important parameter regarding a 
vehicle’s ability to be redirected. As the vehicle impacted the barrier, the fender near the front 
bumper was crushed back toward the occupant compartment until reaching the cowl. The cowl, 
which was much stiffer with support from the firewall, windshield and door frame, provided 
enough resistance to the barrier to safely redirect the vehicle. The benefit of this increased 
stiffness was diminished if the rail rode up and over the fender, allowing the rail to come into 
contact with the A-pillar. An impact angle of 25 degrees caused the vehicle's velocity vector to 
remain more lateral than at 20 degrees, which kept the bumper further in the air. At a 20-degree 
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impact angle, the vehicle was allowed to travel more vertically downward, effectively dropping 
the bumper, compressing the suspension, and allowing for underride of the system. This was 
shown in the sequential images of a 20- and 25-degree impact angle at a 36-in. (914-mm) top-rail 
height in Figure 66. 
At a 20-degree impact angle, the vehicle rode along the barrier just after impact, the front 
of the car dropped much farther than observed for the vehicle impacting at 25 degrees. This 
caused the effect mentioned previously, in which the guardrail rode up over the hood, 
subsequently crushing the A-pillar and causing unacceptable occupant compartment damage, as 
shown in Figure 67. 
At approximately 370 ms, the rail rode over the hood corner, slid up to the A-pillar, and 
crushed the occupant compartment. While redirection was shown, the occupant compartment 
damage as a result of this underride would render this test a failure, which was a function of how 
the vehicle traversed the slope, as shown in Figure 68.  
At a 20-degree impact angle, the vehicle traveled 175.4 in. (4,455 mm) across the slope 
before impacting the barrier, whereas at a 25-degree impact angle the vehicle traveled 142 in. 
(3,607 mm) across the slope before impact. This 20-degree trajectory added an additional 33 in. 
(848 mm) to the path length and allowed the vehicle to roll down the slope, which dropped the 
front bumper and allowed the vehicle to underride, as shown in Figure 69. 
The trajectory of the 25-degree impact vector kept the nose of the car more level with the 
road plane than the 20-degree impact vector. This resulted in a more sustained level redirection. 
At 20 degrees, the car rolled more downward at impact and throughout the simulation, causing 
the nose to drop and the rail to override the hood, as mentioned previously. 
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20° Impact  t = -170 ms     25° Impact 
 
20° Impact  t = -50 ms     25° Impact 
 
20° Impact  t = 70 ms     25° Impact 
 
20° Impact  t = 190 ms     25° Impact 
 
20° Impact  t = 310 ms     25° Impact 
 
20° Impact  t = 430 ms     25° Impact 
Figure 65. Sequential of 20- and 25-degree Impacts at 34-in. (864-mm) Top-Rail Height 
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20° Impact  t = -170 ms     25° Impact 
 
20° Impact  t = -50 ms     25° Impact 
 
20° Impact  t = 70 ms     25° Impact 
 
20° Impact  t = 190 ms     25° Impact 
 
20° Impact  t = 310 ms     25° Impact 
 
20° Impact  t = 430 ms     25° Impact 
Figure 66. Sequential of 20- and 25-degree Impacts at 36-in. (914-mm) Top-Rail Height 
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Note: Trajectory for illustrative purposes and does not indicate impact points
 
 
Figure 68. Vehicle Trajectory Across Approach Slope 
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20-degree impact angle 
 
25-degree impact angle 
 
Figure 69. Vehicle Underride at 36 in. (914 mm) 
9.3.4 Comparison of Test Conditions and Simulation Results 
Comparison of the six simulations and test no. MGSAS-2 were done as a validation for 
the original model and to provide a more complete understanding of the effects of each 
simulation.  
It was clear that the simulation of the MGSAS-2 did a very good job predicting the test 
results. Furthermore, as the rail height was increased, the vehicle underrode the system. The 
underride distance was calculated from the simulations using the left-front corner as a reference 
point. This point was tracked throughout the impact, and the distance the vehicle traveled 
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laterally into the barrier was found. Then, the dynamic deflection of the rail was subtracted, 
giving an estimate of the total distance the car underrode the barrier. All evaluation parameters 
and simulation results are shown in Table 22. 
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Exit Angle deg -8.23 -12.4 -12.1 -14.5 -18.1 -6.45 -17.55 
Pass/Fail - Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Fail Pass 
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It was interesting to note that the increased impact angle did not cause much increased 
underride. Instead, rail deflection increased. The underride was still very much associated with 
the vehicle front-end geometry in relation to the rail. At a 36-in. (914-mm) top-rail height, the 
25-degree impact angle increased the rail deflection and the underride distance by a great margin 
over the 20-degree impact angle. The increased rail deflection over the 34-in. (864-mm) system 
was systematic and due to decreased embedment depth and decreased post stiffness. At a 25-
degree impact angle, the vehicle maintained a more level trajectory throughout the impact. This 
kept the bumper of the vehicle higher off the ground up to parallel, which prevented the rail from 
riding over the hood and into the A-pillar. 
Parallel velocities consistently decreased across the simulations aside from the 20-degree, 
36-in. (914-mm) top-rail height simulation, which ultimately was deemed to be unacceptable. 
The underride exhibited by this impact caused increased rail contact and slowed the vehicle more 
than simulations in which safe redirection was shown. Similarly exit velocities were consistently 
decreasing across simulation runs.  
Exit vectors were higher than shown by the full-scale crash test. This was due to the 
steering mechanism differences and subsequent wheel reaction differences previously noted. As 
shown by the baseline simulation, the wheels tended to turn away from the barrier in the 
simulations rather than into the barrier, as exhibited by test no. MGSAS-2. 
9.4 Underride on 6:1 Approach Slope with 820C 
Good barrier performance was shown for small cars in 8:1 approach slope simulations. 
This suggested that the MGS may be safely used on steeper slopes. Previous simulations 
performed by researchers at the MwRSF have shown that the pickup truck will override the 
MGS system at the standard mounting height when placed on 6:1 approach slopes [31, 32]. For 
this reason the MGS was limited to placement on 8:1 or flatter approach slopes. An MGS that 
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would be allowed on steeper slopes using an increased rail height would provide more flexibility 
to highway engineers and designers. 
Two impact angles, 20 and 25 degrees, were again chosen to examine the effects of 
increased barrier height and steeper approach slopes. For comparison, barrier heights of 31, 34, 
and 36 in. (787, 864, and 914 mm) were again used, and the front face of the MGS was placed 5 
ft (1.5 m) away from the slope break point. It should be noted that, due to the increased slope 
with the same lateral offset, the barrier was effectively placed 2.5 in. (64 mm) lower than a 
similarly offset barrier on an 8:1 approach slope. The trajectory of the vehicle as it traversed the 
slope break point and lost contact with the ground was similar in both approach slope cases.  
9.4.1 Simulation at 31-in. (787-mm) Rail Height 
At a rail height of 31 in. (787 mm) and a 5-ft (1.5-m) lateral offset on a 6:1 approach 
slope, the vehicle was smoothly redirected, and no adverse observable conditions were present 
that would affect the MGS’s effectiveness in redirecting an 820C small car. However, prior 
research has shown that pickup trucks impacting a 31-in. (787-mm) system on 6:1 approach 
slopes will override the system, thus rendering is unusable in practice [31, 32]. A sequential of 
the system redirecting the small car is shown in Figure 70. 
It was clear that the increased slope and the additional 2.5 in. (64 mm) of rail drop caused 
the vehicle to impact the rail at a lower position on the bumper. This condition caused the car to 
roll more laterally over the barrier. This was the same reason that light trucks have failed at this 
rail height on a 6:1 approach slope.  
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20° Impact  t = -170 ms     25° Impact 
 
20° Impact  t = -50 ms     25° Impact 
 
20° Impact  t = 70 ms     25° Impact 
 
20° Impact  t = 190 ms     25° Impact 
 
20° Impact  t = 310 ms     25° Impact 
 
20° Impact  t = 430 ms     25° Impact 
 
Figure 70. Sequential of 20- and 25-degree Impacts at 31-in. (787-mm) Top-Rail Height 
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9.4.2 Simulation at 34-in. (864-mm) Rail Height 
At a rail height of 34 in. (864 mm) and a 5-ft (1.5-m) lateral offset on a 6:1 approach 
slope, the small car again was smoothly redirected, and no adverse observable conditions were 
present that would affect the MGS’s ability to redirect an 820C small car. A sequential of the 
system redirecting the small car is shown in Figure 71. 
Again, due to the increased slope and constant offset, as compared to the 8:1 approach 
slopes previously discussed, the rail was essentially placed 2.5 in. (64 mm) lower in relation to 
the road. This made the top of the 34-in. (864-mm) rail on a 6:1 approach slope effectively the 
same height in relation to the level roadway as a 31.5-in. (800-mm) rail on an 8:1 approach 
slope, making it very comparable to the 31-in. (787-mm) height tested on the 8:1 approach slope. 
Visually and numerically, the results are very comparable. 
9.4.3 Simulation at 36-in. (914-mm) Rail Height 
At a rail height of 36 in. (914 mm) with a 5-ft (1.5-m) lateral offset on a 6:1 approach 
slope, the small car was smoothly redirected, and no adverse observable conditions were present 
that would affect the MGS’s ability to redirect an 820C small car. A sequential of the system 
redirecting the small car is shown in Figure 72. 
Much like the discussion of the 34-in. (864-mm) system on a 6:1 approach slope, the 
increased slope and constant lateral offset made the top of the 36-in. (914-mm) system analogous 
to a 33.5-in. (851-mm) system on an 8:1 approach slope in relation to the level roadway, making 
it very comparable to the 34-in. (864-mm) height tested on the 8:1 approach slope. Due to this 
relationship, it was expected that underride would be shown at this height, which was indeed the 
case. At an impact angle of 25 degrees, the vehicle underrode a distance of approximately 4.7 in. 
(120 mm). Underride was not shown on the 20-degree system, leading to the understanding that 
this height was the maximum height before underride would begin. 
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20° Impact  t = -170 ms     25° Impact 
 
20° Impact  t = -50 ms     25° Impact 
 
20° Impact  t = 70 ms     25° Impact 
 
20° Impact  t = 190 ms     25° Impact 
 
20° Impact  t = 310 ms     25° Impact 
 
20° Impact  t = 430 ms     25° Impact 
Figure 71. Sequential of 20- and 25-degree Impacts at 34-in. (864-mm) Top-Rail Height 
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20° Impact  t = -170 ms     25° Impact 
 
20° Impact  t = -50 ms     25° Impact 
 
20° Impact  t = 70 ms     25° Impact 
 
20° Impact  t = 190 ms     25° Impact 
 
20° Impact  t = 310 ms     25° Impact 
 
20° Impact  t = 430 ms     25° Impact 
Figure 72. Sequential of 20- and 25-degree Impacts at 36-in. (914-mm) Top-Rail Height 
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The increased lateral velocity of a 25-degree impact angle over a 20-degree impact angle 
caused increased impact severity. However, this increased angle caused the car to rotate an 
additional 5 degrees to become parallel with the system, resulting in additional deceleration 
before the vehicle became parallel, as shown across all tests in Table 23. The additional 
deceleration at this height was just enough to allow the vehicle to drop vertically downward and 
slide under the barrier.  
9.4.4 Comparison of Test Conditions and Simulation Results 
A comparison of the six simulations was performed to provide a more complete 
understanding of the results of each simulation. The evaluation parameters and their results are 
shown in Table 23. 
The vehicle did not underride the system as much as shown on an 8:1 approach slope. As 
mentioned, the vehicle trajectory was based on velocity and angle, and the trajectories shown are 
the same for each test. Thus, the vehicle impacted the rail at a different relative height. From 
Tables 22 and 23, underride occurred when the top of the rail was at a relative 26-in. (660-mm) 
vertical height above the road grade at a 5-ft (1.5-m) lateral offset. This concept is shown in 
Figure 73.  
Although the rails were positioned at different top-rail mounting heights in relation to the 
slope, the top of the rail was at a similar distance above the flat roadway in both cases. In this 
range of heights on these slopes, it is analogous to compare the MGS at 36 in. (914 mm) on a 6:1 
approach slope to the MGS at 34 in. (864 mm) on an 8:1 approach slope. Due to this fact, it was 
likely that an 820C small car traveling at an impact speed of 62.1 mph (100 km/h) would likely 
pass at rail heights up to 38 in. (965 mm) on this slope. However, it is undesired to increase the 
rail to this height because underride occurred on flat ground at 37 in. (940 mm). Further, 
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decreased impact angles or decreased speeds could allow the vehicle's trajectory to more closely 
follow the slope and underride the MGS system. 
Table 23. Simulation Results for 820C Vehicle on 6:1 Approach Slope 
Evaluation Parameters Units 
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Parallel Time ms 143 147 147 151 152 174 
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Exit Angle deg -13.03 -12.96 -12.98 -12.49 -13.26 -14.2 
Pass/Fail - Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
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MGS at 36 in. (914 mm) on 6:1 Approach Slope 
 
 
Figure 73. MGS on Approach Slope in Relation to Road Grade 
9.5 Override on 6:1 Approach Slope with 2270P at 5-ft (1.5-m) Offset 
By increasing the rail height to prevent pickup truck override, the usable range of the 
MGS would expand to include 6:1 fill slopes. Although the increased rail height provided stable 
and smooth redirection for the 820C vehicle, it was necessary to also simulate the same MGS 
system with a 2270P pickup truck to examine the potential for override and vehicular instabilities 
during redirection.  
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Suspension failure has been shown to provide stability in full-scale crash tests as the 
front-end of the pickup truck drops toward the ground. Differences between the simulation 
model and full-scale crash test vehicle suspension systems, as well as LS-DYNA model 
simplifications, caused the pickup truck suspension model to not exhibit the same failure as 
shown in full-scale tests. For this reason, two models were run - one without prescribed 
suspension failure and one with prescribed suspension failure just prior to the time of the highest 
joint forces. 
9.5.1 Simulation at 31-in. (787-mm) Rail Height 
On a 6:1 fill slope, previous simulations have shown that a 31-in. (787-mm) top-rail 
height was inadequate to contain a 2000P vehicle [31, 32]. Thus, it was fully expected that a 
2270P vehicle would also not be contained by a 31-in. (787-mm) tall rail. This was true with and 
without suspension failure. Both simulations had instabilities roughly 240 ms after impact, 
causing the simulation to error out. However, at the point of simulation termination, override was 
already exhibited, indicating that the test would fail. Without suspension failure, the truck rolled 
over the barrier. In contrast, the truck was overrode the barrier when suspension failure was 
prescribed, as shown in Figure 74. 
Suspension failure allowed for the truck to slide up and over the rail, as shown more 
closely in Figure 75. This vehicle override tendency also increased the risk of the vehicle to 
strike any fixed objects located behind the barrier. 
Clear system failure and unacceptable vehicle behavior was apparent for a 2270P vehicle 
impacting into a 31-in. (787-mm) tall MGS barrier placed on a 6:1 fill slope. As mentioned, an 
increased rail height of 36-in. (914-mm) may allow the MGS to be placed on 6:1 fill slopes while 
safely containing both pickup trucks and small cars. 
 
December 5, 2012  




No Suspension Failure       t = -170 ms      Suspension Failure 
 
No Suspension Failure       t = -50 ms      Suspension Failure 
 
No Suspension Failure       t = 70 ms      Suspension Failure 
 
No Suspension Failure       t = 130 ms      Suspension Failure 
 
No Suspension Failure       t = 190 ms      Suspension Failure
 
No Suspension Failure       t = 240 ms      Suspension Failure 
 
Figure 74. 2270P Simulation at 31-in. (787-mm) Top-Rail Height on 6:1 Approach Slope 
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Figure 75. 2270P Override at 31-in. (787-mm) Rail Height on 6:1 Approach Slope 
9.5.2 Simulation at 34-in. (864-mm) Top-Rail Height 
At a 34-in. (864-mm)top- rail height, the pickup truck was safely contained and 
redirected in the simulations. The pickup truck experienced moderate roll and pitch angles, 
which were within acceptable limits, as shown in Figure 76. In many full-scale crash tests, it has 
been shown that suspension failure may help to stabilize the trajectory of the pickup truck and 
prevent rollover. In these simulations, suspension failure may result in more severe 
consequences. Furthermore, these simulations appeared to marginally meet the required 
evaluation criteria pertaining to vehicle stability upon redirection. 
9.5.3 Simulation at 36-in. (914-mm) Top-Rail Height 
Simulations at a 36-in. (914-mm) top-rail height on a 6:1 fill slope showed acceptable 
vehicle containment and redirection for cases with and without suspension failure. The 36-in. 
(914-mm) rail height kept the pickup truck closer to the ground than for the 31-in. (787-mm) or 
34-in. (864-mm) rail heights, thus maintaining a more level redirection trajectory, lower pitch, 
and lower roll throughout the impact event.  
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No Suspension Failure       t = -170 ms      Suspension Failure 
 
 
No Suspension Failure       t = -50 ms      Suspension Failure 
 
 
No Suspension Failure       t = 70 ms      Suspension Failure 
 
 
No Suspension Failure       t = 190 ms      Suspension Failure 
 
 
No Suspension Failure       t = 310 ms      Suspension Failure 
 
 
No Suspension Failure       t = 430 ms      Suspension Failure 
 
 
Figure 76. 2270P Simulation at 34-in. (864-mm) Top-Rail Height on 6:1 Approach Slope 
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No Suspension Failure       t = 550 ms      Suspension Failure 
 
 
No Suspension Failure       t = 630 ms      Suspension Failure 
 
Figure 76. 2270P Simulation at 34-in. (864-mm) Top-Rail Height on 6:1 Approach Slope 
(continued) 
With suspension failure prescribed, the wheel became detached and pushed up into the 
undercarriage at roughly 290 ms after impact, as shown in Figure 77. Simplifications of the tire 
model did not allow for tire deflation, which could be attributed to the degree of simulation pitch. 
The pickup truck landed on the inflated tire which pushed the truck upward and airborne. 
Physically, this behavior was highly unlikely as the tire would deflate. 
 
 
Figure 77. Wheel Contacting Undercarriage of Truck 
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Although the truck rolled into the barrier, it remained upright throughout the impact 
event. These simulations would suggest that at a 5-ft (1.5-m) lateral offset and at a 36-in. (914-
mm) nominal top-rail mounting height, the 2270P vehicle would be safely redirected, as shown 
in Figure 78. 2270P Simulation at 36-in. (914-mm) Top-Rail Height on 6:1 Approach Slope 
. In addition, due to the clear failure at the 31-in. (787-mm) top-rail mounting height and 
the clear success at the 36-in. (914-mm) top-rail mounting height, a minimum nominal top rail 
mounting height of 33.5 in. (851-mm) was recommended.  
It was clear from these simulations that increased rail heights may allow the MGS to be 
installed on steeper slopes and still safely accommodate 2270P vehicles. 
 
 
No Suspension Failure       t = -170 ms      Suspension Failure 
 
 
No Suspension Failure       t = -50 ms      Suspension Failure 
 
 
No Suspension Failure       t = 70 ms      Suspension Failure 
 
Figure 78. 2270P Simulation at 36-in. (914-mm) Top-Rail Height on 6:1 Approach Slope 
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No Suspension Failure       t = 190 ms      Suspension Failure 
 
 
No Suspension Failure       t = 310 ms      Suspension Failure 
 
 
No Suspension Failure       t = 430 ms      Suspension Failure 
 
 
No Suspension Failure       t = 550 ms      Suspension Failure 
 
 
No Suspension Failure       t = 630 ms      Suspension Failure 
 
 
Figure 78. 2270P Simulation at 36-in. (914-mm) Top-Rail Height on 6:1 Approach Slope 
(continued) 
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9.5.1 Comparison of Test Conditions and Simulation Results 
Simulations were compared to garner a clear picture of the vehicle reaction and the barrier 
effectiveness at the varying rail heights on a 6:1 fill slope. The simulation results are shown in 
Table 24. Several results from the 31-in. (787-mm) top-rail height MGS simulations were not 
documented due to the failure of the system. 
The increased roll angle observed in the 34-in. (864-mm) top-rail height simulation, from 
33.6 to 42.7 degrees, was due to the nature of the suspension failure. The detached wheel 
allowed the vehicle body to roll more upon exit because there was no left-front wheel to come 
down on as it exited the system.  
In the 36-in. (914-mm) top-rail height simulation, the vehicle reacted differently. Since 
the rail was higher and caught the pickup truck closer to the CG, it kept the truck more level 
throughout the impact event and reduced the magnitude of roll observed in the 34-in. (864-mm) 
top-rail height simulation. When suspension failure was prescribed, the roll motion was 
decreased from 23.6 to 15.6 degrees. As the wheel came in contact with the undercarriage, it 
caused the entire truck to vault and become airborne, increasing pitch. Despite this, all of the 
evaluation criteria were deemed acceptable. In all cases, except the 31-in (787-mm) top-rail 
height simulations, the truck returned to the ground in a level position during redirection after 
exit. This suggested that the vehicle would not roll over in these scenarios. 
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Table 24. Simulation Results for 2270P Vehicle on 6:1 Approach Slope 
Evaluation 
Parameters Units 
























































Prescribed? (Y/N) N Y N Y N Y 










































Tested Impact  
Angle deg 25 25 25 25 25 25 
















Parallel Time ms - - 264 267 264 265 



































Indicator - Post Post Post Post Post Post 













Exit Angle deg - - -14.9 -15.7 -15.42 -10.1 
Max Roll deg 23.5 10.9 33.6 42.7 23.6 15.6 
Max Pitch deg 11.3 14.1 6.8 7.2 5.8 6.9 
Pass/Fail - Fail Fail Pass Pass Pass Pass 
*Simulation did not complete, value is max of run 
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9.6 Override on 6:1 Approach Slope with 2270P at 9-ft (2.7-m) Offset 
Prior research involving simulated vehicle trajectories in V-ditches revealed that a lateral 
offset distance of 9 ft (2.7 m) may provide an override condition for the 2270P vehicle [33]. This 
lateral offset was determined by tracking bumper height in relation to the slope level, where the 
bumper reached a maximum vertical position above the slope. The maximum bumper height 
trajectory was shown at roughly a 9-ft (2.7-m) rail offset away from the slope break point, 
providing the worst-case condition for the impact event. Although the increased rail height 
provided stable and smooth redirection for the 2270P vehicle at a 5-ft (1.5-m) lateral offset, it 
was necessary to also simulate the same MGS system at this worst-case scenario, a 9-ft (2.7-m) 
rail offset.  
Suspension failure provided stability in full-scale crash tests because the front-end of the 
pickup truck dropped to the ground. Differences between the vehicle suspension systems in the 
simulation model and full-scale crash test, as well as LS-DYNA model simplifications, caused 
the simulated truck suspension model to not exhibit the same failure as shown in full-scale tests. 
For this reason, two models were run - one without prescribed suspension failure and one with 
prescribed suspension failure just prior to the time of the highest joint forces. 
9.6.1 Simulation at 36-in. (914-mm) Rail Height 
Simulations at a 36-in. (914-mm) top-rail height on a 6:1 fill slope showed acceptable 
vehicle containment and redirection for cases with and without suspension failure. The 36-in. 
(914-mm) rail height kept the truck closer to the ground than observed for the 31-in. (787-mm) 
or 34-in. (864-mm) top-rail heights at 5-ft (1.5-m) lateral offsets, thus maintaining a more level 
redirection trajectory, lower pitch, and lower roll throughout the impact event.  
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Although the truck rolled into the barrier, it remained upright throughout the impact 
event. These simulations would suggest that at a 9-ft (2.7-m) lateral offset and at a 36-in. (914-
mm) nominal top-rail mounting height, the 2270P vehicle would be safely redirected as shown in 
Figure 79. 
It was clear from these simulations that increased rail height may allow for the MGS to 
safely accommodate 2270P vehicles when installed on steeper approach slopes at this lateral rail 
offset. In these simulations, the impacting wheel did not tumble underneath the vehicle when 
suspension failure was prescribed, and thus the increased pitching shown at the 5-ft (1.5-m) 
lateral offset was not apparent in the simulation using a 9-ft (2.7-m) lateral offset. 
 
 
No Suspension Failure       t = -240 ms      Suspension Failure 
 
 
No Suspension Failure       t = -120 ms      Suspension Failure 
 
 
No Suspension Failure       t = 0 ms      Suspension Failure 
 
Figure 79. 2270P Vehicle Simulation at 36-in. (914-mm) Top-Rail Height and 9-ft (2.7-m) 
Offset on 6:1 Approach Slope 
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No Suspension Failure       t = 120 ms      Suspension Failure 
 
 
No Suspension Failure       t = 240 ms      Suspension Failure 
 
 
No Suspension Failure       t = 360 ms      Suspension Failure 
 
 
No Suspension Failure       t = 480 ms      Suspension Failure 
 
 
No Suspension Failure       t = 600 ms      Suspension Failure 
 
 
No Suspension Failure       t = 720 ms      Suspension Failure 
 
Figure 79. 2270P Vehicle Simulation at 36-in. (914-mm) Top-Rail Height and 9-ft (2.7-m) 
Offset on 6:1 Approach Slope (continued) 
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9.6.1 Comparison of Test Conditions and Simulation Results 
Simulations were compared to garner a clear picture of the vehicle reaction and the 
barrier’s effectiveness at the 36-in. (914-mm) top-rail heights on a 6:1 fill slope at a 9-ft (2.7-m) 
lateral rail offset. The simulation results are shown in Table 25.  
In the 36-in. (914-mm) top-rail height simulation at the 9-ft (2.7-m) lateral offset, the 
MGS guardrail system was able to redirect the truck better than observed at the 5-ft (1.5-m) 
lateral offset. As the truck traversed the slope, a higher roll rate occurred prior to the bumper 
contacting the rail. This roll motion allowed a better alignment of the pickup truck with the 
barrier instead of the trajectory taking the vehicle over the rail. All of the evaluation criteria were 
deemed acceptable. This suggested that the vehicle would not roll over in these scenarios, and 
that this test would pass in accordance with all applicable safety standards. 
The vehicle does not override the system as severely at a 5-ft (1.5-m) lateral offset. 
Therefore, the vehicle impacted the rail at a different relative height. However, the increased rail 
offset allowed for additional roll of the pickup truck down the slope before impact, as shown in 
Figure 80. This also allowed for additional gravitational effects from the greater distance allotted 
in the trajectory between the slope break point and impact with the MGS, helping to align the 
truck better with the rail before impact. In addition, this caused the velocity vector of the vehicle 
CG to travel into the barrier versus over the barrier at this height, creating improved redirection 
behavior. Additionally, at this rail height, the impacting wheel did not snag on the guardrail posts 
as much as observed for the 5-ft (1.5-m) lateral rail offset. This prevented further pitching and 
rolling of the vehicle into and over the barrier.  
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Table 25. Simulation Results for 2270P Vehicle on 6:1 Approach Slope 
Evaluation Parameters Units 





Suspension Failure Prescribed? (Y/N) N Y 















Tested Impact Angle deg 25 25 





Parallel Time ms 256 257 















Working Width Indicator - Post Post 
Exit Time ms 600 560 





Exit Angle deg -11.4 -10.2 
Max Roll deg -15.0 -13.7 
Max Pitch deg -9.106 -8.5 
Pass/Fail - Pass Pass 
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MGS at 36 in. (914 mm) on 6:1 Approach Slope at 5-ft (1.5-m) Offset 
 
 
MGS at 36 in. (914 mm) on 6:1 Approach Slope at 9-ft (2.7-m) Offset 
 
Figure 80. MGS on Approach Slope in Relation to Road Grade 
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Although the rails were positioned at different top-rail mounting heights in relation to the 
slope, the top of the rail was shown to be at a similar distance above the flat roadway top in both 
cases. In this range of heights and on these slopes, it is analogous to compare the MGS at 36 in. 
(914 mm) on a 6:1 approach slope to the MGS at 34 in. (864 mm) on an 8:1 approach slope. Due 
to this fact, it was likely that an 820C small car traveling at an impact speed of 62.1 mph (100 
km/h) would likely pass at rail heights up to 38 in. (965 mm) on this slope. However, it is 
undesired to increase the rail to this height because underride was shown to occur on flat ground 
at 37 in. (940 mm). Further, decreased impact angles or decreased speeds could allow the 
vehicle's trajectory to more closely follow the slope and underride the MGS system. 
9.7 Discussion 
As with increased rail heights of the MGS on flat ground, an increased rail height also 
provided improved vehicle redirection for high CG vehicles impacting the MGS with steeper 
approach slopes. Furthermore, an increased rail height would also make it possible to safely 
place MGS systems at the slope break point of steeper embankments. At an approach slope of 
6:1, the small car can be effectively redirected with rail heights of 31, 34, and 36 in. (787, 864, 
and 914 mm). Previous data suggested that 2000P pickup trucks would override a system on a 
6:1 approach slope [31, 32]. This study showed, similarly, that a 2270P would override a 31-in. 
(787-mm) tall system on a 6:1 approach slope at a 5-ft (1.5-m) lateral offset. The effectiveness of 
the increased rail height provided the ability to locate the MGS on 6:1 approach slopes at the 
offset described. The MGS, with an increased rail height, was shown to safely redirect both small 
cars and large trucks at both 34- and 36-in. (864- and 914-mm) top-rail heights. However, full-
scale crash tests are needed to confirm the simulation results and verify the safety performance 
of the MGS systems with varied height and placement on steeper approach slopes. 
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Out of the 31-, 34-, and 36-in. (787-, 813-, and 914-mm) tall MGS systems, it is most 
likely that a 36-in. (914-mm) tall MGS system would provide the greatest safety for use on 6:1 
approach slopes at a lateral offset of 5 ft (1.5 m) for pickup trucks. Simulated vehicle trajectories 
for 820C small cars into a 6:1 V-ditch at a velocity of 62.1 mph (100 km/h) indicated that the 
front bumper will reach a minimum vertical offset above the embankment at a 25-ft (7.6-m) 
lateral distance from the slope break point [33]. At this point, the suspension compressed which 
lowered the front-end geometry of the car. This would indicate a worst case scenario for 
evaluating underride. However, this behavior occurred at a lateral offset that wass well outside 
the practical distance a W-beam guardrail would normally be placed along a roadway.  
Although this research indicated that the MGS would be safe in these conditions when 
installed on a 6:1 approach slope, it was not recommended that higher rail heights be pursued. A 
simulated 37-in. (940-mm) tall MGS system on flat ground induced severe underride, allowing 
an 820C small car to nearly pass under the rail and reach the windshield and A-pillar. This result 
was not acceptable when considering field implementation and construction tolerances. 
Additionally, these simulations were performed with impact speeds required by MASH and 
NCHRP Report No. 350. However, slower speeds at the same impact angles studied herein could 
allow the vehicles to travel farther down the slope without losing contact with the ground. This 
condition would keep the nose of the car down and potentially allow for vehicles to underride a 
taller MGS system.  
On 6:1 approach slopes, good performance was shown at 36-in. (914-mm) top-rail 
heights. With consideration to vehicle trajectory over the embankment and small car and truck 
redirection, the minimum height would need to be raised over the standard recommended height. 
On this slope, it was recommended that the minimum rail height be raised to 33.5 in. (851 mm) 
and the maximum be 36 in. (914 mm). 
December 5, 2012  
MwRSF Report No. TRP-03-274-12 
153 
Furthermore, the design of real roadsides is slightly different than the simulations 
performed in this study. The simulation used two intersecting planes that formed a perfect break 
point. In reality roadsides are far from this sort of uniformity. Typical embankments begin with a 
gravel shoulder with a small slope before increasing to the roadside slope. These differences may 
cause performance differences in physical systems and should be investigated before the findings 
of these simulations are implemented. 
The simulations reported herein showed the potential for a modified MGS to be placed on 
steeper approach slopes by incorporating an increased rail height. However, full-scale vehicle 
crash tests must be performed to validate these simulations and further investigate the rail height 
effects on approach slopes. MASH impact safety standards require crash tests with both 1100C 
and 2270P vehicles under TL-3 conditions [3]. Two tests, one using each MASH required 
vehicle at a 36-in. (914-mm) rail height and 5-ft (1.5-m) lateral offset on a 6:1 approach slope, 
would be necessary to show that the MGS can be raised to improve effectiveness on steeper 
slopes. V-ditch research showed that a lateral offset distance of 9 ft (2.7 m) was the critical offset 
distance for the 2270P vehicle [33]. This was determined by tracking bumper height in relation 
to the slope level, where the bumper reached a maximum vertical position above the slope. In 
these simulations, the 9-ft (2.7-m) lateral rail offset was not accompanied by any further adverse 
redirection conditions at a 36-in. (914-mm) top-rail height than was exhibited at a 5-ft (1.5-m) 
lateral rail offset. 
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10 SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
10.1 BARRIER VII 
The BARRIER VII analysis showed that in some cases the program performed well in 
comparison to LS-DYNA in predictive capabilities for parameters such as post failure, anchor 
displacement, and pocketing [24]. These were three critical system parameters that affect barrier 
performance. The inability to predict vehicle underride, vehicle suspension failure, or vehicle 
occupant compartment damage somewhat limited the usefulness of BARRIER VII. The program 
did provide a good basis for comparison and verification with LS-DYNA when full-scale data 
were limited. A baseline expectation of maximum barrier height could not be determined using 
the predictive capabilities of BARRIER VII. The lack of ability to simulate underride in 
BARRIER VII simulations did not provide enough data to make a valid conclusion on maximum 
rail height for small cars.   Therefore, it was determined that LS-DYNA simulations were the 
best method for determining a maximum guardrail height with respect to underride. However, 
the LS-DYNA simulation compared in this study was shown to be less effective than BARRIER 
VII in some regards. This analysis led to the use of an updated LS-DYNA MGS model in which 
the entire mesh of the rail was refined. The anchors were updated to more closely match the 
physically tested components, which was shown on the whole to better represent full-scale test 
results.  
10.2 Maximum Height Determination on Flat Ground 
This study set out to evaluate the maximum allowable rail mounting height for the MGS 
when impacted by a small passenger vehicle. Previously, two full-scale crash tests were run on 
the steel-post MGS with rail mounting heights of 34 in. (864 mm) and 36 in. (914 mm), 
respectively [9]. The barrier systems were 175 ft (53.3 m) long. Both of these tests passed in 
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accordance with MASH standards. An LS-DYNA simulation study was undertaken to evaluate a 
maximum allowable rail height. In addition, an LS-DYNA investigation and evaluation of the 
MGS with increased height and installed on approach slopes was performed to evaluate the 
allowable ranges of use. 
Using the full-scale crash data from test no. MGSMRH-1, which was performed on the 
MGS with a top-rail mounting height of 34 in. (864 mm), an LS-DYNA model was created to 
simulate crash performance. The system incorporated 72-in. (1,829-mm) long, W6x9 
(W152x13.4) steel posts with an embedment depth of 37 in. (940 mm). The full-scale test 
consisted of a 2,599-lb (1,179-kg) passenger car impacting the barrier system at a speed of 63.6 
mph (102.4 km/h) and an angle of 25.0 degrees. During the test, the vehicle was smoothly 
redirected without any significant snagging or vehicle underride.  
The current 1100C vehicle model provided by the NCAC, a Dodge Neon, had dissimilar 
front-end geometry to the as-tested vehicle. In the full-scale test a 2003 Kia Rio sedan was used 
which had an approximate 34.4-in. (874-mm) cowl height. The 1100C Dodge Neon model had a 
33.4-in. (848-mm) cowl height. The 820C Geo Metro model had a cowl height of 34.6 in. (879 
mm), which was more analogous to the as-tested vehicle geometry. This cowl height was a 
critical factor in determining the rail height at which the vehicle could be redirected. Thus the 
820C vehicle model was used.  
For the LS-DYNA barrier model, a 34-in. (864-mm) top-rail height was used in 
combination with 72-in. (1,829-mm) long, W6x9 (W152x13.4) steel posts with an embedment 
depth of 37 in. (940 mm). Longitudinal and lateral springs were used to simulate post-soil 
resistance. The simulations were performed with a 1,982-lb (899-kg) small car impacting the 
barrier system at a speed of 62.1 mph (100.0 km/h) and an angle of 25.0 degrees. For the LS-
DYNA simulation, the vehicle was smoothly redirected without any significant snagging or 
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vehicle underride. The maximum simulated dynamic deflection was 29.7 in. (755 mm), while the 
working width of the system was 50.8 in. (1,290 mm). In comparison, in the actual full-scale 
crash test with a 2,599-lb (1,179-kg) passenger car, the maximum permanent set and dynamic 
deflections were found to be 18¼ in. (464 mm) and 29.0 in. (737 mm), respectively. The actual 
working width of the system was found to be 49.4 in. (1,255 mm). 
At the 34-in. (864-mm) top-rail height, a simulation was also performed using a 2270P 
pickup truck model. The simulation consisted of a 5,004-lb (2270-kg) pickup truck impacting the 
barrier system at a speed of 62.1 mph (100.0 km/h) and an angle of 25.0 degrees. During the 
simulation, the pickup exhibited some minor snagging. Without prescribed suspension failure, 
the maximum dynamic deflection was 44.8 in. (1,137 mm), while the working width of the 
system was 58.1 in. (1,475 mm). With prescribed suspension failure, the maximum dynamic 
deflection was 43.4 in. (1,103 mm), while the working width of the system was 60.4 in. (1,533 
mm). Both of the simulation results met all of the MASH safety requirements for test designation 
3-11. 
Using the full-scale crash data from test no. MGSMRH-2, which was performed on the 
MGS with a top-rail mounting height of 36 in. (914 mm), an LS-DYNA model was created to 
simulate crash performance. The system incorporated 72-in. (1,829-mm) long, W6x9 
(W152x13.4) steel posts with an embedment depth of 35 in. (889 mm). The test consisted of a 
2,583-lb (1,172-kg) passenger car impacting the barrier system at a speed of 64.1 mph (103.2 
km/h) and an angle of 25.6 degrees. During the test, the vehicle was smoothly redirected without 
any significant snagging or vehicle underride.  
For the LS-DYNA barrier model, a 36-in. (914-mm) top-rail height was used in 
combination with 72-in. (1,829-mm) long, W6x9 (W152x13.4) steel posts with an embedment 
depth of 35 in. (889 mm). The simulations were performed with a 1,982-lb (899-kg) passenger 
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car impacting the barrier system at a speed of 62.1 mph (100.0 km/h) and an angle of 25.0 
degrees. During the simulation, the vehicle was smoothly redirected without any significant 
snagging or vehicle underride. The maximum dynamic deflection was 31.5 in. (799 mm), and the 
working width of the system was 52.5 in. (1,334 mm). In the actual full-scale crash test with a 
2,599-lb (1,179-kg) passenger car, the maximum permanent set and dynamic deflections were 
16¾ in. (425 mm) and 23.5 in. (597 mm), respectively. The working width of the system was 
40.5 in. (1,029 mm). 
At the 36-in. (914-mm) top-rail height, a simulation was performed using a 1100C Dodge 
Neon car model. The simulation consisted of a 2,425-lb (1100-kg) passenger car impacting the 
barrier system at a speed of 62.1 mph (100.0 km/h) and an angle of 25.0 degrees. This simulation 
was unstable past 200 ms. However, it was already shown at that time that the vehicle was 
underriding the system. Significant A-pillar damage was apparent, which would suggest failure 
per MASH safety requirements for test designation 3-10. This suggested that vehicle front-end 
geometry played a crucial role in the redirection capability of a guardrail system. 
Additionally, at the 36-in. (914-mm) top-rail height, a simulation was performed using a 
2270P pickup truck model. The simulation consisted of a 5,004-lb (2270-kg) pickup truck 
impacting the barrier system at a speed of 62.1 mph (100.0 km/h) and an angle of 25.0 degrees. 
During the simulation, the pickup exhibited some minor snagging but was redirected in a safe 
manner. Without prescribed suspension failure, the maximum dynamic deflection was 47.8 in. 
(1,214 mm), while the working width of the system was 59.4 in. (1,509 mm). With prescribed 
suspension failure, the maximum dynamic deflection was 46.9 in. (1,191 mm), while the 
working width of the system was 60.8 in. (1,545 mm). Both of the simulation results met all of 
the MASH safety requirements for test designation 3-11. 
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As part of this investigation, it was necessary to increase the simulated top-rail height to 
37 in. (940 mm). The LS-DYNA barrier model was modified to include a 37-in. (940-mm) top-
rail height with 72-in. (1,829-mm) long, W6x9 (W152x13.4) steel posts at an embedment depth 
of 34 in. (864 mm). The simulation consisted of a 1,982-lb (899-kg) passenger car impacting the 
barrier system at a speed of 62.1 mph (100.0 km/h) and an angle of 25.0 degrees. During the 
simulation, the vehicle severely underrode the system, causing significant A-pillar damage and 
intrusion into the occupant compartment. The results of the simulation failed to meet the MASH 
safety requirements for test designation 3-10. 
10.3 Maximum Height Determination on Approach Slopes Summary 
An investigation and evaluation of the MGS with increased height and installed on 
approach slopes was performed to evaluate allowable ranges of use. Previously, two full-scale 
crash tests were run on the steel-post MGS with a top-rail mounting height of 31 in. (787 mm) at 
a 5-ft (1.5-m) lateral offset from the slope break point to the front of the system on an 8:1 
approach slope. The barrier system was 175 ft (53.3 m) long. Test no. MGSAS-1 utilized a 
2000P pickup truck, and test no. MGSAS-2 utilized an 820C small car. Both tests passed in 
accordance with the NCHRP Report No. 350 safety standards. An LS-DYNA simulation study 
was undertaken to examine the effects of increasing the rail height while increasing the slope. 
Using the full-scale crash data from test no. MGSAS-2, an LS-DYNA model was created 
to simulate the aspects of this impact on the 8:1 approach slope. The system incorporated 72-in. 
(1,829-mm) long, W6x9 (W152x13.4) steel posts with an embedment depth of 40 in. (1016 mm). 
During the simulation, the vehicle was smoothly redirected without any significant snagging or 
vehicle underride and very accurately represented the results obtained from the full-scale crash 
test.  
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Subsequent simulations were performed to evaluate increased rail heights for the MGS on 
8:1 and 6:1 approach slopes with varying impact angles. At 31-, 34- and 36-in. (787-, 864-, and 
914-mm) top-rail heights, simulations were performed using both the 820C small car and the 
2270P pickup truck model. Simulations were performed on 8:1 and 6:1 approach slopes at a 5-ft 
(1.5-m) lateral offset.  
At 31- and 34-in. (787- and 864-mm) rail heights on 8:1 approach slopes, at both 20- and 
25-degree impact angles, the small car was safely redirected. However, at a 36-in. top-rail height, 
the small car failed at an impact angle of 20 degrees and passed at a 25-degree angle. This result, 
although initially counterintuitive, made sense when considering that the small car had a greater 
distance to traverse the slope at lower angles. Therefore, as the car's trajectory over the slope was 
changed, the suspension compression observed at the lower impact angle created a lower front-
end geometry, causing the car to slide under the rail. Damage to the A-pillar and intrusion into 
the occupant compartment occurred due to this underride. As a result, a top-rail height of 34 in. 
(864 mm) was deemed to be the maximum allowable height on an 8:1 approach slope.  
On 6:1 approach slopes and at a 5-ft (1.5-m) lateral offset, the simulations showed 
acceptable results for the 820C vehicle at 31-, 34- and 36-in. (787-, 864-, and 914-mm) top-rail 
heights. On this steeper slope, the guardrail was effectively lowered by 2.5 in. (64 mm) in 
relation to the road grade. This drop made the 36-in. (914-mm) rail height with a 6:1 approach 
slope more comparable to the 34-in. (864-mm) rail height on an 8:1 approach slope. Due to this 
effect, the lower guardrail caused stability issues when simulated with the 2270P vehicle. The 
trajectory of the truck overrode the barrier at a 31-in. rail height on 6:1 approach slopes at a 5-ft 
(1.5-m) lateral offset. At a 34-in. (864-mm) top-rail height, a high degree of roll was observed, 
but it was deemed acceptable because the truck was recoverable. Vehicle behavior improved at a 
36-in. (914-mm) top-rail height on the same slope as vehicle roll decreased and the probability of 
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vehicle recoverability increased. Due to the relationship between road grade and barrier height 
and its effect on vehicle-to-barrier impact location, it was determined that a 33.5-in. (851-mm) 
top-rail height was a critical minimum on 6:1 approach slopes with a 34-in. (864-mm) top-rail 
height being a practical minimum. The corresponding critical maximum rail height was 36 in. 
(914 mm). The MGS with a rail height above 36 in. (914 mm) could present issues when 
impacted by small cars at decreased impact angles or reduced speeds due to lower trajectories off 
the slope break point and greater vehicle drop prior to striking the barrier. 
Prior research involving simulated vehicle trajectories in V-ditches revealed that a lateral 
offset of 9 ft (2.7 m) may provide a potential override condition for the 2270P vehicle [33]. This 
lateral offset was determined by tracking bumper height in relation to the slope, where the 
bumper reached a maximum vertical position above the slope. The 36-in. (914-mm) rail height 
system at a 9-ft (2.7-m) offset was not shown, in these simulations, to be accompanied by any 
further adverse conditions than was exhibited at a 5-ft (1.5-m) lateral rail offset. 
10.4 Discussion Summary 
Wheel snag did not pose a significant threat to the vehicle in test nos. MGSMRH-1 or 
MGSMRH-2 nor in the simulations at increased rail heights. The primary threat to occupant 
safety was underride of the MGS, resulting in A-pillar and occupant compartment damage. 
Given a high enough cowl height, the small car was safely redirected at a 36-in. (914-mm) rail 
height. Wheel snag occurred in several of the simulations when the right-front tire contacted the 
upstream edge of the front flange of a guardrail post. In all cases, after contact with the wheel, 
the post twisted and bent downstream and did not pose a threat to the vehicle. 
Rail snag under the hood did not occur for either full-scale crash tests. For the 32-in. 
(813-mm) tall MGS simulation, the corner of the 1100C engine hood was located above the top 
corrugation of the rail. In full-scale vehicle crash test nos. MGSMRH-1 and MGSMRH-2, the 
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corner of the engine hood was located between the corrugations of the rail. As a result, the corner 
of the engine hood slid into the valley of the W-beam and crumpled, jarring the hood open. 
Vehicle underride only occurred when the corner of the engine hood was below the lower W-
beam corrugation, as was the case at a 37-in. (940-mm) top-rail height. 
For the LS-DYNA simulations, during redirection, the rail deflected upward as it released 
away from the posts and slid up the side of the vehicle. The vehicle contacted the detached posts 
and overrode them, which caused the vehicle to pitch upward and roll away from the barrier. As 
the vehicle rolled away from the barrier, the side of the vehicle that was in contact with the rail 
moved upward. As a consequence, the rail slid up the vehicle, contacted the base of the A-pillar, 
and remained at this level through the redirection. At this same time, the rail was applying a 
downward force on the vehicle which counteracted the vehicle roll. In all cases, pitch and roll 
angles were relatively low (less than 12 degrees). 
Recent small car design has changed the front-end geometry of cars. A more "raked," 
aerodynamic, slanted hood and windshield profile design has dominated the market and 
increased both the front-corner engine hood and cowl heights. Recent car design changes may 
render these results obsolete, and rail height may no longer be less limited by vehicle geometry 
but rather limited by post-in-soil strength. The updated 1100C Toyota Yaris model that was 
introduced by NCAC may be better suited to predict vehicle-to-guardrail behavior of current 
model-year vehicles. A field study of current model-year vehicles showed that small car cowl 
heights have increased over the tested and simulated vehicle models. A cowl height increase of 3 
to 6 in. (76 to 152 mm) was shown across many makes and models. 
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10.5 Guidelines 
Due to recent small car design trends, previous full-scale vehicle crash testing, MASH 
and NCHRP Report No. 350 safety standards, and the simulations performed in these studies, the 
following conclusions and recommendations were made: 
i. There appears to be a considerable amount of upside tolerance for the rail height 
on the MASH-approved MGS.  This was supported by both the high flare rate 
study and this maximum mounting height study. 
ii. Maximum top-rail mounting height for the MGS should not exceed 36 in. (940 
mm) when placed on level terrain; 
iii. Vehicle front-end geometry, specifically the vehicle cowl height, was a critical 
factor in determining the susceptibility of a small car to underride a guardrail 
system; 
iv. The MGS may be suitable for use on 6:1 approach slopes with 5- and 9-ft (1.5- 
and 2.7-m) lateral offsets when mounted at a 36-in. (940-mm) top rail height; 
v. Improved performance of the MGS could be shown on 8:1 approach slopes when 
the system was mounted at a 34-in. (864-mm) rail height; and 
vi. For compliance with MASH TL-3 standards, full-scale vehicle crash tests should 
be performed, as outlined in Table 26. 
10.6 Future Research 
Current MASH FHWA approval for the MGS consists of a nominal 31-in. (787-mm) top-
rail mounting height. The crash tests reported herein indicate that there exists a considerable 
factor of safety applicable to barrier height. However, a taller MGS was not ready for MASH 
approval as more research must be performed on the system. 
 
 


























(km/h) deg (Y/N) 
System: Midwest Guardrail System (MGS) 
 Length: 175-ft (53.3-m);    Nominal Top Rail Height: 36-in. (914-mm);    Terrain: Level 
3-10 1100C 62.1 (100) 25 Post No. 12 N Test No. MGSMRH-2 has been performed and passed successfully. 
3-11 2270P 62.1 (100) 25 Post No. 12 Y 
Needed to verify acceptable system resistance to loading with decreased post 
embedment depth. 
System: Midwest Guardrail System (MGS) 
 Length: 175-ft (53.3-m);    Nominal Top Rail Height: 36-in. (914-mm);    Terrain: 6:1 Approach Slope at 5-ft (1.5-m) lateral offset 




(100) 20 Post No. 12 Y 
Needed to examine susceptibility of small car to underride system at increased 
mounting heights on approach slopes. 
3-11 2270P 62.1 (100) 25 Post No. 12 Y 
Needed to verify acceptable system resistance to loading with decreased post 
embedment depth, and to examine susceptibility of truck to override system. 
System: Midwest Guardrail System (MGS) 
 Length: 175-ft (53.3-m);    Nominal Top Rail Height: 36-in. (914-mm);    Terrain: 6:1 Approach Slope at 9-ft (2.7-m) lateral offset 




(100) 20 Post No. 12 Y 
Vehicle trajectory presents unknown behavior and potential underride issues at 
this offset. 
3-11 2270P 62.1 (100) 25 Post No. 12 Y Vehicle trajectory in the air presents unknown behavior. 
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At a minimum, full-scale vehicle crash testing should be performed on the MGS at a 36-
in. (914-mm) top-rail height: 
i. with a 2270P pickup truck; and  
ii. on transitions to and from a 31-in. (787-mm) rail to examine potential “wedging” 
of the small car. 
For practical usage, full-scale vehicle crash testing should be performed on the MGS at a 
36-in. (914-mm) top-rail height with: 
i. end terminals; and 
ii. transitions to other systems (e.g., thrie-beam and concrete barriers). 
For extended usage, full-scale vehicle crash testing should be performed on the MGS at a 
36-in. (914-mm) top-rail height with no blockouts. 
These full-scale vehicle crash tests should be supported with LS-DYNA simulations, 
including the use of the new NCAC 1100C Toyota Yaris model. 
For use on approach slopes, two full-scale tests should be performed at a 36-in. (914-mm) 
top-rail height on a 6:1 approach slope at a 5-ft (1.5-m) lateral rail offset with: 
i. the 2270P pickup truck at a 25-degree impact angle; and  
ii. the 1100C small car at a 20-degree impact angle. 
Furthermore, verification of and improvements to the existing post-soil model used in 
LS-DYNA should be pursued. Physical bogie testing should be performed with decreased post 
embedment to verify and fine tune the post-soil model. Alternate soil modeling techniques, such 
as Arbitrary-Lagrangian Eulerian (ALE) methods, may prove better at simulating soil in these 
models. 
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Appendix A.  - MGS 31-in. (787-mm) BARRIER VII Input Deck (2270P) 
MGS 175ft, 2270P at 31-in. System Height 
  225    2    1    1  253    6    2    0 
    0.0001    0.0001     2.000 2000    0       1.0    1 
   10   10   10   10   10  500    1 
    1       0.0       0.0 
  225      2100       0.0 
    1  225  223    1     9.375 
    1  225      0.40 
  225  224  223  222  221  220  219  218  217  216   
  215  214  213  212  211  210  209  208  207  206   
  205  204  203  202  201  200  199  198  197  196   
  195  194  193  192  191  190  189  188  187  186   
  185  184  183  182  181  180  179  178  177  176   
  175  174  173  172  171  170  169  168  167  166   
  165  164  163  162  161  160  159  158  157  156   
  155  154  153  152  151  150  149  148  147  146   
  145  144  143  142  141  140  139  138  137  136   
  135  134  133  132  131  130  129  128  127  126   
  125  124  123  122  121  120  119  118  117  116   
  115  114  113  112  111  110  109  108  107  106   
  105  104  103  102  101  100   99   98   97   96   
   95   94   93   92   91   90   89   88   87   86   
   85   84   83   82   81   80   79   78   77   76   
   75   74   73   72   71   70   69   68   67   66   
   65   64   63   62   61   60   59   58   57   56   
   55   54   53   52   51   50   49   48   47   46   
   45   44   43   42   41   40   39   38   37   36   
   35   34   33   32   31   30   29   28   27   26   
   25   24   23   22   21   20   19   18   17   16   
   15   14   13   12   11   10    9    8    7    6   
    5    4    3    2    1 
  100    1 
    1      2.29      1.99     9.375   30000.0      6.92      99.5      68.5 0.05 12-Gauge W-Beam 
  300    3 
    1    24.875      0.00       6.0       6.0     100.0     675.0     675.0 0.05 Simulated Strong 
Anchor Post 
     100.0     100.0      15.0      15.0 
    2    24.875      0.00       3.0       3.0     100.0     150.0    225.00 0.05 Second BCT Post 
      50.0      50.0      15.0      15.0 
    3    24.875       0.0      3.00      2.60      54.0     61.90    164.18 0.05 W6x9 by 6' Long 
Emb. 40" in H.E. 8 soil 
      15.0      25.0      15.0      15.0 
    1    1    2  224    1  101       0.0       0.0       0.0  
  225    1                 301       0.0       0.0       0.0       0.0       0.0 
  226    9                 302       0.0       0.0       0.0       0.0       0.0 
  227   17       251    8  303       0.0       0.0       0.0       0.0       0.0 
  252  217                 302       0.0       0.0       0.0       0.0       0.0 
  253  225                 301       0.0       0.0       0.0       0.0       0.0 
    5000.0   58310.0   20    6    4    0    1 
    1     0.055      0.12      6.00      17.0 
    2     0.057      0.15      7.00      18.0 
    3     0.062      0.18     10.00      12.0 
    4     0.110      0.35     12.00       6.0 
    5      0.35      0.45      6.00       5.0 
    6      1.45      1.50     15.00       1.0 
    1    102.50    15.875    1      12.0    1    1    0    0 
    2    102.50    27.875    1      12.0    1    1    0    0 
    3    102.50    39.000    2      12.0    1    1    0    0 
    4     88.75    39.000    2      12.0    1    1    0    0 
    5     76.75    39.000    2      12.0    1    1    0    0 
    6     64.75    39.000    2      12.0    1    1    0    0 
    7     52.75    39.000    2      12.0    1    1    0    0 
    8     40.75    39.000    2      12.0    1    1    0    0 
    9     28.75    39.000    2      12.0    1    1    0    0 
   10     16.75    39.000    2      12.0    1    1    0    0 
   11    -13.25    39.000    3      12.0    1    1    0    0 
   12    -33.25    39.000    3      12.0    1    1    0    0 
   13    -53.25    39.000    3      12.0    1    1    0    0 
   14    -73.25    39.000    3      12.0    1    1    0    0 
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   15    -93.25    39.000    3      12.0    1    1    0    0 
   16   -125.35    39.000    4      12.0    1    1    0    0 
   17   -125.35   -39.000    4      12.0    0    0    0    0 
   18    102.50   -39.000    1      12.0    0    0    0    0 
   19     62.40     33.90    5       1.0    1    1    0    0 
   20    -77.85     33.90    6       1.0    1    1    0    0 
    1     62.40     33.90       0.0      608. 
    2     62.40    -33.90       0.0      608. 
    3    -77.85     33.90       0.0      492. 
    4    -77.85    -33.90       0.0      492. 
   25       0.0       0.0 
    3    900.00       0.0      25.0     62.10       0.0       0.0       1.0
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Appendix B. - MGS 32-in. (813-mm) BARRIER VII Input Deck (1100C) 
MGS 175ft, 1100C at 32-in. System Height 
  225    2    1    1  253    6    2    0 
    0.0001    0.0001     2.000 2000    0       1.0    1 
    2   10   10   10   10  500    1 
    1       0.0       0.0 
  225      2100       0.0 
    1  225  223    1     9.375 
    1  225      0.30 
  225  224  223  222  221  220  219  218  217  216   
  215  214  213  212  211  210  209  208  207  206   
  205  204  203  202  201  200  199  198  197  196   
  195  194  193  192  191  190  189  188  187  186   
  185  184  183  182  181  180  179  178  177  176   
  175  174  173  172  171  170  169  168  167  166   
  165  164  163  162  161  160  159  158  157  156   
  155  154  153  152  151  150  149  148  147  146   
  145  144  143  142  141  140  139  138  137  136   
  135  134  133  132  131  130  129  128  127  126   
  125  124  123  122  121  120  119  118  117  116   
  115  114  113  112  111  110  109  108  107  106   
  105  104  103  102  101  100   99   98   97   96   
   95   94   93   92   91   90   89   88   87   86   
   85   84   83   82   81   80   79   78   77   76   
   75   74   73   72   71   70   69   68   67   66   
   65   64   63   62   61   60   59   58   57   56   
   55   54   53   52   51   50   49   48   47   46   
   45   44   43   42   41   40   39   38   37   36   
   35   34   33   32   31   30   29   28   27   26   
   25   24   23   22   21   20   19   18   17   16   
   15   14   13   12   11   10    9    8    7    6   
    5    4    3    2    1 
  100    1 
    1      2.29      1.99     9.375   30000.0      6.92      99.5      68.5 0.05 12-Gauge W-Beam 
  300    3 
    1    25.875      0.00       6.0       6.0     100.0     675.0     675.0 0.05 Simulated Strong 
Anchor Post 
     100.0     100.0      15.0      15.0 
    2    25.875      0.00       3.0       3.0     100.0     150.0    225.00 0.05 Second BCT Post 
      50.0      50.0      15.0      15.0 
    3    25.875       0.0      3.00      2.60      54.0     61.90    142.05 0.05 W6x9 by 6' Long 
Emb. 39" in H.E. 8 soil 
      15.0      25.0      15.0      15.0 
    1    1    2  224    1  101       0.0       0.0       0.0  
  225    1                 301       0.0       0.0       0.0       0.0       0.0 
  226    9                 302       0.0       0.0       0.0       0.0       0.0 
  227   17       251    8  303       0.0       0.0       0.0       0.0       0.0 
  252  217                 302       0.0       0.0       0.0       0.0       0.0 
  253  225                 301       0.0       0.0       0.0       0.0       0.0 
    2579.0   16264.9   20    1    4    0    1 
    1     0.033     0.150       4.5      13.0 
    1    75.750   -32.188    1    43.240    1    1    0    0 
    2    75.750   -21.458    1    10.729    1    1    0    0 
    3    75.750   -10.729    1    10.729    1    1    0    0 
    4    75.750     0.000    1    10.729    1    1    0    0 
    5    75.750    10.729    1    10.729    1    1    0    0 
    6    75.750    21.458    1    10.729    1    1    0    0 
    7    75.750    32.188    1    12.940    1    1    0    0 
    8    60.600    32.188    1    15.150    1    1    0    0 
    9    45.450    32.188    1    15.150    1    1    0    0 
   10    30.300    32.188    1    15.150    1    1    0    0 
   11    15.150    32.188    1    15.150    1    1    0    0 
   12     0.000    32.188    1    18.888    1    1    0    0 
   13   -22.625    32.188    1    22.625    1    1    0    0 
   14   -45.250    32.188    1    22.625    1    1    0    0 
   15   -67.875    32.188    1    22.625    1    1    0    0 
   16     -90.5    32.188    1    22.625    1    1    0    0 
   17   -90.500   -32.188    1    45.250    1    1    0    0 
   18     0.000   -32.188    1    45.250    1    1    0    0 
   19      38.5    27.813    1     1.000    1    1    0    0 
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   20      38.5   -27.813    1     1.000    1    1    0    0 
    1      38.5    27.813      0.00   380.250 
    2      38.5   -27.813      0.00   380.250 
    3     -57.0    27.813      0.00   264.500 
    4     -57.0   -27.813      0.00   264.500 
    1      0.00      0.00 
    7    950.00       0.0      25.0     62.10       0.0       0.0       1.0
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Appendix C. - MGS 34-in. (864-mm) BARRIER VII Input Deck (1100C) 
MGSMRH-1 175ft, 1100C at 34-in. System Height 
  225    2    1    1  253    6    2    0 
    0.0001    0.0001     2.000 2000    0       1.0    1 
   10   10   10   10   10  500    1 
    1       0.0       0.0 
  225      2100       0.0 
    1  225  223    1     9.375 
    1  225      0.35 
  225  224  223  222  221  220  219  218  217  216   
  215  214  213  212  211  210  209  208  207  206   
  205  204  203  202  201  200  199  198  197  196   
  195  194  193  192  191  190  189  188  187  186   
  185  184  183  182  181  180  179  178  177  176   
  175  174  173  172  171  170  169  168  167  166   
  165  164  163  162  161  160  159  158  157  156   
  155  154  153  152  151  150  149  148  147  146   
  145  144  143  142  141  140  139  138  137  136   
  135  134  133  132  131  130  129  128  127  126   
  125  124  123  122  121  120  119  118  117  116   
  115  114  113  112  111  110  109  108  107  106   
  105  104  103  102  101  100   99   98   97   96   
   95   94   93   92   91   90   89   88   87   86   
   85   84   83   82   81   80   79   78   77   76   
   75   74   73   72   71   70   69   68   67   66   
   65   64   63   62   61   60   59   58   57   56   
   55   54   53   52   51   50   49   48   47   46   
   45   44   43   42   41   40   39   38   37   36   
   35   34   33   32   31   30   29   28   27   26   
   25   24   23   22   21   20   19   18   17   16   
   15   14   13   12   11   10    9    8    7    6   
    5    4    3    2    1 
  100    1 
    1      2.29      1.99     9.375   30000.0      6.92      99.5      68.5 0.05 12-Gauge W-Beam 
  300    3 
    1    27.875      0.00       6.0       6.0     100.0     675.0     675.0 0.05 Simulated Strong 
Anchor Post 
     100.0     100.0      15.0      15.0 
    2    27.875      0.00       3.0       3.0     100.0     150.0    225.00 0.05 Second BCT Post 
      50.0      50.0      15.0      15.0 
    3    27.875       0.0      2.60      2.60      54.0     61.90    160.98 0.05 W6x9 by 6' Long 
Emb. 37" in H.E. 8 soil 
      15.0      25.0      15.0      15.0 
    1    1    2  224    1  101       0.0       0.0       0.0  
  225    1                 301       0.0       0.0       0.0       0.0       0.0 
  226    9                 302       0.0       0.0       0.0       0.0       0.0 
  227   17       251    8  303       0.0       0.0       0.0       0.0       0.0 
  252  217                 302       0.0       0.0       0.0       0.0       0.0 
  253  225                 301       0.0       0.0       0.0       0.0       0.0 
    2599.0   16264.9   20    1    4    0    1 
    1     0.030     0.150       4.5      13.0 
    1    75.750   -32.188    1    43.240    1    1    0    0 
    2    75.750   -21.458    1    10.729    1    1    0    0 
    3    75.750   -10.729    1    10.729    1    1    0    0 
    4    75.750     0.000    1    10.729    1    1    0    0 
    5    75.750    10.729    1    10.729    1    1    0    0 
    6    75.750    21.458    1    10.729    1    1    0    0 
    7    75.750    32.188    1    12.940    1    1    0    0 
    8    60.600    32.188    1    15.150    1    1    0    0 
    9    45.450    32.188    1    15.150    1    1    0    0 
   10    30.300    32.188    1    15.150    1    1    0    0 
   11    15.150    32.188    1    15.150    1    1    0    0 
   12     0.000    32.188    1    18.888    1    1    0    0 
   13   -22.625    32.188    1    22.625    1    1    0    0 
   14   -45.250    32.188    1    22.625    1    1    0    0 
   15   -67.875    32.188    1    22.625    1    1    0    0 
   16     -90.5    32.188    1    22.625    1    1    0    0 
   17   -90.500   -32.188    1    45.250    1    1    0    0 
   18     0.000   -32.188    1    45.250    1    1    0    0 
   19      38.5    27.813    1     1.000    1    1    0    0 
December 5, 2012  
MwRSF Report No. TRP-03-274-12 
 
175 
   20      38.5   -27.813    1     1.000    1    1    0    0 
    1      38.5    27.813      0.00   380.250 
    2      38.5   -27.813      0.00   380.250 
    3     -57.0    27.813      0.00   264.500 
    4     -57.0   -27.813      0.00   264.500 
    1      0.00      0.00     
    7    940.00       0.0      25.0     62.10       0.0       0.0       1.0
December 5, 2012  
MwRSF Report No. TRP-03-274-12 
 
176 
Appendix D. - MGS 36-in. (914-mm) BARRIER VII Input Deck (1100C) 
 
MGSMRH-2 175ft, 1100C at 36-in. System Height 
  225    2    1    1  253    6    2    0 
    0.0001    0.0001     2.000 2000    0       1.0    1 
   10   10   10   10   10  500    1 
    1       0.0       0.0 
  225      2100       0.0 
    1  225  223    1     9.375 
    1  225      0.35 
  225  224  223  222  221  220  219  218  217  216   
  215  214  213  212  211  210  209  208  207  206   
  205  204  203  202  201  200  199  198  197  196   
  195  194  193  192  191  190  189  188  187  186   
  185  184  183  182  181  180  179  178  177  176   
  175  174  173  172  171  170  169  168  167  166   
  165  164  163  162  161  160  159  158  157  156   
  155  154  153  152  151  150  149  148  147  146   
  145  144  143  142  141  140  139  138  137  136   
  135  134  133  132  131  130  129  128  127  126   
  125  124  123  122  121  120  119  118  117  116   
  115  114  113  112  111  110  109  108  107  106   
  105  104  103  102  101  100   99   98   97   96   
   95   94   93   92   91   90   89   88   87   86   
   85   84   83   82   81   80   79   78   77   76   
   75   74   73   72   71   70   69   68   67   66   
   65   64   63   62   61   60   59   58   57   56   
   55   54   53   52   51   50   49   48   47   46   
   45   44   43   42   41   40   39   38   37   36   
   35   34   33   32   31   30   29   28   27   26   
   25   24   23   22   21   20   19   18   17   16   
   15   14   13   12   11   10    9    8    7    6   
    5    4    3    2    1 
  100    1 
    1      2.29      1.99     9.375   30000.0      6.92      99.5      68.5 0.05 12-Gauge W-Beam 
  300    3 
    1    29.875      0.00       6.0       6.0     100.0     675.0     675.0 0.05 Simulated Strong 
Anchor Post 
     100.0     100.0      15.0      15.0 
    2    29.875      0.00       3.0       3.0     100.0     150.0    225.00 0.05 Second BCT Post 
      50.0      50.0      15.0      15.0 
    3    29.875       0.0      3.00      2.60      54.0     61.90    172.53 0.05 W6x9 by 6' Long 
Emb. 35" in H.E. 8 soil 
      15.0      25.0      15.0      15.0 
    1    1    2  224    1  101       0.0       0.0       0.0  
  225    1                 301       0.0       0.0       0.0       0.0       0.0 
  226    9                 302       0.0       0.0       0.0       0.0       0.0 
  227   17       251    8  303       0.0       0.0       0.0       0.0       0.0 
  252  217                 302       0.0       0.0       0.0       0.0       0.0 
  253  225                 301       0.0       0.0       0.0       0.0       0.0 
    2583.0   16264.9   20    1    4    0    1 
    1     0.030     0.150       4.5      13.0 
    1    75.750   -32.188    1    43.240    1    1    0    0 
    2    75.750   -21.458    1    10.729    1    1    0    0 
    3    75.750   -10.729    1    10.729    1    1    0    0 
    4    75.750     0.000    1    10.729    1    1    0    0 
    5    75.750    10.729    1    10.729    1    1    0    0 
    6    75.750    21.458    1    10.729    1    1    0    0 
    7    75.750    32.188    1    12.940    1    1    0    0 
    8    60.600    32.188    1    15.150    1    1    0    0 
    9    45.450    32.188    1    15.150    1    1    0    0 
   10    30.300    32.188    1    15.150    1    1    0    0 
   11    15.150    32.188    1    15.150    1    1    0    0 
   12     0.000    32.188    1    18.888    1    1    0    0 
   13   -22.625    32.188    1    22.625    1    1    0    0 
   14   -45.250    32.188    1    22.625    1    1    0    0 
   15   -67.875    32.188    1    22.625    1    1    0    0 
   16     -90.5    32.188    1    22.625    1    1    0    0 
   17   -90.500   -32.188    1    45.250    1    1    0    0 
   18     0.000   -32.188    1    45.250    1    1    0    0 
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   19      38.5    27.813    1     1.000    1    1    0    0 
   20      38.5   -27.813    1     1.000    1    1    0    0 
    1      38.5    27.813      0.00   380.250 
    2      38.5   -27.813      0.00   380.250 
    3     -57.0    27.813      0.00   264.500 
    4     -57.0   -27.813      0.00   264.500 
    1      0.00      0.00     
    7    940.00       0.0      25.0     62.10       0.0       0.0       1.0 
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A ____                Report 350 820C Small Car______ __________ _____________________              __          
(Report 350 or MASH or EN1317 Vehicle Type)   
 
Striking a _____32-in. tall Midwest Guardrail System_____________________________                __       
(roadside hardware type and name) 
 
Report Date: __5/29/2012_________ _________________________________________             ______ 
 
Type of Report (check one)   
 Verification (known numerical solution compared to new numerical solution) or 
 Validation (full-scale crash test compared to a numerical solution). 
General Information Known Solution Analysis Solution 
   Performing Organization MwRSF MwRSF/Julin 
   Test/Run Number: NPG-1 NPG-1_SIM-2012_01 
   Vehicle: 1994 Geo Metro MwRSF modified Geo (NCAC/Politecnico di Milano 820C) 
Impact Conditions   
   Vehicle Mass: 887 kg 899 kg 
   Speed: 102.9 km/h 100 km/h 
   Angle: 18.7 degrees 20 degrees 
   Impact Point: Upstream of post no. 14 Upstream of post no. 12 
 
Composite Validation/Verification Score 
                 List the Report 350/MASH or EN1317 Test Number 3-10 
Part I Did all solution verification criteria in Table E-1 pass? Yes 
Part II Do all the time history evaluation scores from Table E-2 result in a satisfactory 
comparison (i.e., the comparison passes the criterion)?  If all the values in Table 
E-2 did not pass, did the weighted procedure shown in Table E-3 result in an 
acceptable comparison.  If all the criteria in Table E-2 pass, enter “yes.”  If all the 





All the criteria in Table E-4 (Test-PIRT) passed? Yes 
 Are the results of Steps I through III all affirmative (i.e., YES)?  If all three steps 
result in a “YES” answer, the comparison can be considered validated or verified.  
If one of the steps results in a negative response, the result cannot be considered 
validated or verified. 
Yes 
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PART I: BASIC INFORMATION 
 
These forms may be used for validation or verification of roadside hardware crash tests.  
If the known solution is a full-scale crash test (i.e., physical experiment) which is being 
compared to a numerical solution (e.g., LSDYNA analysis) then the procedure is a validation 
exercise.  If the known solution is a numerical solution (e.g., a prior finite element model using a 
different program or earlier version of the software) then the procedure is a verification exercise.  
This form can also be used to verify the repeatability of crash tests by comparing two full-scale 
crash test experiments.  Provide the following basic information for the validation/verification 
comparison: 
1. What type of roadside hardware is being evaluated (check one)?  
  Longitudinal barrier or transition  
 Terminal or crash cushion  
  Breakaway support or work zone traffic control device  
 Truck-mounted attenuator  
 Other hardware:  ______________________________________________________ 
 
2. What test guidelines were used to perform the full-scale crash test (check one)? 
NCHRP Report No. 350 
 MASH 
 EN1317 
 Other: _______________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Indicate the test level and number being evaluated (fill in the blank).  ___3-10 ___  
 
4. Indicate the vehicle type appropriate for the test level and number indicated in item 3 
according to the testing guidelines indicated in item 2. 
 
NCHRP Report No. 350/MASH 
 700C   820C   1100C 
 2000P   2270P   






Car (900 kg)   Car (1300 kg)   Car (1500 kg) 
 Rigid HGV (10 ton)  Rigid HGV (16 ton)  
 Rigid HGV (30 ton) 
 Bus (13 ton)   
 Articulated HGV (38 ton)   
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PART II: ANALYSIS SOLUTION VERIFICATION 
 
Using the results of the analysis solution, fill in the values for Table E-1.  These values 
are indications of whether the analysis solution produced a numerically stable result and do not 
necessarily mean that the result is a good comparison to the known solution.  The purpose of this 
table is to ensure that the numerical solution produces results that are numerically stable and 
conform to the conservation laws (e.g., energy, mass and momentum).   
Table E-1. Analysis Solution Verification Table 
Verification Evaluation Criteria Change(%) Pass? 
Total energy of the analysis solution (i.e., kinetic, potential, contact, etc.)  
must not vary more than 10 percent from the beginning of the run to the end  
of the run. 
3.97 Yes 
Hourglass Energy of the analysis solution at the end of the run is less than  
five percent of the total initial energy at the beginning of the run. 0 Yes 
Hourglass Energy of the analysis solution at the end of the run is less than  
ten percent of the total internal energy at the end of the run. 0 Yes 
The part/material with the highest amount of hourglass energy at the end of  
the run is less than ten percent of the total internal energy of the part/material 
at the end of the run. 
0 Yes 
Mass added to the total model is less than five percent of the total model mass at the 
beginning of the run. 0.3 Yes 
The part/material with the most mass added had less than 10 percent of its initial mass 
added. 2.1 Yes 
The moving parts/materials in the model have less than five percent of mass added to 
the initial moving mass of the model. 0.3 Yes 
There are no shooting nodes in the solution? Yes Yes 
There are no solid elements with negative volumes? Yes Yes 
 
The Analysis Solution (check one)  passes   does NOT pass all the criteria in Table E1-1  
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PART III: TIME HISTORY EVALUATION TABLE 
 
Table E-2. Roadside Safety Validation Metrics Rating Table – Time History Comparisons 
(single channel option) 
Evaluation Criteria  
Time interval  
[0 sec; 0.5 sec] 
O Sprague-Geers Metrics 
List all the data channels being compared.  Calculate the M and P metrics 
using RSVVP and enter the results.  Values less than or equal to 40 are 
acceptable. 
 
RSVVP Curve Preprocessing Options 













X acceleration CFC 180 Min. Area of Residuals Y N Y N 2.8 30.5 Yes 
Y acceleration CFC 180 Min. Area of Residuals Y N Y N 17.4 22.4 Yes 
Z acceleration CFC 180 Min. Area of Residuals Y N Y N 32.4 48.9 No 
Roll rate  CFC 180 Min. Area of Residuals Y N Y N 37.9 37.9 Yes 
Pitch rate  CFC 180 Min. Area of Residuals Y N Y N 46.7 48.8 No 
Yaw rate  CFC 180 Min. Area of Residuals Y N Y N 0.2 8.6 Yes 
P ANOVA Metrics 
List all the data channels being compared.  Calculate the ANOVA metrics 
using RSVVP and enter the results.  Both of the following criteria must be 
met: 
 The mean residual error must be less than five percent of the peak 
acceleration ( Peakae  05.0 ) and 
 The standard deviation of the residuals must be less than 35 



























     X acceleration/Peak 0.03 0.23 Yes 
     Y acceleration/Peak 0.05 0.21 Yes 
     Z acceleration/Peak 0.06 0.32 No 
     Roll rate  0.04 0.35 Yes 
     Pitch rate  0.08 0.44 No 
     Yaw rate  0.05 0.12 Yes 
The Analysis Solution (check one)  passes    does NOT pass all the criteria in Table E-2. 
December 5, 2012  
MwRSF Report No. TRP-03-274-12 
 
182 
Table E-3. Roadside Safety Validation Metrics Rating Table – Time History Comparisons 
(multi-channel option) 
Evaluation Criteria (time interval [0 sec; 0.5 sec]) 
Channels (Select which were used) 
  X Acceleration   Y Acceleration  Z Acceleration 
  Roll rate   Pitch rate   Yaw rate 
Multi-Channel Weights 
 
  Area II method 
  Inertial method 
 
X Channel: 0.149209 
Y Channel: 0.269629 
Z Channel: 0.081161 
Yaw Channel: 0.464020 
Roll Channel: 0.016895 
Pitch Channel: 0.019084 
O   Sprague-Geer Metrics   Values less or equal to 40 are acceptable. M P Pass? 
9.4 20.1 Yes 
P 
ANOVA Metrics 
Both of the following criteria must be met: 
 The mean residual error must be less than five percent of the 
peak acceleration   
( Peakae  05.0 ) 
 The standard deviation of the residuals must be less than 35 
























0.02 0.19 Yes 
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PART IV: PHENOMENA IMPORTANCE RANKING TABLE 
Table E-4. Evaluation Criteria Test Applicability Table 
Evaluation 




Test article should contain and redirect the vehicle; the vehicle 
should not penetrate, under-ride, or override the installation 
although controlled lateral deflection of the test article is 
acceptable.  
10, 11, 12, 20, 21, 22, 35, 36, 
37, 38 
B The test article should readily activate in a predictable manner by breaking away, fracturing or yielding.  60, 61, 70, 71, 80, 81 
C Acceptable test article performance may be by redirection, controlled penetration or controlled stopping of the vehicle.  
30, 31,, 32, 33, 34, 39, 40, 41, 




Detached elements, fragments or other debris from the test article 
should not penetrate or show potential for penetrating the occupant 
compartment, or present an undue hazard to other traffic, 
pedestrians or personnel in a work zone.  
All 
E 
Detached elements, fragments or other debris from the test article, 
or vehicular damage should not block the driver’s vision or 
otherwise cause the driver to lose control of the vehicle. (Answer 
Yes or No) 
70, 71 
F  The vehicle should remain upright during and after the collision although moderate roll, pitching and yawing are acceptable.  
All except those listed in 
criterion G 
  G It is preferable, although not essential, that the vehicle remain upright during and after collision.  
12, 22 (for test level 1 – 30, 
31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 
39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44) 
H 
Occupant impact velocities should satisfy the following: 
Occupant Impact Velocity Limits (m/s) 
Component Preferred Maximum 
10, 20, 30,31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 
40, 41, 42, 43, 50, 51, 52, 53, 
80, 81 Longitudinal and 
Lateral 9 12 
Longitudinal 3 5 60, 61, 70, 71 
I 
Occupant ridedown accelerations should satisfy the following: 
Occupant Ridedown Acceleration Limits (g’s) 
Component Preferred Maximum 
10, 20, 30,31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 
40, 41, 42, 43, 50, 51, 52, 53, 
60, 61, 70, 71, 80, 81 Longitudinal and 




The occupant impact velocity in the longitudinal direction should 
not exceed 40 ft/sec and the occupant ride-down acceleration in 
the longitudinal direction should not exceed 20 G’s. 
11,21, 35, 37, 38, 39 
M 
The exit angle from the test article preferable should be less than 
60 percent of test impact angle, measured at the time of vehicle 
loss of contact with test device. 
10, 11, 12, 20, 21, 22, 35, 36, 
37, 38, 39 
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Test article should contain and redirect the vehicle; the 
vehicle should not penetrate, under-ride, or override the 
installation although controlled lateral deflection of the 
test article is acceptable. (Answer Yes or No) 
Yes Yes  Yes 
A2 
Maximum dynamic deflection: 
- Relative difference is less than 20 percent or 
- Absolute difference is less than 0.15 m 
0.442 m 0.496 m 11.9% 0.054 m Yes 
A3 
Length of vehicle-barrier contact: 
- Relative difference is less than 20 percent or 
- Absolute difference is less than 2 m 
450 ms 410 ms 8.9% Yes 
A4 Number of broken or significantly bent posts is less than 20 percent. 2 2 0% Yes 
A5 Did the rail element rupture or tear (Answer Yes or No) No No  Yes 
A6 Were there failures of connector elements (Answer Yes orNo). No No  Yes 
A7 Was there significant snagging between the vehicle wheels and barrier elements (Answer Yes or No). No No  Yes 
A8 Was there significant snagging between vehicle body components and barrier elements (Answer Yes or No). No No  Yes 
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Table E-5. (b) Roadside Safety Phenomena Importance Ranking Table (Occupant Risk) 
















Detached elements, fragments or other debris from the test 
article should not penetrate or show potential for 
penetrating the occupant compartment, or present an 
undue hazard to other traffic, pedestrians or personnel in a 
work zone. (Answer Pass or Fail) 
Pass Pass  Yes 
F 
F1 
The vehicle should remain upright during and after the 
collision although moderate roll, pitching and yawing are 
acceptable. (Answer Pass or Fail) 
Pass Pass  Yes 
F2 
Maximum roll of the vehicle: 
- Relative difference is less than 20 percent or 
- Absolute difference is less than 5 degrees. 
2.69° 2.5° 7.6% 0.19° Yes 
F3 
Maximum pitch of the vehicle is: 
- Relative difference is less than 20 percent or 
- Absolute difference is less than 5 degrees. 
0.6° 1.0° 66.6% 0.4° Yes 
F4 
Maximum yaw of the vehicle is: 
- Relative difference is less than 20 percent or 
- Absolute difference is less than 5 degrees. 




Occupant impact velocities: 
- Relative difference is less than 20 percent or 
- Absolute difference is less than 2 m/s.     
 Longitudinal OIV (m/s) 3.52 3.28 6.8% 0.24 m/s Yes 
 Lateral OIV (m/s) 5.68 4.74 16.5% 0.97 m/s Yes 
 THIV (m/s) *N.R. *N.R.   
L2 
Occupant accelerations: 
- Relative difference is less than 20 percent or 
- Absolute difference is less than 4 g’s. 
    
 Longitudinal ORA 6.13 6.3 0.17 g Yes 
 Lateral ORA 7.97 8.64 0.67 g Yes 
 PHD *N.R. *N.R.   
 ASI *N.R. 1.85   
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Table E-5. (c) Roadside Safety Phenomena Importance Ranking Table (Vehicle Trajectory) 



















The exit angle from the test article preferable  
should be less than 60 percent of test impact  
angle, measured at the time of vehicle loss of 




73%  Yes 
M2 
Exit angle at loss of contact: 
- Relative difference is less than 20 percent or 
- Absolute difference is less than 5 degrees. 
10.3° 14.5° 28% 4.2° Yes 
M3 
Exit velocity at loss of contact: 
- Relative difference is less than 20 percent or 
- Absolute difference is less than 5 degrees. 
*N.R. 75.9  km/h   
M4 One or more vehicle tires failed or de-beaded  during the collision event (Answer Yes or No). Yes *N.M.   
*N.R. - Not Reported  *N.M. - Not Modeled   
The Analysis Solution (check one)  passes    does NOT pass all the criteria in Tables E-5a 
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(a)      (b) 
Figure E-1. X-Channel (a) acceleration-time history data used to compute metrics and (b) 
integration of acceleration-time history data 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure E-2. Y-Channel (a) acceleration-time history data used to compute metrics and (b) 
integration of acceleration-time history data 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure E-3. Z-Channel (a) acceleration-time history data used to compute metrics and (b) 
integration of acceleration-time history data 
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(a)      (b) 
Figure E-4. Roll Channel (a) angular rate-time history data used to compute metrics and (b) 
integration of angular rate-time history data 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure E-5. Pitch Channel (a) angular rate-time history data used to compute metrics and (b) 
integration of angular rate-time history data 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure E-6. Yaw Channel (a) angular rate-time history data used to compute metrics and (b) 
integration of angular rate-time history data 
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A ____               MASH 2270P Pickup Truck _ _ _       ________ ________                _______________          
(Report 350 or MASH or EN1317 Vehicle Type) 
 
Striking a _____31-in. tall Midwest Guardrail System_  _____________________              _________       
(roadside hardware type and name) 
 
Report Date: __5/30/2012_________ ____________________________________             ___________ 
 
Type of Report (check one)   
 Verification (known numerical solution compared to new numerical solution) or 
 Validation (full-scale crash test compared to a numerical solution). 
General Information Known Solution Analysis Solution 
   Performing Organization MwRSF MwRSF/Julin 
   Test/Run Number: 2214MG-2 2214MG-2_SIM-2012_SUSP 
   Vehicle: 2002 Dodge Ram MwRSF modified Silverado (NCAC) 
Impact Conditions   
   Vehicle Mass: 2268 kg 2270 kg 
   Speed: 101.2 km/h 100 km/h 
   Angle: 25.5 degrees 25 degrees 
   Impact Point: Upstream of post no. 12 Upstream of post no. 12 
 
Composite Validation/Verification Score 
                 List the Report 350/MASH or EN1317 Test Number 3-11 
Part I Did all solution verification criteria in Table F-1 pass? Yes 
Part II Do all the time history evaluation scores from Table F-2 result in a satisfactory 
comparison (i.e., the comparison passes the criterion)?  If all the values in Table 
F-2 did not pass, did the weighted procedure shown in Table F-3 result in an 
acceptable comparison.  If all the criteria in Table F-2 pass, enter “yes.”  If all the 





All the criteria in Table F-4 (Test-PIRT) passed? Yes 
 Are the results of Steps I through III all affirmative (i.e., YES)?  If all three steps 
result in a “YES” answer, the comparison can be considered validated or verified.  
If one of the steps results in a negative response, the result cannot be considered 
validated or verified. 
Yes 
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PART I: BASIC INFORMATION 
 
These forms may be used for validation or verification of roadside hardware crash tests.  
If the known solution is a full-scale crash test (i.e., physical experiment) which is being 
compared to a numerical solution (e.g., LSDYNA analysis) then the procedure is a validation 
exercise.  If the known solution is a numerical solution (e.g., a prior finite element model using a 
different program or earlier version of the software) then the procedure is a verification exercise.  
This form can also be used to verify the repeatability of crash tests by comparing two full-scale 
crash test experiments.  Provide the following basic information for the validation/verification 
comparison: 
5. What type of roadside hardware is being evaluated (check one)?  
  Longitudinal barrier or transition  
 Terminal or crash cushion  
  Breakaway support or work zone traffic control device  
 Truck-mounted attenuator  
 Other hardware:  ______________________________________________________ 
 
6. What test guidelines were used to perform the full-scale crash test (check one)? 
NCHRP Report No. 350 
 MASH 
 EN1317 
 Other: _______________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Indicate the test level and number being evaluated (fill in the blank).  ___3-11  ___ 
 
8. Indicate the vehicle type appropriate for the test level and number indicated in item 3 
according to the testing guidelines indicated in item 2. 
 
NCHRP Report No. 350/MASH 
 700C   820C   1100C 
 2000P   2270P   






Car (900 kg)   Car (1300 kg)   Car (1500 kg) 
 Rigid HGV (10 ton)  Rigid HGV (16 ton)   
 Rigid HGV (30 ton) 
 Bus (13 ton)   
 Articulated HGV (38 ton)   
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PART II: ANALYSIS SOLUTION VERIFICATION 
 
Using the results of the analysis solution, fill in the values for Table F-1.  These values 
are indications of whether the analysis solution produced a numerically stable result and do not 
necessarily mean that the result is a good comparison to the known solution.  The purpose of this 
table is to ensure that the numerical solution produces results that are numerically stable and 
conform to the conservation laws (e.g., energy, mass and momentum).   
Table F-1. Analysis Solution Verification Table 
Verification Evaluation Criteria Change(%) Pass? 
Total energy of the analysis solution (i.e., kinetic, potential, contact, etc.)  
must not vary more than 10 percent from the beginning of the run to the end  
of the run. 
5.2 Yes 
Hourglass Energy of the analysis solution at the end of the run is less than  
five percent of the total initial energy at the beginning of the run. 1.5 Yes 
Hourglass Energy of the analysis solution at the end of the run is less than  
ten percent of the total internal energy at the end of the run. 1.6 Yes 
The part/material with the highest amount of hourglass energy at the end of  
the run is less than ten percent of the total internal energy of the part/material 
at the end of the run. 
1.5 Yes 
Mass added to the total model is less than five percent of the total model mass at the 
beginning of the run. 0.6 Yes 
The part/material with the most mass added had less than 10 percent of its initial mass 
added. 1.2 Yes 
The moving parts/materials in the model have less than five percent of mass added to 
the initial moving mass of the model. 0.6 Yes 
There are no shooting nodes in the solution? Yes Yes 
There are no solid elements with negative volumes? Yes Yes 
 
The Analysis Solution (check one)  passes   does NOT pass all the criteria in Table E1-1  
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PART III: TIME HISTORY EVALUATION TABLE 
 
Table F-2. Roadside Safety Validation Metrics Rating Table – Time History Comparisons 
(single channel option) 
Evaluation Criteria  
Time interval  
[0 sec; 0.6 sec] 
O Sprague-Geers Metrics 
List all the data channels being compared.  Calculate the M and P metrics 
using RSVVP and enter the results.  Values less than or equal to 40 are 
acceptable. 
 
RSVVP Curve Preprocessing Options 













X acceleration CFC 180 Min. Area of Residuals Y N Y N 7.9 32.5 Yes 
Y acceleration CFC 180 Min. Area of Residuals Y N Y N 21.7 19.5 Yes 
Z acceleration CFC 180 Min. Area of Residuals Y N Y N 157.8 46.3 No 
Roll rate  CFC 180 Min. Area of Residuals Y N Y N 54.9 45.6 No 
Pitch rate  CFC 180 Min. Area of Residuals Y N Y N 140.4 48.2 No 
Yaw rate  CFC 180 Min. Area of Residuals Y N Y N 6.6 7.3 Yes 
P ANOVA Metrics 
List all the data channels being compared.  Calculate the ANOVA metrics 
using RSVVP and enter the results.  Both of the following criteria must be 
met: 
 The mean residual error must be less than five percent of the peak 
acceleration ( Peakae  05.0 ) and 
 The standard deviation of the residuals must be less than 35 



























     X acceleration/Peak 0.04 0.28 Yes 
     Y acceleration/Peak 0.05 0.31 Yes 
     Z acceleration/Peak 0.02 0.72 No 
     Roll rate  0.27 0.49 No 
     Pitch rate  0.08 0.81 No 
     Yaw rate  0.03 0.13 Yes 
The Analysis Solution (check one)  passes    does NOT pass all the criteria in Table F-2. 
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Table F-3. Roadside Safety Validation Metrics Rating Table – Time History Comparisons 
(multi-channel option) 
Evaluation Criteria (time interval [0 sec; 0.6 sec]) 
Channels (Select which were used) 
  X Acceleration   Y Acceleration  Z Acceleration 
  Roll rate   Pitch rate   Yaw rate 
Multi-Channel Weights 
 
  Area II method 
  Inertial method 
 
X Channel: 0.192377 
Y Channel: 0.296924 
Z Channel: 0.010698 
Yaw Channel: 0.433215 
Roll Channel: 0.032576 
Pitch Channel: 0.034208 
O   Sprague-Geer Metrics   Values less or equal to 40 are acceptable. M P Pass? 
19.1 18.8 Yes 
P 
ANOVA Metrics 
Both of the following criteria must be met: 
 The mean residual error must be less than five percent of the 
peak acceleration   
( Peakae  05.0 ) 
 The standard deviation of the residuals must be less than 35 
























0.3 0.25 Yes 
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PART IV: PHENOMENA IMPORTANCE RANKING TABLE 
Table F-4. Evaluation Criteria Test Applicability Table 
Evaluation 




Test article should contain and redirect the vehicle; the vehicle 
should not penetrate, under-ride, or override the installation 
although controlled lateral deflection of the test article is 
acceptable.  
10, 11, 12, 20, 21, 22, 35, 36, 
37, 38 
B The test article should readily activate in a predictable manner by breaking away, fracturing or yielding.  60, 61, 70, 71, 80, 81 
C Acceptable test article performance may be by redirection, controlled penetration or controlled stopping of the vehicle.  
30, 31,, 32, 33, 34, 39, 40, 41, 




Detached elements, fragments or other debris from the test article 
should not penetrate or show potential for penetrating the occupant 
compartment, or present an undue hazard to other traffic, 
pedestrians or personnel in a work zone.  
All 
E 
Detached elements, fragments or other debris from the test article, 
or vehicular damage should not block the driver’s vision or 
otherwise cause the driver to lose control of the vehicle. (Answer 
Yes or No) 
70, 71 
F  The vehicle should remain upright during and after the collision although moderate roll, pitching and yawing are acceptable.  
All except those listed in 
criterion G 
  G It is preferable, although not essential, that the vehicle remain upright during and after collision.  
12, 22 (for test level 1 – 30, 
31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 
39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44) 
H 
Occupant impact velocities should satisfy the following: 
Occupant Impact Velocity Limits (m/s) 
Component Preferred Maximum 
10, 20, 30,31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 
40, 41, 42, 43, 50, 51, 52, 53, 
80, 81 Longitudinal and 
Lateral 9 12 
Longitudinal 3 5 60, 61, 70, 71 
I 
Occupant ridedown accelerations should satisfy the following: 
Occupant Ridedown Acceleration Limits (g’s) 
Component Preferred Maximum 
10, 20, 30,31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 
40, 41, 42, 43, 50, 51, 52, 53, 
60, 61, 70, 71, 80, 81 Longitudinal and 




The occupant impact velocity in the longitudinal direction should 
not exceed 40 ft/sec and the occupant ride-down acceleration in 
the longitudinal direction should not exceed 20 G’s. 
11,21, 35, 37, 38, 39 
M 
The exit angle from the test article preferable should be less than 
60 percent of test impact angle, measured at the time of vehicle 
loss of contact with test device. 
10, 11, 12, 20, 21, 22, 35, 36, 
37, 38, 39 
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Test article should contain and redirect the vehicle; the 
vehicle should not penetrate, under-ride, or override the 
installation although controlled lateral deflection of the 
test article is acceptable. (Answer Yes or No) 
Yes Yes  Yes 
A2 
Maximum dynamic deflection: 
- Relative difference is less than 20 percent or 
- Absolute difference is less than 0.15 m 
1.114 m 0.987 m 11.4% 0.127 m Yes 
A3 
Length of vehicle-barrier contact: 
- Relative difference is less than 20 percent or 
- Absolute difference is less than 2 m 
 718 ms 620 ms 13.6% Yes 
A4 Number of broken or significantly bent posts is less than 20 percent. 3 3 0% Yes 
A5 Did the rail element rupture or tear (Answer Yes or No) No No  Yes 
A6 Were there failures of connector elements (Answer Yes orNo). No No  Yes 
A7 Was there significant snagging between the vehicle wheels and barrier elements (Answer Yes or No). No No  Yes 
A8 Was there significant snagging between vehicle body components and barrier elements (Answer Yes or No). No No  Yes 
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Table F-5. (b) Roadside Safety Phenomena Importance Ranking Table (Occupant Risk) 
















Detached elements, fragments or other debris from the test 
article should not penetrate or show potential for 
penetrating the occupant compartment, or present an 
undue hazard to other traffic, pedestrians or personnel in a 
work zone. (Answer Pass or Fail) 
Pass Pass  Yes 
F 
F1 
The vehicle should remain upright during and after the 
collision although moderate roll, pitching and yawing are 
acceptable. (Answer Pass or Fail) 
Pass Pass  Yes 
F2 
Maximum roll of the vehicle: 
- Relative difference is less than 20 percent or 
- Absolute difference is less than 5 degrees. 
4.08° 5.5° 25.8% 1.42° Yes 
F3 
Maximum pitch of the vehicle is: 
- Relative difference is less than 20 percent or 
- Absolute difference is less than 5 degrees. 
-1.8° -2.4° 33.3% 0.6° Yes 
F4 
Maximum yaw of the vehicle is: 
- Relative difference is less than 20 percent or 
- Absolute difference is less than 5 degrees. 




Occupant impact velocities: 
- Relative difference is less than 20 percent or 
- Absolute difference is less than 2 m/s.     
 Longitudinal OIV (m/s) 4.2 4.69 11.7% 0.49 m/s Yes 
 Lateral OIV (m/s) 4.8 2.98 37.9% 1.82 m/s Yes 
 THIV (m/s) 6.9 5.04 27% 1.86 m/s Yes 
L2 
Occupant accelerations: 
- Relative difference is less than 20 percent or 
- Absolute difference is less than 4 g’s. 
    
 Longitudinal ORA 8.2 5.01 3.19 g Yes 
 Lateral ORA 6.9 4.37 2.53 g Yes 
 PHD 10.8 9.7 1.1 g Yes 
 ASI *N.R. *N.R.   
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Table F-5. (c) Roadside Safety Phenomena Importance Ranking Table (Vehicle Trajectory) 



















The exit angle from the test article preferable  
should be less than 60 percent of test impact  
angle, measured at the time of vehicle loss of 




62%  Yes 
M2 
Exit angle at loss of contact: 
- Relative difference is less than 20 percent or 
- Absolute difference is less than 5 degrees. 
13.5° 16.2° 20% 2.7° Yes 
M3 
Exit velocity at loss of contact: 
- Relative difference is less than 20 percent or 






4.1 km/h Yes 
M4 One or more vehicle tires failed or de-beaded  during the collision event (Answer Yes or No). Yes Yes  Yes 
*N.R. - Not Reported  *N.M. - Not Modeled   
The Analysis Solution (check one)  passes    does NOT pass all the criteria in Tables F-5a 
through F-5c  with exceptions as noted  without exceptions . 
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(a)      (b) 
Figure F-1. X-Channel (a) acceleration-time history data used to compute metrics and (b) 
integration of acceleration-time history data 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure F-2. Y-Channel (a) acceleration-time history data used to compute metrics and (b) 
integration of acceleration-time history data 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure F-3. Z-Channel (a) acceleration-time history data used to compute metrics and (b) 
integration of acceleration-time history data 
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(a)      (b) 
Figure F-4. Roll Channel (a) angular rate-time history data used to compute metrics and (b) 
integration of angular rate-time history data 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure F-5. Pitch Channel (a) angular rate-time history data used to compute metrics and (b) 
integration of angular rate-time history data 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure F-6. Yaw Channel (a) angular rate-time history data used to compute metrics and (b) 
integration of angular rate-time history data
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A ____                Report 350 820C Small Car______ __________ _______________              ________          
(Report 350 or MASH or EN1317 Vehicle Type) 
 
Striking a _____31-in. tall Midwest Guardrail System on 8:1 Approach Slope________              ____       
(roadside hardware type and name) 
 
Report Date: __5/31/2012_________ ________________________________________             _______ 
 
Type of Report (check one)   
 Verification (known numerical solution compared to new numerical solution) or 
 Validation (full-scale crash test compared to a numerical solution). 
General Information Known Solution Analysis Solution 
   Performing Organization MwRSF MwRSF/Julin 
   Test/Run Number: MGSAS-2 MGSAS-2_SIM-2012_01 
   Vehicle: 2000 Geo Metro MwRSF modified Geo (NCAC/Politecnico di Milano 820C) 
Impact Conditions   
   Vehicle Mass: 912 kg 899 kg 
   Speed: 99.62 km/h 100 km/h 
   Angle: 21.6 degrees 20 degrees 
   Impact Point: Upstream of post no. 14 Upstream of post no. 14 
 
Composite Validation/Verification Score 
                 List the Report 350/MASH or EN1317 Test Number 3-10 
Part I Did all solution verification criteria in Table G-1 pass? Yes 
Part II Do all the time history evaluation scores from Table G-2 result in a satisfactory 
comparison (i.e., the comparison passes the criterion)?  If all the values in Table 
G-2 did not pass, did the weighted procedure shown in Table G-3 result in an 
acceptable comparison.  If all the criteria in Table G-2 pass, enter “yes.”  If all the 





All the criteria in Table G-4 (Test-PIRT) passed? Yes 
 Are the results of Steps I through III all affirmative (i.e., YES)?  If all three steps 
result in a “YES” answer, the comparison can be considered validated or verified.  
If one of the steps results in a negative response, the result cannot be considered 
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PART I: BASIC INFORMATION 
  
These forms may be used for validation or verification of roadside hardware crash tests.  
If the known solution is a full-scale crash test (i.e., physical experiment) which is being 
compared to a numerical solution (e.g., LSDYNA analysis) then the procedure is a validation 
exercise.  If the known solution is a numerical solution (e.g., a prior finite element model using a 
different program or earlier version of the software) then the procedure is a verification exercise.  
This form can also be used to verify the repeatability of crash tests by comparing two full-scale 
crash test experiments.  Provide the following basic information for the validation/verification 
comparison: 
9. What type of roadside hardware is being evaluated (check one)?  
  Longitudinal barrier or transition  
 Terminal or crash cushion  
  Breakaway support or work zone traffic control device  
 Truck-mounted attenuator  
 Other hardware:  ______________________________________________________ 
 
10. What test guidelines were used to perform the full-scale crash test (check one)? 
NCHRP Report No. 350 
 MASH 
 EN1317 
 Other: _______________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Indicate the test level and number being evaluated (fill in the blank).  ___3-10_ __ 
 
12. Indicate the vehicle type appropriate for the test level and number indicated in item 3 
according to the testing guidelines indicated in item 2. 
 
NCHRP Report No. 350/MASH 
 700C   820C   1100C 
 2000P   2270P   






Car (900 kg)   Car (1300 kg)   Car (1500 kg) 
 Rigid HGV (10 ton)  Rigid HGV (16 ton)   
 Rigid HGV (30 ton) 
 Bus (13 ton)   
 Articulated HGV (38 ton)   
December 5, 2012  
MwRSF Report No. TRP-03-274-12 
202 
PART II: ANALYSIS SOLUTION VERIFICATION 
 
Using the results of the analysis solution, fill in the values for Table G-1.  These values 
are indications of whether the analysis solution produced a numerically stable result and do not 
necessarily mean that the result is a good comparison to the known solution.  The purpose of this 
table is to ensure that the numerical solution produces results that are numerically stable and 
conform to the conservation laws (e.g., energy, mass and momentum).   
Table G-1. Analysis Solution Verification Table 
Verification Evaluation Criteria Change(%) Pass? 
Total energy of the analysis solution (i.e., kinetic, potential, contact, etc.)  
must not vary more than 10 percent from the beginning of the run to the end  
of the run. 
1.96 Yes 
Hourglass Energy of the analysis solution at the end of the run is less than  
five percent of the total initial energy at the beginning of the run. 0 Yes 
Hourglass Energy of the analysis solution at the end of the run is less than  
ten percent of the total internal energy at the end of the run. 0 Yes 
The part/material with the highest amount of hourglass energy at the end of  
the run is less than ten percent of the total internal energy of the part/material 
at the end of the run. 
4.3 Yes 
Mass added to the total model is less than five percent of the total model mass at the 
beginning of the run. 0.3 Yes 
The part/material with the most mass added had less than 10 percent of its initial mass 
added. 0.9 Yes 
The moving parts/materials in the model have less than five percent of mass added to 
the initial moving mass of the model. 0.3 Yes 
There are no shooting nodes in the solution? Yes Yes 
There are no solid elements with negative volumes? Yes Yes 
 
The Analysis Solution (check one)  passes   does NOT pass all the criteria in Table E1-1  
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PART III: TIME HISTORY EVALUATION TABLE 
 
Table G-2. Roadside Safety Validation Metrics Rating Table – Time History Comparisons 
(single channel option) 
Evaluation Criteria  
Time interval  
[0 sec; 0.43 sec] 
O Sprague-Geers Metrics 
List all the data channels being compared.  Calculate the M and P metrics 
using RSVVP and enter the results.  Values less than or equal to 40 are 
acceptable. 
 
RSVVP Curve Preprocessing Options 













X acceleration CFC 180 Min. Area of Residuals Y N Y N 31.2 38.8 Yes 
Y acceleration CFC 180 Min. Area of Residuals Y N Y N 36.9 25.6 Yes 
Z acceleration CFC 180 Min. Area of Residuals Y N Y N 33.2 46 No 
Roll rate  CFC 180 Min. Area of Residuals Y N Y N 3.5 39.5 Yes 
Pitch rate  CFC 180 Min. Area of Residuals Y N Y N 20.1 42.8 No 
Yaw rate  CFC 180 Min. Area of Residuals Y N Y N 12.9 10.8 Yes 
P ANOVA Metrics 
List all the data channels being compared.  Calculate the ANOVA metrics 
using RSVVP and enter the results.  Both of the following criteria must be 
met: 
 The mean residual error must be less than five percent of the peak 
acceleration ( Peakae  05.0 ) and 
 The standard deviation of the residuals must be less than 35 



























     X acceleration/Peak 0.003 0.20 Yes 
     Y acceleration/Peak 0.07 0.28 No 
     Z acceleration/Peak 0.07 0.32 No 
     Roll rate  0.06 0.40 No 
     Pitch rate  0.06 0.31 No 
     Yaw rate  0.12 0.11 No 
The Analysis Solution (check one)  passes    does NOT pass all the criteria in Table G-2. 
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Table G-3. Roadside Safety Validation Metrics Rating Table – Time History Comparisons 
(multi-channel option) 
Evaluation Criteria (time interval [0 sec; 0.43 sec]) 
Channels (Select which were used) 
  X Acceleration   Y Acceleration  Z Acceleration 
  Roll rate   Pitch rate   Yaw rate 
Multi-Channel Weights 
 
  Area II method 
  Inertial method 
 
X Channel: 0.109794 
Y Channel: 0.290212 
Z Channel: 0.099994 
Yaw Channel: 0.381478 
Roll Channel: 0.088161 
Pitch Channel: 0.030361 
O   Sprague-Geer Metrics   Values less or equal to 40 are acceptable. M P Pass? 
23.3 25.2 Yes 
P 
ANOVA Metrics 
Both of the following criteria must be met: 
 The mean residual error must be less than five percent of the 
peak acceleration   
( Peakae  05.0 ) 
 The standard deviation of the residuals must be less than 35 
























0.05 0.22 Yes 
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PART IV: PHENOMENA IMPORTANCE RANKING TABLE 
Table G-4. Evaluation Criteria Test Applicability Table 
Evaluation 




Test article should contain and redirect the vehicle; the vehicle 
should not penetrate, under-ride, or override the installation 
although controlled lateral deflection of the test article is 
acceptable.  
10, 11, 12, 20, 21, 22, 35, 36, 
37, 38 
B The test article should readily activate in a predictable manner by breaking away, fracturing or yielding.  60, 61, 70, 71, 80, 81 
C Acceptable test article performance may be by redirection, controlled penetration or controlled stopping of the vehicle.  
30, 31,, 32, 33, 34, 39, 40, 41, 




Detached elements, fragments or other debris from the test article 
should not penetrate or show potential for penetrating the occupant 
compartment, or present an undue hazard to other traffic, 
pedestrians or personnel in a work zone.  
All 
E 
Detached elements, fragments or other debris from the test article, 
or vehicular damage should not block the driver’s vision or 
otherwise cause the driver to lose control of the vehicle. (Answer 
Yes or No) 
70, 71 
F  The vehicle should remain upright during and after the collision although moderate roll, pitching and yawing are acceptable.  
All except those listed in 
criterion G 
  G It is preferable, although not essential, that the vehicle remain upright during and after collision.  
12, 22 (for test level 1 – 30, 
31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 
39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44) 
H 
Occupant impact velocities should satisfy the following: 
Occupant Impact Velocity Limits (m/s) 
Component Preferred Maximum 
10, 20, 30,31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 
40, 41, 42, 43, 50, 51, 52, 53, 
80, 81 Longitudinal and 
Lateral 9 12 
Longitudinal 3 5 60, 61, 70, 71 
I 
Occupant ridedown accelerations should satisfy the following: 
Occupant Ridedown Acceleration Limits (g’s) 
Component Preferred Maximum 
10, 20, 30,31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 
40, 41, 42, 43, 50, 51, 52, 53, 
60, 61, 70, 71, 80, 81 Longitudinal and 




The occupant impact velocity in the longitudinal direction should 
not exceed 40 ft/sec and the occupant ride-down acceleration in 
the longitudinal direction should not exceed 20 G’s. 
11,21, 35, 37, 38, 39 
M 
The exit angle from the test article preferable should be less than 
60 percent of test impact angle, measured at the time of vehicle 
loss of contact with test device. 
10, 11, 12, 20, 21, 22, 35, 36, 
37, 38, 39 
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Test article should contain and redirect the vehicle; the 
vehicle should not penetrate, under-ride, or override the 
installation although controlled lateral deflection of the 
test article is acceptable. (Answer Yes or No) 
Yes Yes  Yes 
A2 
Maximum dynamic deflection: 
- Relative difference is less than 20 percent or 
- Absolute difference is less than 0.15 m 
0.635 m 0.509 m 19.8% 0.126 m Yes 
A3 
Length of vehicle-barrier contact: 
- Relative difference is less than 20 percent or 
- Absolute difference is less than 2 m 
372 ms 300 ms 19.4% Yes 
A4 Number of broken or significantly bent posts is less than 20 percent. 2 2 0% Yes 
A5 Did the rail element rupture or tear (Answer Yes or No) No No  Yes 
A6 Were there failures of connector elements (Answer Yes orNo). No No  Yes 
A7 Was there significant snagging between the vehicle wheels and barrier elements (Answer Yes or No). No No  Yes 
A8 Was there significant snagging between vehicle body components and barrier elements (Answer Yes or No). No No  Yes 
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Table G-5. (b) Roadside Safety Phenomena Importance Ranking Table (Occupant Risk) 
















Detached elements, fragments or other debris from the test 
article should not penetrate or show potential for 
penetrating the occupant compartment, or present an 
undue hazard to other traffic, pedestrians or personnel in a 
work zone. (Answer Pass or Fail) 
Pass Pass  Yes 
F 
F1 
The vehicle should remain upright during and after the 
collision although moderate roll, pitching and yawing are 
acceptable. (Answer Pass or Fail) 
Pass Pass  Yes 
F2 
Maximum roll of the vehicle: 
- Relative difference is less than 20 percent or 
- Absolute difference is less than 5 degrees. 
11.3° 6.93° 38.7% 4.37° Yes 
F3 
Maximum pitch of the vehicle is: 
- Relative difference is less than 20 percent or 
- Absolute difference is less than 5 degrees. 
3.2° 2.23° 30.3% 0.97° Yes 
F4 
Maximum yaw of the vehicle is: 
- Relative difference is less than 20 percent or 
- Absolute difference is less than 5 degrees. 




Occupant impact velocities: 
- Relative difference is less than 20 percent or 
- Absolute difference is less than 2 m/s.     
 Longitudinal OIV (m/s) 3.75 3.23 13.9% 0.52 m/s Yes 
 Lateral OIV (m/s) 5.31 6.99 31.6%  1.68 m/s Yes 
 THIV (m/s) 5.93 4.62 22.1% 1.31 m/s Yes 
L2 
Occupant accelerations: 
- Relative difference is less than 20 percent or 
- Absolute difference is less than 4 g’s. 
    
 Longitudinal ORA 4.03 4.81 0.78 g Yes 
 Lateral ORA 9.65 7.61 2.04 g Yes 
 PHD 9.68 12.56 2.88 g Yes 
 ASI *N.R. 1.69   
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Table G-5. (c) Roadside Safety Phenomena Importance Ranking Table (Vehicle Trajectory) 



















The exit angle from the test article preferable  
should be less than 60 percent of test impact  
angle, measured at the time of vehicle loss of 




62%  Yes 
M2 
Exit angle at loss of contact: 
- Relative difference is less than 20 percent or 
- Absolute difference is less than 5 degrees. 
8.23° 12.4° 51% 4.2° Yes 
M3 
Exit velocity at loss of contact: 
- Relative difference is less than 20 percent or 






2.2 km/h Yes 
M4 One or more vehicle tires failed or de-beaded  during the collision event (Answer Yes or No). Yes N.M.*   
*N.R. - Not Reported  *N.M. - Not Modeled   
The Analysis Solution (check one)  passes    does NOT pass all the criteria in Tables G-5a 
through G-5c  with exceptions as noted  without exceptions. 
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(a)      (b) 
Figure G-1. X-Channel (a) acceleration-time history data used to compute metrics and (b) 
integration of acceleration-time history data 
 
 (a)      (b) 
Figure G-2. Y-Channel (a) acceleration-time history data used to compute metrics and (b) 
integration of acceleration-time history data 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure G-3. Z-Channel (a) acceleration-time history data used to compute metrics and (b) 
integration of acceleration-time history data 
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(a)      (b) 
Figure G-4. Roll Channel (a) angular rate-time history data used to compute metrics and (b) 
integration of angular rate-time history data 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure G-5. Pitch Channel (a) angular rate-time history data used to compute metrics and (b) 
integration of angular rate-time history data 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure G-6. Yaw Channel (a) angular rate-time history data used to compute metrics and (b) 
integration of angular rate-time history data 
 
December 5, 2012  






















END OF DOCUMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
